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date: 17 February 2020

(p. xxi) List of Figures

(p. xxi) List of Figures

  1. 1.1 Percentage of lower court nominations not confirmed by the Senate 1933–2012 4

  2. 1.2A Average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation on the federal courts of appeals, 1981–January 13, 2013 5

  3. 1.2B Average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation on the U.S. district courts, 1981–January 13, 2013 6

  4. 1.3A Minorities and women on the courts of appeals, percentage of total judges appointed by president, January 1977–May 2014 20

  5. 1.3B Minority and female appointees to the U.S. district courts, January 1977–May 2014 21

  6. 3.1 Confidence in state courts, by state 61

  7. 4.1 When federal judges end active status relative to pension qualification 84

  8. 4.2 Federal judicial salaries, inflation adjusted, 2014 dollars 91

  9. 4.3 Federal judicial caseload, terminated by year-end 92

  10. 4.4 Number of authorized federal judges 93

  11. 13.1 Spatial representation SOP model 256

  12. 16.1 Distribution of ideal points by party, 98th Senate 313

  13. 16.2 Partisan polarization and ideology of the justices, 1994 term 313

  14. 16.3 Distribution of ideal points by party, 107th Senate 314

  15. 16.4 Partisan polarization and ideology of the justices, 2010 term 315

  16. 23.1 Approval of the Supreme Court, Congress, and president 435

  17. 23.2 Ideological evaluations of the Supreme Court 436

  18. 23.3 Proportion of GSS respondents expressing a “great deal” of confidence in each branch of government 438

  19. 26.1 Votes in all non-unanimous cases for the 1941–53 terms 510

  20. 26.2 Illustration of probability (probit) model for judicial votes in three cases 511

  21. 26.3 Illustration of Bayesian updating with judicial votes from the 1941 term 513

  22. 26.4 Static (median) ideal point estimates with 95 percent credible intervals for the 1941–53 terms 522

  23. (p. xxii) 26.5 Median dynamic ideal points for all justices, with separate pre- and post-Nuremberg trends for Jackson 523

  24. 26.6 Median post-Nuremburg shift for subsets of cases and all cases, 1941–53 525

  25. 26.7 Static ideal points in First Amendment cases, 1941–53 525

  26. 26.8 Ideal point estimates for economic regulation cases and civil liberties cases 527

  27. 26.9 Divergent inferences about Nuremberg’s effect on Jackson’s due process views 528