- Phenomenological method: reflection, introspection, and skepticism
- Transcendental phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning
- Respecting appearances: a phenomenological approach to consciousness
- On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology
- The phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject
- Intentionality without representationalism
- Perception, context, and direct realism
- Colours and sounds: the field of visual and auditory consciousness
- Bodily intentionality, affectivity, and basic affects
- Thought in action
- Sex, gender, and embodiment
- At the edges of my body
- Action and selfhood: a narrative interpretation
- Self-consciousness and World-consciousness
- Self, consciousness, and shame
- The (many) foundations of knowledge
- The phenomenological foundations of predicative structure
- Language and non-linguistic thinking
- Sharing in truth: phenomenology of epistemic commonality
- Responsive ethics
- Towards a phenomenology of the political world
- Other people
- Experience and history
- The forgiveness of time and consciousness
- Hermeneutical phenomenology
- Something that is nothing but can be anything: the image and our consciousness of it
- Phenomenological and aesthetic epoché: painting the invisible things themselves
- Evidence in the phenomenology of religious experience
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter addresses the issues that motivate representationalist accounts, and it describes the different versions of representationalism as responses to these issues. It argues that the representationalist views do not adequately respond to the epistemological problems that motivate them and that they engender some ontological problems. The chapter presents an alternative ‘presentationalist’ account that preserves the straightforward sense of the mind's openness to the world. While representationalism and presentationalism agree that the relation between mental events or states is direct but mediated, they radically differ in their views of the nature of the mediation involved in the mind's intentional directedness to the world. This difference and the preferability of the presentationalist account are explored.
John J. Drummond is Robert Southwell, S.J. Distinguished Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University. He received his PhD from Georgetown University, and he is the author of Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object, as well as Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy. He has edited or co-edited five collections of articles on themes in phenomenology, and he has published numerous articles on phenomenology in collections and in journals such as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Husserl Studies, New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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