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date: 19 May 2019

Abstract and Keywords

A general survey of Frege’s views on truth, the chapter explores the problems in response to which Frege’s distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. Particular attention is paid to Frege’s early engagement with the work of George Boole, how the notion of truth-functionality emerges from it, and the tensions in Frege’s notion of content that this exposes. It also discusses Frege’s view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth, which has been the focus of much of the literature concerning Frege on truth. Finally, the chapter considers, very briefly, the question whether Frege was, as is so often claimed, a deflationist.

Keywords: Frege, truth, reference, semantics, Boole, deflationism

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