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date: 20 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Truthmaker theory says that what is true depends on what exists. This chapter spells out this thesis, its implications, and why we should believe it. It looks at the connection between truth-making and the in virtue of relation. It looks at reasons to accept or reject truthmaker maximalism—the claim that absolutely every truth has a truthmaker—and truthmaker necessitarianism—the claim that if A makes p true then it is impossible for A to exist without p being true. It asks what views on essentialism are compatible with truthmaker theory. Three reasons for accepting the view are discussed. The views that truthmaker theory is required by the correct theory of truth, and that it is a commitment of realism, is rejected. It is argued that the best reason to accept truthmaker theory is that it yields a parsimonious account of what truths are brute.

Keywords: truthmaker, theory of truth, in virtue of, truthmaker maximalism, truthmaker necessitarianism, essentialism, realism

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