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date: 20 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

In “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood” Russell offers both a multiple-relation theory of judgment and a correspondence theory of truth. It has been a prevailing understanding of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s multiple-relation idea but endorses the correspondence theory. Ramsey took the opposite view. In his “Facts and Propositions,” Ramsey endorses Russell’s multiple-relation idea, rejects the correspondence theory, and then asserts that these moves are both due to Wittgenstein. This chapter will argue that Ramsey’s ascriptions are both correct. The extent of the agreement between Ramsey and Wittgenstein moreover counts definitively against standard understandings of Ramsey as a redundancy theorist of truth. Wittgenstein is no correspondence theorist and Ramsey is no redundancy theorist; rather, both philosophers offer identity theories of truth.

Keywords: Russell, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, multiple-relation theory of judgment, correspondence theory of truth, identity theory of truth, redundancy theory of truth

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