- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Notes on Contributors
- Foundations of Business Groups: Towards an Integrated Framework
- Business Groups in Historical Perspectives
- Business Groups in Prewar Japan: Historical Formation and Legacy
- Business Networks in Postwar Japan: Whither the <i>Keiretsu</i>?
- Business Groups in South Korea
- Business Groups in Taiwan
- Business Groups in China
- Business Groups in Thailand
- Business Groups in Singapore
- Business Groups in India
- Business Groups in Argentina
- Business Groups in Brazil
- Business Groups in Chile
- Business Groups in Mexico
- Business Groups in Israel
- Business Groups in Turkey
- Business Groups in Russia
- Business Groups in South Africa
- Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
- The Riddle of the Great Pyramids
- Economic Institutions and the Boundaries of Business Groups
- Business Groups and the State: The Politics of Expansion, Restructuring, and Collapse
- Corporate Governance of Business Groups
- The Kin and the Professional: Top Leadership in Family Business Groups
- Diversification Strategy and Business Groups
- Capability Building in Business Groups
- Technological Innovation and Business Groups
Abstract and Keywords
Business groups inspire much confusion. To the Americans and British, capitalism forced brisk competition—maximizing efficiency. To everyone else, capitalism turned the economy over to a handful of old moneyed families. Neither side accorded the other much leeway: the Americans and Brits marveled at the conspiracy theories circulating in less enlightened parts of the world; the others marveled at the naivety of the Anglo-Saxons. Only recently has either side taken the other seriously. It turns out both are right, and capitalism is different in different countries. Remarkably, this stems largely—primarily, this article argues—from differences in corporate governance regarding pyramidal groups. Following most of the finance literature, this article defines a group as two or more listed firms under a common controlling shareholder. It says that the group is pyramidal if one listed group firm is a controlled subsidiary of another.
Randall Morck is Stephen A. Jarislowski Distinguished Chair in Finance and University Professor at the University of Alberta and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has published widely on corporate valuations, business groups, family firms and corporate lobbying in the Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Finance, Journal of Economic Literature and other leading journals.
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