- The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics
- About the Contributors
- Behavioral Approaches to the Study of Congress
- Formal Approaches to the Study of Congress
- Measuring Legislative Preferences
- Touching the Bones: Interviewing and Direct Observational Studies of Congress
- Historical Approaches to the Study of Congress: Toward a Congressional Vantage on American Political Development
- House and Senate Elections
- Congressional Campaigns
- Congressional Redistricting
- Campaign Finance in Congressional Elections
- Descriptive Representation: Understanding the Impact of Identity on Substantive Representation of Group Interests
- Bicameral Representation
- Dyadic Representation
- Pork Barrel Politics
- Public Opinion and Congressional Policy
- Public Evaluations of Congress
- Party Leadership
- Congressional Committees
- The Supermajority Senate
- Managing Plenary Time: The U.S. Congress in Comparative Context
- Congressional Reforms
- The Congressional Budget Process
- Party Polarization
- Deliberation in Congress
- Roll‐Call Votes
- Lobbying and Interest Group Advocacy
- The Ties That Bind: Coalitions in Congress
- Legislative Productivity and Gridlock
- The Development of Congressional Elections
- The Evolution of Party Leadership
- The Development of the Congressional Committee System
- Majority Rule and Minority Rights
- Sectionalism and Congressional Development
- Congress and the Executive Branch: Delegation and Presidential Dominance
- Congressional War Powers
- The Amorphous Relationship between Congress and the Courts
- Reflections on the Study of Congress 1969–2009
- Theorizing about Congress
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
The relationship between Congress and the judiciary is a complex one that is poorly defined or understood. This ambiguity in the relationship is the result of the failure of the Constitution to define what legal doctrines must shape judicial decision-making or whether the judiciary has the authority to strike the acts of Congress. Whereas the relationship between Congress and the executive is well-defined in the Constitution, the relationship between Congress and the courts was left by the founders to be defined by history. In addition to the Constitution's ambiguity in defining the relationship of Congress and the judiciary, the ambiguity also stems from several factors: the relationship has changed over time; modern accounts of the relationship have produced theoretical claims that are difficult to validate; and the multiple dimensions of the interdependence of the two institutions makes it hard to determine whether Congress is constrained by law and whether the Court is constrained by Congress. This article discusses the evolution of constitutional interpretation. It discusses Congress's abandonment of its role as an interpreter of the Constitution and the emergence of the federal judiciary as a venue for policymaking. The article also discusses congressional response to the Court. It discusses legislative anticipation of judicial review, congressional assertiveness in the nomination process, and congressional reaction to hostile Court activity. The article also discusses judicial anticipation of congressional review.
Michael A. Bailey is Colonel William J. Walsh Professor of American Government in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.
Forrest Maltzman is professor of political science at the George Washington University.
Charles R. Shipan is the J. Ira and Nicki Harris Professor of Social Science and Professor of Public Policy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan.
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