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date: 19 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter explores the relationship between truth and metaethical noncognitivism. It looks at an important puzzle about moral truth as it is faced by early noncognitivists and by metaethical expressivists, the early noncognitivists’ contemporary cousins. It looks at what it would take for expressivists to “earn the right” to talk about moral truths at all, and in particular at what it would take for them to earn the right to claim that moral truths behave in the ways that we should expect—including that meaningful moral sentences which lack presuppositions are true or false, and that classically valid arguments are truth-preserving, along the way developing the tools of an approach that is called here “commitment theory.” And finally, the chapter looks at whether the assumptions about truth which expressivists need in order to do these things have any independent plausibility or merit.

Keywords: truth, noncognitivism, expressivism, Frege-Geach Problem, commitment, Allan Gibbard, James Dreier, A. J. Ayer

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