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date: 19 October 2019

(p. 911) Subject Index

(p. 911) Subject Index

accountability, and elections142, 674–6
administrative agencies, and presidential creation of802
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)793
advertising:
and campaign spending153–4
soft money221, 222
and campaign strategy184
and congressional election campaigns172
and electoral connection142, 143
and issue‐advocacy advertisements221
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)634
advocacy coalitions634
agency theory:
and congressional delegation to executive791–2
political transaction costs795–8
and congressional dominance793–4
and presidential dominance:
ex ante politics of delegation799–803
ex post politics of delegation803–7
agenda‐setting:
and descriptive representation252
and House Rules Committee721, 723–4
aggregate voting, and dyadic representation308–10
Agriculture Committee, House, and Jones' study of399
American Community Survey (ACS)202
American Conservative Union69
American Enterprise Institute486
American Medical Association565
American National Election Studies356
American political development (APD):
and development of120
and historical approaches to study of Congress116–17, 120
growth in scholarship122–4
labor movement125
legislative productivity125
Mayhew's America's Congress122
particular historical episodes125
political representation126
southern politics125–6
and neglect of Congress116–17, 120–1
and place of Congress within126–8
suggestions for128–31
American Political Science Association (APSA):
and Congressional Fellowship Program15–16, 862
and congressional reform477, 479, 538–9
and Study of Congress Project15, 16, 479, 862
Americans for Democratic Action69
American Society for the Study of Comparative Legislation642
Anti‐Deficiency Act504
Appropriations Committee, House:
and 19th century development of720–1
and budget resolutions509
and congressional budget process503
and creation of719, 720
and Fenno's study of398–9
and power of504
and recentralization of control (1920)725–7
and spending advocacy515
and spending restraint515
Appropriations Committee, Senate:
and budget resolutions509
and creation of719, 720
and Fenno's study of398–9
and recentralization of control (1920)726–7
approval ratings, see evaluations of Congress
Australian ballot669
authorizations503–4
automobile insurance reform, and deliberation564–5
ballot structure and voting procedure668–70
bargaining:
and baseline closed‐rule model42–4
and formal modeling42–4
behavioral study of Congress11–12, 31–2, 867, 870
and congressional committees13, 17–20
and factors favoring growth of15–16
(p. 912)
and historical research:
disdain for17, 23
increased role of24–5
and House of Representatives25–6
and House‐Senate relations27–8
and inclusive approach of16
and institutional change23–5
and integrative approach15
and interviews13
and origins of12–13
and participant observation13
and party leaders13, 20–3
and Peabody's analysis of12–17
and political parties13, 20–3
and qualitative approaches13–14
and quantitative approaches14–15
and reliance on NOMINATE data28–30
and roll‐call behavior14–15
and Senate26–8
and theory development16–17
bicameral representation272–3
as check on power272
and future research287–8
and implications of two chambers275–9
bicameral negotiations277–8
budget deficits278–9
difficulties in legislating275
experimental approaches277
obstacle to national policymaking275–7
power relationships277–8
and institutional differences276
and pork barrel politics331–2
and representational differences279–80
House of Representatives280, 661
ideological representation284–5
impact on policy outcomes280–2
interest representation282–3
partisan representation284
representational relationships285–7
Senate279–80, 661–2
and theories of bicameralism273–5
founding era273–4
modern theory274–5
nineteenth century practice274
policy stability274–5
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) (2002)222–3
Brigham Young University (BYU), and Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (CSED)221
Brookings Institution486
Budget and Accounting Act (1921)505, 725, 801, 804
Budget Committee, House508
Budget Committee, Senate508
budget deficits500
and bicameralism278–9
Budget Enforcement Act (1990)502, 512–13
budget process, congressional:
and accretion of procedures502–3
and appropriations500, 503–4
budget resolutions509
duration of504
government shutdowns504
quasi‐adversarial nature504
and budget resolutions499, 508–9
appropriations509
contents of508
implementation508–9
as collection of tools500
and complexity of498, 500–1
and conflicting aims501, 502
and Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (1974)442, 498, 502, 506–9
budget resolutions499, 508–9
impact on behavior516
impetus for506–7
purpose of509
waivers509
and definition of498
and entitlements500
growth in spending506, 507
and government budget policy499
and incremental decision‐making517–19
and macro‐budgeting501–2
and micro‐budgeting501–2
and outcome‐oriented reforms511–14
Budget Enforcement Act (1990)502, 512–13
Gramm‐Rudman‐Hollings law511–12
and piecemeal adoption of budget500
and policy outcomes517
and pre‐1974 structure505–6
and president's budget499, 505, 804–5
and procedure as constraint on behavior514–17
and Program Assessment Rating Tool519
and reconciliation process510–11
impact on balance of power511
Senate442–4, 510–11
two‐stage process510
and research interest in519
and revenues500, 504–5
tax expenditures504–5
as servant of congressional majority500
and significance of498–9
and variations in499–500
bureaucracy:
and formal modeling of Congress's interactions with46
early formal work46–7
lessons learned52–3
(p. 913)
overcoming obstacles49–52
questions and concerns47–9
and presidential appointees803–4
Bureau of the Budget (BOB)801
Byrd Rule442–3, 444, 511
campaign finance and spending152–5, 215–16
and character of donors223–6
candidate‐donor relationship224
expansion of small‐donor base225
individuals223–4
interest groups225
motivations224
political action committees225
political parties225
self‐financed candidates225–6
solicitations from individuals224
and corporate spending232–3
and differences from presidential campaign finance system216–18
and effects of152–4
and effects on Congress216
and future research154–5, 160, 233–4
donor behavior233
fundraising culture234
local context234
party vs candidate funding234
public vs private funding233
socially motivated donors234
and impact of 1994 mid‐term elections218–19, 220
and impact on nature of candidates226
and implications of campaign money229–32
influence on member behavior229–30
leadership PACs231
party unity in Congress230
raising money for others230–2
and misleading media coverage of218
and political action committees218
and political advertising153–4
and political parties218–20, 222–3
and public perceptions of218
and regulation of:
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002)222–3
coordinated expenditures219
differences from presidential system216–18
donation limits223
political parties219–20
resistance to public funding217, 218
and research questions215
and soft money220–3
candidate's lack of control over222
concentration of221–2
matching of candidate expenditures222
reform of222–3
spending on campaign communications222
and uses of campaign funds226
campaign expenses227–8
deterrent to challengers154, 176, 226–7
non‐campaign expenditures229
signalling effects226–7
transfer to other campaigns229
Campaign Finance Institute (CFI)221, 222, 225
campaigns, see election campaigns
candidate competition and elections149–52
and candidate characteristics676–8
and candidate quality151
and challenger emergence149–50, 175–6
strategic behavior149–50, 151, 175
and challenger quality174–5
and future research151–2
and motivations of weak candidates150
Cannon revolt400, 697–8, 724, 757, 770–1
Carnegie Corporation479
cartel theory622, 883
and legislative productivity652–3
and models of congressional organization411–12
and negative agenda power589
and party leadership377, 380–1
Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance325
Center for Responsive Politics228
Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW)324, 325
Civil Aeronautics Board454
Civil Rights Act (1964)777
civil rights movement776–7, 780
Civil Service Reform Act (1980)803
class:
and New Deal Democratic coalition771, 772
and party alignment769–70, 777
coalitions in Congress618–19
and barriers to entry620
and context634
and definition of618
and enduring multi‐issue coalitions:
Conservative Coalition624–7
ideological coalitions624–7
political parties621–4
and enduring single‐issue coalitions:
advocacy coalitions634
policy subsystems632–5
and formal modeling40–2, 45–6
and formation of619
and forms of619
and future research635–7
coalition size636
contribution of other fields635
(p. 914)
distributive politics636
dynamics of coalition formation635–6
policy perspective636
and interconnected nature of634
and reasons for collective action619–20
and size of pork barrel coalitions332–5
and transitory multi‐issue coalitions, distributive politics627–9
and transitory single‐issue coalitions:
coalition building strategies631–2
entrepreneurial politics629–32
and typology of620
and ubiquity of619
collective action problem871
collective representation, and distinction from dyadic representation294–5
Communications Act (1934)839
Compensation Act (1816)674
Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act (1995)840
conditional party government21, 53, 410
and ideological power balance theory744
and motion to recommit746
and partisan polarization531, 537, 546
and party leadership374–5, 381–4
and seniority system729, 733
Confederate States of America766
conference committees277–8, 540
confirmation process804
and filibusters435–6
and lower court nominees841–4
and partisan polarization541–2
and supermajoritarian Senate433–7
and Supreme Court nominees844–5
Congress, US:
and centrality in system of government3
and change in demographic composition241–2
and influence of3
Congressional Black Caucus245
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (1974, BICA)442, 498, 502, 506–9
and appropriations509
and budget resolutions499, 508–9
and impact on congressional behavior516
and impetus for506–7
and purpose of509
Congressional Budget Office508
congressional committees:
and appointments to318–19
historical development of process721–3
and behavioral research13, 17–20
and bicameral negotiations277–8
and changes in18–19, 401
and changes in scholarship on396–7
and conference committees277–8, 540
and creation of standing committees719, 720
and decline in interest in19
and decline in power of chairs401
and deliberation561
and foundational works on397–401
context of397–8
Fenno on Appropriation Committees398–9
Jones on House Agricultural Committee399
Manley on House Ways and Means Committee399–400
and future research415–20
assignment process416–17
committee leadership418–19
committee roll calls418
decision‐making419–20
legislative organization419
member participation417
preference formation419–20
and gatekeeping747–8
and historical development of712–13
origins of standing committees (1790s–1820s)713–18
committee‐party relationship (1820s–1910s)721–3
expansion of system (1820s–1910s)718–24
House Rules Committee as agenda‐setting body (1880s–90s)723–4
consolidation of (20th century)725–8
Legislative Reorganization Act (1946)727–8
emergence of seniority system (20 th century)728–9
post‐1946 period732–4
and investigative role730–2
and member goals18
and models of congressional organization406
adjudicating between412–15
cartel theory411–12
conditional party government410
distributive model406–8
informational model408–10
partisan model410–12
and national security820–1
and New Deal Democratic coalition772–4
and partisan polarization397–8, 540–1
and political parties, relationship between721–3, 734
and pork barrel politics317
bipartisan distribution328–9
committee benefit hypothesis318–20
measuring demand for distributive benefits320–3
partisan distribution329–31
patterns of allocation of benefits326–8
and rational choice perspective401–6
assignment process404–6
(p. 915)
environmental constraints402, 404
Fenno's Congressmen in Committees401–3
members' goals402
Shepsle's The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle405–6
Smith and Deering's Committees in Congress404
strategic premise403
and reform of House committees403–4
and seniority system400
challenge to733
evolution of728–9
and subcommittee government403–4
and textbook congress725, 732, 774, 862
and variations across18
congressional dominance793–4
congressional government, and Wilson's idea of875–7
congressional organization models:
and adjudicating between412–15
and distributive model406–8
and informational model408–10
and partisan model410–12
cartel theory411–12
conditional party government410
Conservative Coalition624–7, 701, 774–5
Constitution, US:
and congressional war powers815–19, 827
constitutional interpretation835–7
Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES)161, 350, 351
cooperative game theory38
credit claiming, and electoral connection142–3
critical mass theory, and descriptive representation:
and institutional power in Congress260–1
and legislative behavior258–60
deficit reduction:
and Budget Enforcement Act (1990)512–13
and compromise agreements519–20
and Gramm‐Rudman‐Hollings law511–12
and loss of interest in513–14
and reconciliation process510–11
delegation, congressional, and the presidency790–1, 807–8
and agency theory791–2
and congressional dominance793–4
and future research808
and political transaction costs795–8
and presidential dominance798, 807–8
ex ante politics of delegation799–803
ex post politics of delegation803–7
and separation of powers792
and war powers815, 821–2
attempts to constrain822–3
deliberation:
and approaches to:
contemporary members552
Framers of the Constitution552
pluralism553
rational choice theory553
and challenges in research on551
and cross‐national comparisons559–60
and decision‐making failures550–1
causes of551
and deliberative democracy558–60
and formal approaches60
and future research567–9
conceptual clarity567–8
observation and measurement568–9
partisanship569
theory569
and growth in scholarship on551, 554–5, 566–7
Bessette554–5
Maass554
and institutional structure560–3
and policymaking563–6
and rational choice theory553
games of incomplete information555–8
political‐talk models556, 557–8
signaling games556–7
and scholarly neglect of550, 553
deliberative democracy558–60
descriptive representation:
and benefits of243–4
and concerns over243, 244
and constituent‐representative link244–6
surrogate representation245
and critical mass theory:
institutional power in Congress260–1
legislative behavior258–60
and diversity within minority groups262
and dyadic representation307–8
and essentialism244
and future research263–4
and impact on constituent views245–6
and impact on legislative behavior264
and institutional norms257–8
and integration of women and minorities264–5
and intersectionality262
African American women262–3
Latina women263
minority women263
and leadership styles261–2
and majority‐minority districts248–9
and population changes265
and substantive representation of group interests242, 243–4, 246–7 (p. 916)
African‐Americans245, 247, 248–9, 252–3, 254
agenda‐setting252
defining group interests246–7
institutional and partisan dynamics255–7
issue prioritization251–2
Latinos245, 247, 250, 253, 254
legislative behavior248–51
legislative processes251–4
majority‐minority districts248–9
policy impact246
relative group representation247
vigorous advocacy of group interests254–5
dialogue, and election campaigns183
discourse ethics, and deliberation558, 560
distributive model of congressional organization406–8
distributive politics:
and definition of distributive policies627
and formal modeling40–1
baseline closed‐rule model42–4
lessons learned45–6
overcoming obstacles42–5
questions and concerns41–2
and representation basis of Congress280–2
and transitory multi‐issue coalitions627–9 see also pork barrel politics
divided government:
and legislative productivity643–4, 649–50
legislative significance646–7
legislative successes and failures647–8
party cartel theory652–3
pivotal politics651–2
public mood650
and Mayhew's Divided We Govern644–5
responses to645–8
dyadic representation:
and aggregation308–10
and congressional elections297
incumbency advantage297–8
magnitude of candidate/party voting298–9
officeholder effect299–300
selection effect299
split‐ticket voting297, 298
and descriptive representation307–8
and distinction from collective representation294–5
and electoral connection294
and electoral motivation295
and importance of297
and meaning of293
and micro connection301–3
and nature of293–4
and partisan polarization544
and presidential‐congressional government structure296
and representative‐constituent relationship295–6, 301–3
personal characteristics of candidate307–8
personal vote306–7
policy congruence301–2, 303–6
spatial model of voting301
structure of301
and single‐member districts296 see also electoral connection
earmarks, and pork barrel politics323, 324–5
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (2001)444
election campaigns, congressional:
and advertising strategy184
and campaign agendas180–2
and candidate‐centered thesis219
and candidate emergence175–6
and candidate interaction:
dialogue183–4
negativity184–5
websites184
and centrality of169
and challenger emergence175
strategic behavior175
and challenger quality174–5
and differences from presidential campaigns172–3
and dyadic nature of182
and effects on outcomes172–3
and electoral connection173
and evaluations of Congress362–3
and future research161, 185–7
candidate behavior across time186
candidate behavior in primaries185–6
innovation in campaign communications680
interest groups186
link with policymaking186–7
and issue selection180–2
candidate background182
gender influences182
partisan issue ownership181–2
and links with policymaking173–4, 176, 186–7
and position‐taking177–80
ambiguity179
avoidance of179
issue salience178–9
median voter theory177–8
and professionalization of220
and relative scholarly neglect of169, 170
focus on elections170–2
focus on presidential campaigns172–3
and value of research on169–70 (p. 917) see also campaign finance and spending; elections
Election Law Journal221
elections, congressional:
and accountability142
and aggregate seat change155
mid‐term losses155–6
and candidate competition149–52
candidate quality151
challenger emergence149–50, 175–6
challenger quality174–5
future research151–2
motivations of weak candidates150
strategic behavior149–50, 151, 175
and dyadic representation297
incumbency advantage297–8
magnitude of candidate/party voting298–9
officeholder effect299–300
selection effect299
split‐ticket voting297, 298
and electoral connection170, 173
advertising142, 143
credit claiming142–3
House‐centric nature of research144
limitations of research inspired by143–4
position taking143
and evolution of scholarship on662–7
historical elections666–7
House‐centric nature of144, 662–3
incumbency advantage663–4
partisan factors663
party cohesion664, 665–6
quantitative analysis662
rational choice theory663
Senate elections664–5
and formal approaches59
and future research157–62, 678
campaign spending154–5, 160
candidate competition151–2
candidate emergence679
candidate quality160
cross‐chamber focus160–1
election campaigns161
expanding time period covered157–9
innovation in campaign communications680
interaction of congressional actions, campaigns and outcomes159–60
legislator‐constituency linkages161–2
political parties679
primary elections159
redistricting679–80
social movements679
sources and utilization of money160
turnout161
voter behavior161
and historical study of666–7
accountability674–6
ballot structure and voting procedure668–70
election of senators669–70
gerrymandering667–8, 669
impact of geographical boundaries667–8
participation and representation676–8
party control of nomination and election process670–4
and incumbency advantage144–8
decline in uncontested elections148
doubts over growth of148
explanations of144–5
historical elections158–9
measurement of145
personal vote146–7, 306–7
quality effect145–6
reasons for continued research on147–8
redistricting146, 147–8
strategic entry and exit decisions146
and mid‐term losses:
exposure thesis156
referenda theory156
surge and decline theory155–6
and progress in research on141
and re‐election motivation of Congress members142, 881–2
and salience of359
and Senate elections, impact of direct election144 see also campaign finance and spending; election campaigns
electoral connection170, 173
and advertising142, 143
and credit claiming142–3
and dyadic representation294
and House‐centric nature of research on144
and limitations of research inspired by143–4
and pork barrel politics316–17
and position‐taking143
and roll‐call votes578 see also dyadic representation
entrepreneurial politics:
and coalition building strategies631–2
and definition of legislative entrepreneur630
and transitory single‐issue coalitions629–32
environmental issues, and deliberation563–4
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)563–4, 839
essentialism, and descriptive representation244
European Parliament751
evaluations of Congress364–5
and changes over time356–8
volatility356
(p. 918)
and comparison with other government institutions359–61
presidential approval359–60
reasons for differences in360–1
Supreme Court360
and comparison with other legislatures361–2
international361–2
states361
and consequences of362–3
citizen participation363
election campaign strategies362–3
and factors affecting:
economic conditions356–7
individual‐level factors358
non‐policy factors357
party affiliation357
and future research365
and improving approval levels363–4
and individual members of Congress358–9
and low approval ratings355
and partisan polarization545
and scholars' duty871–2
evolutionary game models757
Executive Office of the President (EOP)790, 801
executive orders805
experts, and role in decision‐making565
Federal Assistance Awards Data System (FAADS)325
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)454
Federal Election Commission (FEC)217
Federal Elections Campaign Act (1970)217, 662
Federal Trade Commission793
Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)794
filibusters:
and behavioral research27
and confirmation of judicial nominees435–6, 842
and filibuster pivots432–4
and obstruction in Senate428–9
and silent filibusters429
and supermajoritarian Senate431–2
folkways26, 96, 880
foreign‐policy issues:
and Congress's diminished role820–1
and deliberation564
formal study of Congress36–7, 58–9, 883–5
and coalition formation40–1
lessons learned45–6
overcoming obstacles42–5
questions and concerns41–2
and Congress's relations with external actors46
and Congress's relations with the bureaucracy
early formal work46–7
lessons learned52–3
overcoming obstacles49–52
questions and concerns47–9
and distributive politics40–1
baseline closed‐rule model42–4
lessons learned45–6
overcoming obstacles42–5
questions and concerns41–2
and formal models37–9
actors37
decision criteria38
definition of37
game theory38
outcomes38
preferences38
structure37
and future research:
capacity and ability of members59
Congress and private sector60–1
congressional development60
deliberation60
elections59
separation of powers61
and historical development of formal approaches40
and internal workings of Congress39–40
and political parties53
accounting for empirical findings57
build/borrow useful technologies55–6
build models cumulatively56–7
early formal work53–4
metagames and institutional choice57–8
modeling choices58
overcoming obstacles55–8
questions and concerns54
simplification57
specifying complete formal model55
Gallup Organization355, 356
game theory:
and deliberation555–8
games of incomplete information555–8
signaling games556–7
and evolutionary game models757
and study of Congress38
and Ultimatum Game753–4 see also formal study of Congress
gatekeeping, and minority rights747–8
gender, and issue selection182
General Accounting Office (GAO)512
gerrymandering193–4, 206–8, 667–8, 669
goal theories, and congressional studies881–2
gold standard767–8
Gramm‐Rudman‐Hollings law511–12
gridlock:
and bicameralism275–6
(p. 919)
and measurement of648
and partisan polarization539
and pivotal politics651–2, 653
Harris Polling356
Hartford Convention (1815)764
historical study of Congress:
and congressional committees712–13
origins of standing committees (1790s–1820s)713–18
committee‐party relationship (1820s–1910s)721–3
expansion of system (1820s–1910s)718–24
House Rules Committee as agenda‐setting body (1880s–90s)723–4
consolidation of (20th century)725–8
Legislative Reorganization Act (1946)727–8
emergence of seniority system (20th century)728–9
development of investigative role (1910s–40s)730–2
post‐1946 period732–4
and congressional elections666–7
accountability674–6
ballot structure and voting procedure668–70
election of senators669–70
future research678–80
gerrymandering667–8, 669
impact of geographical boundaries667–8
participation and representation676–8
party control of nomination and election process670–4
and disdain for17, 23
and early approaches:
Brady‐Cooper initiative119
Clausen‐Sinclair initiative119–20
Mayhew's Party Loyalty among Congressmen117–18
Polsby119
and focus of research124
Congress's external relationships124–5
institutional development124
labor movement125
legislative productivity125
particular historical episodes125
political representation126
southern politics125–6
and growth in scholarship on122–3, 124
Binder123
Mayhew's America's Congress122
Schickler123
works in progress123
and increased role of24–5, 116
and party leadership684–5
weak beginnings (1789–1811)685–7
emergence of (1811–37)687–90
pre‐Civil War period (1837–61)691–3
party consolidation (1861–90)693–5
high tide of party (1890–1910)695–7
early 20th century (1910–33)697–701
committee ascendancy (1933–60)701–3
reform and contemporary period (1960–2010)703–5
future research705–7
and place within American political development126–8
suggestions for128–31
and sectionalism:
pre‐Civil War period764–6
slavery764–6
Republican party‐state766–7
industrialization767–70
New Deal Democratic coalition771–6
civil rights movement776–7, 780
convergence of party alignments777–8
realignment of party system779–81 see also American political development (APD)
holds, and the Senate437
home styles145, 578
and partisan polarization544
House of Representatives:
and behavioral research25–6
and differences from Senate279
and evolution of party leadership:
weak beginnings (1789–1811)685–6
emergence of (1811–37)687–90
pre‐Civil War period (1837–61)691–2
party consolidation (1861–90)693–5
high tide of party (1890–1910)695–6
early 20th century (1910–33)697–700
committee ascendancy (1933–60)701–3
reform and contemporary period (1960–2010)703–4
and House‐Senate relations27–8
and institutionalization863
and party leaders27
and plenary time management467–9
and representation basis280
ideological representation284–5
impact on policy outcomes280–2
interest representation282–3
partisan representation284
representational relationships285–7 see also congressional committees; redistricting
ideal point estimation, and legislative preferences66, 67, 91, 350
and basic logic of spatial model74–5
and Bayesian estimation85–6
and cut point68
and estimation of ideal points77–8
(p. 920)
and ideal point67
and interest group ratings69–70
and interpretation of estimates88–90
belief constraints88
multiple dimensions89–90
role of ideology88–9
and multiple dimensions76
and NOMINATE model78–80
D‐NOMINATE model79–80
refinement of80
and probabilistic voting75–6
and sample size82–4
and scale choice81–2
and sincere voting68
and spatial model of voting67–9
ideological power balance theory, and minority rights744–5
ideological representation:
and ideological coalitions624–7
and representation basis of Congress284–5
ideology:
and legislative preferences88–9
and position‐taking177–80
and redistricting208–9
impoundments507
incrementalism870
and budget process517–19
incumbency advantage144–8, 865
and approval ratings358–9
and decline in uncontested elections148
and doubts over growth of148
and dyadic representation297–8
and explanations of144–5
and historical elections158–9
and measurement of145
and officeholder effect299–300
and personal vote146–7, 306–7
and quality effect145–6
and reasons for continued research on147–8
and redistricting146, 147–8, 194, 208
strengthening by195
weakening by194–5
and selection effect299, 300
and strategic entry and exit decisions146
industrialization, and sectionalism767–70
informational model of congressional organization408–10
and minority rights740–1
inside models of congressional behavior864–5, 866
Institute for Politics, Democracy and the Internet225
institutional change:
and behavioral research23–5
and congressional studies887–9
and sectionalism783–4
institutional design, and political transaction costs795–8
institutionalization863
institutional norms, and descriptive representation257–8
institutional structure, and deliberation560–3
interest group ratings, and legislative preferences69–70
and advantages of70
and artificial extremism71
and comparisons over time and across legislatures72–3
and construction of69
and dimensionality73
and ideal point estimation69–70
and ‘lumpiness’ of70–1
and measuring demand for distributive benefits321–2
interest groups:
and campaign donations225
and election campaigns186
and influence on roll‐call votes581–2 see also lobbying, and interest group advocacy
interest representation, and representation basis of Congress282–3
internet polling349, 350–1
interstate commerce768
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)664
interview‐based study of Congress95–6, 880
and access problems100, 101–2
staff members101
suspiciousness of outsiders101
and advantages of in‐person interviews111–12
and advantages of personal relationship with Congress member104–5
and anonymity of interviewees106
and behavioral research13
and bland responses110
and controversial statements107
and embeddedness:
as access strategy101–3
payoff from103
and former members of Congress105
and guarding against awe of interviewees113
and influential works:
Evans' Leadership in Committee97–8
Hall's Participation in Congress98
Kingdon's Congressmen's Voting Decisions96–7
Lee and Oppenheimer's Sizing up the Senate98
Matthews' US Senators and Their World95, 96
(p. 921)
Polsby's How Congress Evolves98–9
Sinclair's Transformation of the US Senate97
and obstacles to99–100
and open‐ended questions110–11
and participant observation99
and paucity of studies95
and recording interviews106
and scheduling interviews, difficulties with104
and selectivity in using material113–14
and telephone interviews112
and trustworthiness of sources107–9
and unexpected revelations112–13
issue salience:
and opinion‐policy relationship345
and position‐taking178–9
issue selection, and election campaigns180–2
candidate background182
gender influences182
partisan issue ownership181–2
Item Response Theory (IRT)85
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (2003)444
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (JCOC)477, 479, 486
judicial review, and congressional anticipation of839–40 see also judiciary
Judiciary Act (1789)834
judiciary and Congress, relations between:
and complexity of834, 851–2
factors affecting852
and congressional anticipation of judicial review839–40
and congressional reaction to hostile court activity840–1
and the Constitution834–5
and constitutional interpretation835–7
and judicial anticipation of congressional review845–51
attitudinal model846
costs of legislative override848–9
separation of powers model846–51
and politicizationofthelaw837–8
and redistricting196–7
and Senate's role in confirmation process841
lower court confirmations841–4
Supreme Court confirmations844–5 see also Supreme Court, US
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights256–7
leadership styles, and descriptive representation261–2 see also party leadership
League of Conservation Voters69, 70
legislative performance, see legislative productivity
legislative preferences:
and Bayesian estimation85–6
and choice of measure of67
and descriptive representation248–51
and formation of385
and ideal point estimation66, 67, 91
basic logic of spatial model74–5
Bayesian estimation85–6
cut point68
D‐NOMINATE model79–80
estimation of ideal points77–8
ideal point67
interpretation of estimates88–90
multiple dimensions76
NOMINATE model78–80
probabilistic voting75–6
refinement of NOMINATE model80
sample size82–4
scale choice81–2
sincere voting68
spatial model of voting67–9
and interest group ratings69–70
advantages of70
artificial extremism71
comparisons over time and across legislatures72–3
construction of69
dimensionality73
“lumpiness” of70–1
and methodological innovation66
and model evaluation86–7
proportional reduction in error87
and party leaders' influence on formation of385
and political science641–2
and spatial model of voting67–9
basic logic of74–5
cut point68
ideal point67
probabilistic voting75–6
sincere voting68
single‐peakedness67
symmetry68, 69
and spatial representation66–7
and zone of acceptable outcomes385
legislative productivity641, 645
and bicameralism276–7, 653
and changes in approaches to641–3
and divided government643–4, 649–50
and future research654–6
and historical approaches to study of Congress125
and legislative significance646–7
and legislative successes and failures647–8
and macro‐level studies650
turn to643–4
(p. 922)
and Mayhew's Divided We Govern643, 644–5
responses to645–8
and party cartel theory652–3
and pivotal politics651–2, 653
and public mood650
and spatial model650, 651
and veto player650–1
Legislative Reference Division (LRD)801, 805
Legislative Reorganization Act (1946)400, 478
and congressional committees727–8
Legislative Reorganization Act (1970)480–1
Legistorm324
Little, Brown Study of Congress series16
lobbying, and interest group advocacy613–14
and alternative terms for599
and assessing influence600–2
in committees600–1
constituency linkages601–2
floor votes600
neopluralist view602
transaction model602
for collective goods610
characteristics of610–11
protection against vote‐buying611–12
public nature of611
relative weakness of individual members612
and definition of599
and enduring single‐issue coalitions632–5
and feature of interest group success612
and lobbying tactics602–4
grassroots mobilizations607
providing information604–5
working with allies605–7
and minimizing negative effects613
and popular view of598, 599, 613
for private goods610
clandestine nature of611
limited influence612–13
as symbiotic process607–10, 614
brokerage role of interest groups608
economic theories of lobbying609–10
lobbying subsidy theory607–9 see also interest groups
Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995)601, 613
logrolling:
and formal modelling44
and transitory multi‐issue coalitions627–9
majority‐minority districts778
malapportionment:
and distributive politics280–2
and redistricting194
and Senate representation279–80
median voter theory:
and opinion‐policy relationship345–6
intervening institutions346
voter intensity347
and position‐taking177–8
Medicaid506
Medicare506, 565
mid‐term losses155–6
minority influence756
minority representation242
and legislative behavior248–51
and majority‐minority districts248–9
and redistricting195–6, 205
and Senate283 see also descriptive representation
minority rights in legislatures738–9
and future research:
comparative studies751–2
computer systems756–7
decency and rudeness754–5
dominance models757
interruption rates754–5
majority retention of minority rights753
minority party strategy750–1
party cohesion measures749
party strength measure749
psychological approach755–6
violence755
and gatekeeping747–8
and ideological power balance view744–5
and informational account of740–1
and majority size account of741–2
and motion to recommit745–7
limiting of majority power746
types of745
and rationales for existence of747
and supply/demand analysis of743–4
party strength measure743–4
Missouri Compromise688, 764
modernization theory863
Morrill Tariff767
motion to recommit745–7
and conditional party government746
and limiting of majority power746
and types of745
Nash equilibrium38
National Election Study662
National Labor Relations Act (1935)630–1
National Labor Relations Board806
New Deal Democratic coalition771–6
and congressional committees772–4
new institutionalism401
NOMINATE data:
and advantages of28
and behavioral research, reliance on28–30
and ideal point estimation78–80
D‐NOMINATE model79–80
(p. 923)
refinement of models80
and partisan polarization528–9
nomination process804
and lower courts841–4
and partisan polarization541–2
and pivotal politics433–4
and Supreme Court844–5
non‐partisan theory, and party influence debate378–80, 381–2, 384
norms880
obstruction124
and curtailment of438–9
and growth of428–9
and simple model of750 see also filibusters
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)802, 805
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)324, 801–2, 805, 806
and congressional budget process504
and Gramm‐Rudman‐Hollings law512
and president's budget505
and Program Assessment Rating Tool519
Open Government Act (2007)613
outside models of congressional behavior864–6
oversight, and development of committee‐based730–2
participant observation99
and behavioral research13 see also interview‐based study of Congress
participation:
and congressional elections676–8
and evaluations of Congress363
partisan model of congressional organization410–12
and cartel theory411–12
and conditional party government410
partisan polarization527, 546
and automated textual analysis543–4
and conditional party government531, 537, 546
and confirmation process541–2
and congressional committees397–8, 540–1
and congressional‐presidential relations541
and consequences of:
congressional representation544–5
policy debates542–4
policymaking538–42
public view of Congress545
responding to public opinion545
and definition of528
and economic issues536, 543
and external causes531–5
homogenous constituencies534–5
influence of party activists534
mass partisan change531–2
partisan sorting533–4
redistricting534–5
southern realignment532–3
and historical context527, 538, 546
and home styles544
and House of Representatives528
and internal causes531, 535–6
changes in congressional agenda536
changes in vote recording535–6
procedural votes536
and intra‐government relations541
and legislative gridlock539
and measurement of528–9
automated textual analysis543–4
limitations of roll‐call votes530
and parties as enduring multi‐issue coalitions621–4
and party influence debate531
and public relations strategies542–3
and Senate528
and unified explanation of537–8
partisan representation, and representation basis of Congress284–5
partisan theory622, 623–4
party cohesion653, 664, 665–6, 743, 749, 870
party identification294–5, 310
party leadership, congressional371–2
and behavioral research13, 20–3
and cartel theory377
and conditional party government374–5, 410
and foundational works on373–4
and future research391–2
empirical research391–2
theory391
and historical development of684–5
weak beginnings (1789–1811)685–7
emergence of (1811–37)687–90
pre‐Civil War period (1837–61)691–3
party consolidation (1861–90)693–5
high tide of party (1890–1910)695–7
early 20th century (1910–33)697–701
committee ascendancy (1933–60)701–3
reform and contemporary period (1960–2010)703–5
future research705–7
and House‐centric nature of research on387
and House styles of leadership373–4
and independent agency of party leaders377–8, 384–6
and institutional context372, 373–4
and leaders' motivations385–6
and limits of373
and methodological challenges in studying389–91
(p. 924)
and partisan model of congressional organization410–12
cartel theory411–12
conditional party government410
and party influence debate378–84, 531
cartel theory380–1
conditional party government381–4
lessons from384
non‐partisan theory378–80, 381–2, 384
and party strength373–4
and personality375, 376
and political context376
and principal‐agent theory372, 375–6, 377–8
and rational choice institutionalism372, 374–8
and the Senate27, 387–9
emergence in387
increase in partisanship387–8
and significance of371
and spatial theory approaches372, 376–7 see also political parties in Congress
party polarization, see partisan polarization
path dependency, and evolution of supermajoritarian Senate438, 445
Pecora Investigation730
Pendleton Act (1883)876
performance, see legislative productivity
personal vote:
and dyadic representation306–7
and incumbency advantage306–7
pivotal politics432–3, 885–6
and confirmation of judicial nominees433–4
and filibuster pivots433–4
and legislative productivity651–2, 653
plenary time management469–70
and agenda‐setting rules:
blocking by governing coalition456
blocking by opposition coalition456
and allocation models:
free access for all455
free access for some455
restricted access455
and comparison with airstrip time management453–4
and enactment of bills452–3
and erosion of opposition rights454
and features of451–2
and history of454
and House‐Senate differences467–9
and majority government blocking power463
roll rates463–7
and plenary bottleneck453
and restrictions on access to plenary agenda456–9
definition of busy legislature457–8
definition of free access457
opposition parties' access462
private members' access459–62
policy congruence, and dyadic representation301–2, 303–6
policy debates, and partisan polarization542–4
policymaking:
and congressional delegation to executive790–1, 807–8
agency theory791–2
political transaction costs795–8
separation of powers792
and congressional dominance793–4
and deliberation563–6
and executive orders805
and New Deal model871
and partisan polarization538–42
and policy subsystems632
definition of632–3
and politicization of the law837–8
and presidency, founders' intentions790
and presidential dominance798, 807–8
ex ante politics of delegation799–803
ex post politics of delegation803–7
policy subsystems:
and definition of632–3
and enduring single‐issue coalitions632–5
political action committees (PACs):
and campaign finance218, 225, 231
and influence of601–2
political parties in Congress:
and behavioral research13, 20–3
and campaign finance218–20, 222–3, 225
and committee appointments319
historical development of process721–3
and congressional committees, relationship between721–3, 734
and control of nomination and election process670–4
as enduring multi‐issue coalitions621–4
and formal modeling of53
accounting for empirical findings57
build/borrow useful technologies55–6
build models cumulatively56–7
early formal work53–4
metagames and institutional choice57–8
modeling choices58
overcoming obstacles55–8
questions and concerns54
simplification57
specifying complete formal model55
and legislative productivity645
and party influence debate378–84, 531
cartel theory380–1
conditional party government381–4
non‐partisan theory378–80, 381–2, 384
and policy differences781–3
(p. 925)
and roll‐call votes579–80, 585–6
and sectional realignment of779–81 see also partisan polarization; party leadership
political science, and legislative productivity641–2
pork barrel politics315–16, 335–6
and bipartisan distribution of benefits328–9
and committee‐benefit hypothesis318–20
and congressional committees317
measuring demand for distributive benefits320–3
patterns of allocation of benefits326–8
and definition of pork barrel benefits316
and electoral connection316–17
and future research332
and House‐Senate differences331–2
and inefficiency of benefits316
as integral to congressional life315
and measuring pork barrel benefits323–6
bureaucratic grants323–4, 325–6
congressionally designated earmarks323, 324–5
and motives for supplying pork317–18
collective‐benefit theories317–18
individual‐benefit theories317
and partisan distribution of benefits329–31
and patterns of allocation of benefits:
bureaucratic grants328
committee benefit hypothesis326–8
and re‐election goal316–17
and size of pork barrel coalitions332–5
position taking:
and election campaigns177–80
ambiguity179
avoidance of179
issue salience178–9
median voter theory177–8
and electoral connection143
preferences, see legislative preferences
presidency:
and budget process804–5
and congressional delegation to790–1, 807–8
agency theory791–2
congressional dominance793–4
future research808
political transaction costs795–8
separation of powers792
war powers815, 821–3
and executive authority790
and executive orders805
and founders' intentions for789–90
and influence on roll‐call votes580–1
and legislative action790
and political appointments803–4
and presidential dominance798, 807–8
ex ante politics of delegation799–803
ex post politics of delegation803–7
and status of790
and war powers815
claim of inherent powers815
congressional delegation815, 821–3
Congress's direct influence823–5
Congress's indirect influence825–6
prerogative powers817–18
salus populi doctrine815, 816
primary elections159
and candidate behavior185–6
principal‐agent theory:
and congressional reform scholarship479–80
and party leadership372, 375–6, 377–8
private sector, and Congress's relations with60–1
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)519
protectionism767, 768–9, 770
public canvass675
public opinion and congressional policy:
and Congress as responder to341
and Congress's influence on341–2, 826
and cost considerations349–50
and elections342–3, 350
and individual members' influence on341
and influence relationship341
and internet polling349, 350–1
and interpretation difficulties344
and intervening institutions340–1, 346, 347
and issue salience345
and measurement of347–8
and median voter analysis345–6
intervening institutions346
voter intensity347
and opinion‐policy relationship342–4
causal issues343
importance of340
measurement of347–9
nature of341
response to change in342–3
strength of344–5
and opinion polls, problems with344
and partisan polarization545
and roll‐call votes577–9
and supermajoritarian Senate439–40 see also evaluations of Congress
public policy, see policymaking; public opinion
public relations strategies, and partisan polarization542–3
Pujo Hearings730
purposive politicians881–2
rational choice theory:
and congressional committees401–6 (p. 926)
assignment process404–6
environmental constraints402, 404
Fenno's Congressmen in Committees401–3
members' goals402
Shepsle's The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle405–6
Smith and Deering's Committees in Congress404
strategic premise403
and congressional elections663
and congressional studies867–9
and deliberation553
games of incomplete information555–8
political‐talk models556, 557–8
and distributive politics317
reconciliation, and budget process510–11
and impact on balance of power511
and Senate442–4, 510–11
as two‐stage process510
reconstruction767
redistricting193, 209
and automated redistricting206–7
and difficulties with statistical analyses of outcomes207
and effects of206
and federal requirements199–200
and gerrymandering193–4
tests for206–8
and ideology of representatives208–9
and incumbency advantage146, 147–8, 194, 208
strengthening of195
weakening of194–5
and institutions responsible for196
courts196–7
impact on outcomes197
legislative processes196, 197
redistricting commissions196, 198, 199
reform of198–9
research on effects of197–8
state structures196
and interest representation282
and malapportionment194
and minority representation195–6
and outcome‐based criteria200, 204–8
political goals204–5
regulations constraining partisan influence205–6
state courts208
tests for gerrymandering206–7
Voting Rights Act (1965)205
and partisan polarization534–5
and process‐based criteria200
census data202
compactness203–4
contiguity202–3
equal population200–2
respect for communities of interest204
respect for political subdivisions204
voting‐eligible adjustment201–2
and United States Supreme Court194, 198, 203, 205, 206
reference groups756
reform, congressional473–4
and 1960s scholarship478–80
functionalism479
principal‐agent theory479–80
theory‐guided research480
use of large data‐sets480
and 1970s scholarship481–4
goals of reform proponents483
hypothesis testing483
theory‐guided research482–3
and 1980s scholarship484–6
conditional party government486
hypothesis testing485
rational choice theory485
reform eras484
theory‐guided research484–5
and 1990s scholarship486–9
historical perspective489
partisanship487–8
path dependency488
re‐election imperative488
Republican reforms487
and American Political Science Association477, 538–9
Study of Congress project479
and Boling Committee481, 482
and deficiency in scholarship on474
and definition of474–5
and early scholarship on475–6
and Hansen reforms482
and Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress477, 479, 486
and Legislative Reorganization Act (1946)478
and Legislative Reorganization Act (1970)480–1
and limitations of research on490
and scholars' recommendations for reform490–1
and sporadic scholarly interest in489–90
and World War II scholarship477–8
Reorganization Act (1946)23
representation:
and congressional elections676–8
and partisan polarization544–5
and textbook image of308–9
(p. 927) representational relationships, and representation basis of Congress285–7
responsible parties468, 539, 540, 643, 877–9
roll‐call votes592
and areas of settled research583
aggregated influences on roll‐call voting584–5
role of political parties585–6
and behavioral research14–15
reliance on NOMINATE scores28–30
and constitutional constraints576
and future research576, 586
exogenous shocks and crises590–1
House‐Senate differences590
members' other decisions588–9
negative agenda power589
subjects of roll‐call votes587–8
types of roll‐call votes586–7
and importance of575
and influences on576
constituent opinion577–9
electoral incentives577, 578
interest groups581–2
political parties579–80
president580–1
and institutional constraints576
and members' personal preferences582–3
operative preferences582, 583
personal preferences582–3
and partisan polarization528–9
limitations as measure of530
and representation models
delegate575–6
trustee575–6
Rules Committee, House, and emergence as agenda‐setting body721, 723–4
sectionalism, and congressional development761
and civil rights movement776–7, 780
and commonalities of interest762
and congressional politics763
and Conservative Coalition774–5
and convergence of interests762
and convergence of party alignments777–8
and future of781–5
future research784–5
party policy differences781–3
and industrialization767–70
and institutional change783–4
and legislative structure763
and New Deal Democratic coalition771–6
congressional committees772–4
and origins of762
and party systems:
evolution of763, 769–70, 777–8
New Deal Democratic coalition771–6
sectional realignment of779–81
and pre‐Civil War period764–6
slavery764–6
and Republican party‐state766–7
and sectional competition762–3
and separatism763–4
Senate, US:
and behavioral research26–8
and budget reconciliation bills442–4, 510–11
and Byrd Rule442–3, 444, 511
and cloture votes429
effectiveness of 1917 rule430
requirements for428
and confirmation of judicial nominees433–7
lower courts841–4
pivotal politics model433–4
Supreme Court844–5
and differences from House of Representatives279
and election procedure669–70
and evolution of party leadership:
weak beginnings (1789–1811)686–7
emergence of (1811–37)690
pre‐Civil War period (1837–61)692–3
party consolidation (1861–90)695
high tide of party (1890–1910)696–7
early 20th century (1910–33)698, 699, 700–1
committee ascendancy (1933–60)701–3
reform and contemporary period (1960–2010)704–5
and fast‐track procedures441–2
and filibusters428–9, 431–2
filibuster pivots432–4
and House‐Senate relations27–8
and malapportionment279–80
and minority representation283
as obstacle to legislation276–7
and party leadership27, 387–9
emergence of387
increase in partisanship387–8
and plenary time management467–9
and representation basis279–80
ideological representation284–5
impact on policy outcomes280–2
interest representation282–3
partisan representation284
representational relationships285–7
and unanimous consent agreements444–5 see also congressional committees; supermajoritarian Senate
seniority system, and congressional committees400, 723
and challenge to733
and emergence of728–9
(p. 928) separation of powers:
and congressional‐judicial relations846–51
and delegation792
and formal approaches61
sequestration, and Gramm‐Rudman‐Hollings law512
Sherman Antitrust Act (1890)794
signing statements800–1
slavery, and sectionalism764–6
social choice theory866
social movements679, 865
social psychology867
Social Security Act (1935)506
sociology867, 880
soft money, and campaign finance220–3
spatial dissonance877–9
spatial theories of congressional organization406
and distributive model406–8
and informational model408–10
and partisan model410–12
conditional party government410
and party influence debate, cartel theory411–12
split‐ticket voting297, 298, 669
strategic politicians theory149–50, 151, 175–6
strategic premise concept403
Subcommittee Bill of Rights20, 482, 515
Superfundlaw564
supermajoritarian Senate276, 426–7, 446–7
and benefit of supermajority coalitions439
and cloture votes429
effectiveness of 1917 rule430
requirements for428
and confirmation of judicial nominees433–7
and filibusters431–2
filibuster pivots432–4
and historical evolution of427–30
growth of obstruction428–9
path dependency438, 445
reasons for429–30
and holds437
and institutional equilibrium431
and limitation by binding precedent438–9
and maintenance of438–41
and procedural innovations441–6
budget reconciliation bills442–4
Byrd Rule442–3, 444, 511
fast‐track procedures441–2
unanimous consent agreements444–5
and public opinion439–40
Supreme Court, US:
and amicus briefs838
and anticipation of congressional review845–51
attitudinal model846
costs of legislative override848–9
separation of powers model846–51
and approval ratings360
and confirmation of judicial nominees433–7, 844–5
and congressional/judicial relations834–5
and congressional war powers818–19
and constitutional interpretation835–7
and Baker v Carr (1962)194, 836
and Buckley v Valeo (1976)217
and Citizens United v FEC (2010)232
and Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v Federal Election Commission (1996)222
and Dames & Moore v Regan (1981)819
and Davis v Bandemer (1986)206
and Ex parte Milligan (1866)849
and Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006)817, 819
and Katzenbach v Morgan (1966)837
and Korematsu case (1944)818
and League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v Perry (2006)206
and Marbury v Madison836, 849
and Miller v Johnson (1995)203
and Shaw v Reno (1993)203
and Synar v Bowsher (1986)512
and Thornburg v Gingles (1986)205
and US Term Limits Inc v Thornton (1995)198
and Wesberry v Sanders (1964)146, 194, 280
and West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish (1937)849
and Youngstown Sheet and Tube case (1952)819 see also judiciary and Congress
symbolic representation307
tariffs767, 768–9, 770
Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS)324
Teapot Dome scandal730
technology, and campaign communications680
“textbook congress“725, 732, 774, 862, 863, 865
textual analysis, and partisan polarization543–4
theorizing about Congress889–90
and formal approaches883–5
and institutional change887–9
and norms and roles880–1
and pivotal politics885–7
and purposive politicians881–2
and responsible parties approach877–9
and spatial dissonance877–9
and Wilson's congressional government idea875–7
transaction costs, and congressional delegation to executive795–8
turnout, and future research161
Ultimatum Game753–4
Un‐American Activities Committee, House730, 731
(p. 929) unanimous consent agreements (UCAs)444–5
United States Association of Former Members of Congress105
valence politics179
veto players, and legislative productivity650–1
voter behavior, and future research161
Voting Rights Act (1965)20, 195, 401, 703, 777, 837
and redistricting205
Wagner Act (1935)630–1
war powers, congressional812, 827–8
and congressional committees820–1
and the Constitution815–19, 827
presidential prerogative powers817–18
and constitutional governance813–14
and delegation to presidency815, 821–2
attempts to constrain822–3
and diminished role in national security820
and direct influence on presidential action823–5
and future research828–9
and indirect influence on presidential action825–6
and infrequent use of812
and international relations813
and president's claim of inherent powers815
prerogative powers817–18
salus populi doctrine815, 816
and scholarly approaches to812–13
constitutional prerogatives812–13
direct influences813
indirect influences813
limitations of814
and Supreme Court818–19
War Powers Act822
War Powers Resolution (1973)822
Ways and Means Committee, House:
and congressional budget process503
and Manley's study of399–400
women:
and descriptive representation245–7, 250–1, 253, 254–6, 264–5
African American women262–3
Latina women263
minority women263
and increase in representation in Congress242
and underrepresentation in Congress242
World Values Survey361, 362 (p. 930)