- Phenomenological method: reflection, introspection, and skepticism
- Transcendental phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning
- Respecting appearances: a phenomenological approach to consciousness
- On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology
- The phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject
- Intentionality without representationalism
- Perception, context, and direct realism
- Colours and sounds: the field of visual and auditory consciousness
- Bodily intentionality, affectivity, and basic affects
- Thought in action
- Sex, gender, and embodiment
- At the edges of my body
- Action and selfhood: a narrative interpretation
- Self-consciousness and World-consciousness
- Self, consciousness, and shame
- The (many) foundations of knowledge
- The phenomenological foundations of predicative structure
- Language and non-linguistic thinking
- Sharing in truth: phenomenology of epistemic commonality
- Responsive ethics
- Towards a phenomenology of the political world
- Other people
- Experience and history
- The forgiveness of time and consciousness
- Hermeneutical phenomenology
- Something that is nothing but can be anything: the image and our consciousness of it
- Phenomenological and aesthetic <i>epoché</i>: painting the invisible things themselves
- Evidence in the phenomenology of religious experience
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understanding the consensus is insufficient as whatever proposition people rationally and openly accept in conversation. It is suggested that joint (epistemic) attitudes are irreducible, relational, and pre-reflective, and that such attitudes are joint, in the respect that the participants are aware of themselves as a ‘we’. Highly inferential beliefs need some form of communication, and are probably really some form of joint commitment.
Hans Bernhard Schmid is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. He received his PhD (1998) and Habilitation (2005) from the University of Basel. He is currently working on a project dealing with the metaphysics of the social world. He is the author of Subjekt, System, Diskurs: Edmund Husserls Begriff transzendentaler Subjektivität in sozialtheoretischen Bezügen (2000), Wir-Intentionalität: Kritik des ontologischen Individualismus und Rekonstruktion der Gemeinschaft (2005), Plural Action (2009), and Moralische Integrität: Kritik eines Konstrukts (2011).
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