- Phenomenological method: reflection, introspection, and skepticism
- Transcendental phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning
- Respecting appearances: a phenomenological approach to consciousness
- On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology
- The phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject
- Intentionality without representationalism
- Perception, context, and direct realism
- Colours and sounds: the field of visual and auditory consciousness
- Bodily intentionality, affectivity, and basic affects
- Thought in action
- Sex, gender, and embodiment
- At the edges of my body
- Action and selfhood: a narrative interpretation
- Self-consciousness and World-consciousness
- Self, consciousness, and shame
- The (many) foundations of knowledge
- The phenomenological foundations of predicative structure
- Language and non-linguistic thinking
- Sharing in truth: phenomenology of epistemic commonality
- Responsive ethics
- Towards a phenomenology of the political world
- Other people
- Experience and history
- The forgiveness of time and consciousness
- Hermeneutical phenomenology
- Something that is nothing but can be anything: the image and our consciousness of it
- Phenomenological and aesthetic epoché: painting the invisible things themselves
- Evidence in the phenomenology of religious experience
Abstract and Keywords
What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-ideal, and a capacity for critical self-assessment, or does it rather, as some have suggested, point to the fact that the self is in part socially constructed? Should shame primarily be classified as a self-conscious emotion, is it rather a distinct social emotion, or might this forced alternative be misguided? In the chapter, I contrast certain prevalent cognitivist accounts of shame with different proposals that can be found in the phenomenological tradition and ultimately argue that prototypical forms of shame provide vivid examples of other-mediated forms of self-experience.
Dan Zahavi, Danish National Research Foundation, Center for Subjectivity Research, and Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen.
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