Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 19 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter traces developments in idealist theories of truth in and after Kant, focusing especially on key moments in the nineteenth-century history of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Though Kant intended his transcendental idealism to effect a Copernican revolution in philosophy, he did not advocate for revisions in the traditional definition of truth in terms of a correspondence or agreement between our judgments and their objects. Many of his successors countered that it was only by carefully revisiting the nature of truth itself that philosophy could hope to avoid the “subjectivizing” pitfalls they saw latent in Kantian idealism. Intense post-Kantian reflection on the concept of truth led to a series of accounts which were deeply influential across a number of philosophical traditions and which provide the crucial proximate historical and conceptual context for many of the most influential discussions of truth, and semantics more generally, in the twentieth century.

Keywords: idealism, Kant, Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, truth-bearer, truth-maker, correspondence theory, early analytic philosophy, phenomenology

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.