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date: 21 October 2019

(p. 1069) Index

(p. 1069) Index

acquisition argument, see antirealism
acquisition of language 133, 146–8, 207, 333, 657–8, 944–5, 951, 957–8, 978–9
connectionist conception of 128–9
and Chomsky 127–8, see also Chomsky
and Davidson, see Davidson, triangulation
and joint attention 356–7, 978–9 see also knowledge of language
Adams, E.
on conditionals 97
Alston, W.
on illocutionary acts 901–2
ambiguity
of “actual” rigidifier 486
of definite article 4
at lexical level 209–10
scope ambiguity of negation 408–10, 482, 497 n. 11, 790, 829
scope ambiguity of modals 410, 482–5
scope ambiguity of quantifiers 540, 649, 815–7, 836–7
and speaker's intentions 546–9
syntactic ambiguity 835, 948 n. 16, 958–9, 960
problems with, 378, 482–6, 537–41, 543, 545, 600, 638n. 9
analytic/synthetic distinction
in Carnap 75–6,
in inferential role theory 177–8, 228–30, 312, 313
Quine's rejection of 77, 247–8, 313, see also Quine
anaphora 744, 540, 546, 547, 956, 975
and indefinite descriptions 534
in discourse representation theory vs. dynamic predicate logic 570–1, 660–1
and opacity 670
temporal 697–8, 709–13
animals
faculty of communication 953, 958 n. 28
and evolutionary account of language 130, 1015
and Davidson on attribution of thought 1014–15, 1059–64
in naturalist semantics 181–7
anti‐realism 162–3, 169–71
acquisition and manifestation arguments 986, 1001–4
and assertability conditions 609
and problems of knowledge 995–1001
aphasia 205–6, 262, 946
a posteriori
and identity statements 492
necessities 575, 589–90, 603
a priori
and analyticity 61, 313, 492
contingencies 52
in two‐dimensionalism 578, 579, 581–604
Aristotle, 394, 422, 935
on logic, 5, 823, 824
on metaphors 851
assertibility conditions 81–2, 162–3, 621, 626–7, 991
for conditionals 97, 778, 779 see also Dummett
assertion
deflationary accounts of 622–3, 624–5, 627–8
in Frege 622 n. 36, 623–4
in metaphor 858
and paratactic account 874–5
and illocutionary acts 386–7, 623–4
Austin, John
on illocutionary acts 866, 899–903
on locutionary and rhetic acts 386–7, 527 n. 11, 895–6
and ordinary language philosophy 91–4
performative/constative distinction 905
on speech acts 92–3, 893–906,
on perlocutionary acts 377, 895, 900–1
autism 252 n. 6, 262, 357, 1018 n. 15
Ayer, Alfred J.
on truth 612, 623
on moral language 74 see also logical positivism
(p. 1070) Bach, Kent 255 n. 22, 382 n. 53, 387 n. 67, 544, 866
on context without speaker's intention 384–5, 543
on speech‐acts 873 n. 18, 899–900, 904
on saying/meaning 527 n. 11
Bar‐Hillel, Yehoshua 198, 368
Baron‐Cohen Simon
on theory of mind 352, 357
Barwise, Jon
on quantification 794, 801
Beardsley, M.
on metaphor 846
belief‐reports
and compositionality 287
in the Tractatus 67, 91
and non‐relational accounts of belief 286–8 see also attitudes, propositional reports
Benacerraf, Paul 283, 284
Bezuidenhout, Anne 347, 537 n. 23, 860, 1033–4
Black, Max
on metaphor 847, 848, 853–5
Blackburn, Simon 900, 1002
Block, Ned 221, 313
and conceptual role semantics 177, 214, 224, 307
on holism 229
about two‐dimensionalism 598, 604
Boghossian, Paul 165–6, 219, 229–30, 310, 613, 625
Boole, George 5, 15–16
and Frege 5–8, 13, 15–16
Boolos, George 736, 737, 744–6, 750
Boyd, Richard 854
Brandom, Robert
and inferentialism 214, 902
prosentential theory of truth 612 n. 9, 624
on asserting and taking true 624, 625
and speech acts 906
Burge, Tyler 406
and internalism/externalism debate 135–7, 144–5, 326 n. 4, 336, 337 n. 28
on self‐knowledge 336
on concepts and conceptions 136
on proper names 539, 543, 741
Cappelen, Herman 348–9, see also Lepore
Carnap, Rudolf 73–6, 193, 198–9, 558, 575, 577, 1063
on logic as convention 74, 76–7, 830
and formal semantics 558–64
and Quine 76–7, 233, 247 n. 21, 830, 832
and Tarski 559–60 see also logical positivism
Carston, Robyn 344, 351, 355–6
on metaphor 346, 849
on unarticulated constituents 349–50
on logical constants 787–91 see also Relevance Theory
causal theories
and conceptual role semantics 178–80, 504
of perception, and triangulation 1008–10, 1015, 1059–60, 1066–7, see also Davidson
of proper names 35 n. 76, 329, 406–7, 502–3, 504, see also proper names
Cavell, Stanley 94
Chalmers, David 585–6, 601, 603, 604
epistemic two‐dimensionalism 588–98
charity principle 81–2, 200, 219, 226
Chomsky, Noam 127–38, 914–5, 937 n. 30, 944 n. 4, 980
on competence/performance 205, 373
and Davidson 131, 200, 203–5, 1011 n. 6
and Dummett's view of language 131–3
on I/E languages 127, 373 n. 28, 945–7
and individualism 137–8, 918, 921, 1011 n. 6
on knowledge of language 133, 205, 373–4, 944 n. 4, 945–8, 973–4, 1000
against externalism 129–37
on linguistics 114–15, 127, 132–3, 135, 203–5, 915, 924–9, 933, 969, 980
on logical form 836–38
on recursion 953
against referential semantics 99, 135, 374, 924–5
Church, Alonzo 562
Churchland, Paul 177, 227
state space semantics 224
cognitive pragmatics 351–2 see also Relevance Theory; Sperber; Wilson
cognitivism 371–5, 958
and first person authority 946–8, 959–78
and semantics in Larson‐Segal 203–8 see also Chomsky; Sperber; Wilson
communication
across contexts 1024–7
animal vs. human 953, 957–8
communicated content 1028–52
as ostensive, see ostention
and Relevance Theory 341–2, see also Relevance Theory
and sense variations 27–9, 1021–52
competence, and performance 128, 205–7, 373, 970 n. 39 (p. 1071)
semantic competence and linguistic competence 373–5, 928 n. 19, 993 see also Chomsky; knowledge of language
compositionality 633–663
and belief reports 287
constraints of 634–5, 641–7
vs. computability 659
and learnability 657–9
as functionality 635–9
as a methodological principle 659–63
as substitutability 639–40
concept
vs. conception 136
in Frege 6–14, 34–5
in Russell 69
conceptual role semantics 177–8, 296–319
and analytic/synthetic distinction 177–8, 228
circularity 178, 314–15
conceptual role/inferential role 214–15
as holistic 177, 217–19, 229, 311–12
and information based theories 310–13
and intrinsic content 296, 313–14
and meaning as use 296–8
non‐factuality 318–19
normative accounts 314, 318–19, 592, 600, 902
and proper names 504
conditionals 96–7
indicative 597–8
non‐truth functional accounts 774, 778–80, 773–87
and quantification 660–2
suppositional theory 779–80, 784–6
as truth‐functional 15, 23, 26 n. 60, 623, 777–8, 780–1, 782, 787 see also Adams; Lewis; Jackson; Stalnaker
content
broad vs. narrow 224
communicated content 1023–4, 1028–38, 1051–2
and Fregean thoughts 8–9, 23, 26
as language‐like in the Tractatus 67
non‐propositional 288–91
and truth‐conditions 325–32
vs. force 901
propositional and non propositional content 267–91, 350
propositional content in Davidsonian semantics 1007–8, 1057–67 see also Davidson; externalism; internalism
context
definitions of 384–5, 543
as extensional vs. non extensional 380, 450, 456, 465, 468, 663, 668–9
as indexical value assignment 343, 1022
sensitivity/insensitivity 1020–53, see also contextualism
context principle 105, 645, 647, 659–60
contextualism 1021–2
and communication across context 1024–7
vs. context insensitivity 348–9, 382, 1023–4
at lexical level 343–5, 1020–1, 1022, 1044–5
and moderate invariantism 1039–44
and quantifiers 1025–7
about truth 1044–7
convention T. see Tarski, T‐sentences
Cooper, Robin
on quantification 794, 801, 815
cooperative principle 341, 898 see also Grice
copula
and predication 440–2, 453, 462–5, 823
and plurals 739, 743 see also predicates
Crimmins, Mark
on propositional attitudes reports 283 n. 22, 1027
Davidson, Donald 14, 79–85, 88, 990
charity and humanity principle 81–2, 200, 219, 226
on first person authority 82–4
and holism 215, 216, 221, 353 n. 4
on metaphor 849–50, 854, 858–9
on publicity of meaning 203, 207–8
on propositional attitudes and paratactic theory 667–8, 288–291, 874–6
and quantification over events 839, 749, 752–3
and Quine 80, 81, 198, 240, 242
on quotation 682–3
on radical interpretation 81–2, 85, 198, 199–200, 215–6
on reference 194, 203
on Swampman 184–5, 1060
and Tarski 80, 682–4
on theory of truth and theory of meaning 80–1, 200–2, 283, 405, 620–1
on there being no such thing as language 84–5, 131
on triangulation, 83–4, 204, 207, 1006–18, 1065–7
Davies, Martin 138, 961
two‐dimensionalism and ‘fixedly actually’ operator 577, 578, 583–5
deflationism
disquotationalism 607–9, 613–19
illocutionary deflationism 612
minimalism 177 n. 9, 609–10, 617, see also Horwich
objections 612–15
and presuppositions 617–19
prosentential theory 611–12
redundancy theory 610
(p. 1072)
simple substitutional theory 615
demonstratives
complex demonstratives 396, 517, 541–2, 548
demonstrative thoughts 521, 708–9
in Kaplan 568–9, 578–80, 700
non referential use 535–541
in paratactic accounts 289–91
plural demonstratives 740–42
and predicates 452–4
vs. pure indexicals 544, 568–9
and reference 396–9, 404, 520 n. 3, 541–9, 569, 1022
in Russell 273 n. 7, 535–6
Dennett, Daniel 215, 318 n. 9
denotation
vs. connotation in Mill 394 n. 3
vs. reference in Russell 396 see also reference
DeRose, Keith
on contextualism 1027
Derrida, Jacques 64, 849 n. 13, 897, 905
Descartes, René 61, 89, 984, 987
descriptions, definite 410–15
denotation vs. reference 396
and direct reference theories 550 n. 38, 551
and pragmatic inference in RT 347
and quantification 412, 718–19, 727–8, 733, 742
referential vs. attributive use 346–7, 411–5, 480–4, 529–30, 537
as referring expressions 410, 526–8, 529–31
as referring through speaker's intentions 93, 408, 410
and rigidity 417–19, 477–8, 485–6, 531, 550 n. 38, 551
as non singular terms 42, 70–1, 408, 410, 426, 479, 481–4, 518 n. 2, 526–8
scope ambiguity 408–10, 482–5 see also Donnellan; Russell
descriptions, indefinite 529 n. 12, 532–3
and anaphora 534
determination of meaning 218–20, 223–5
as best approximation 224, 230
in Davidson 224, 1006–18, 1065–7
semantic overdetermination 224
semantic underdetermination 78–9, 224, 259, 282–3, 383–7, 537 n. 23, 769 see also Davidson; indeterminacy; Quine
Devitt, Michael
causal theory of reference 35 n. 76, 502, 504, 513
on holism and localism 217–18
and common sense realism 987, 988, 990–3
against Dummett's theory of understanding 993–5, 1000
direct reference theories 327–8, 337, 491–3, 503, 505–7, 543, 550–1, 569
division of linguistic labour 131, 142, 327, 513
and deference 135–6 see also externalism, linguistic
Donnellan, Keith
on definite descriptions 529, 831, 412, 414–5
and referential‐attributive distinction 346–7, 411–5, 480–4, 529–30, 537
Dowty, David 710
Dretske, Fred 179 n. 4, 133–4, 184, 187, 296
indicator semantics 178–9, 309–11
on learning 179, 187, 318 n. 9
on misrepresentation 179
Duhem, Pierre 75, 78, 82
Dummett, Michael
acquisition and manifestation arguments 986, 1001–4
against semantic realism 986, 989–1001
anti‐holism 216, 226–7, 229
on assertability conditions 81–2, 162
on canonical evidence 82, 229
and Davidson 81–2, 131, 215, 226, 620
interpretation of Frege 17 n. 35, 25 n. 56, 25 n. 57, 27 n. 63, 31 n. 71, 34, 35 n. 78, 61–2, 64, 65, 440
on knowledge of language 133, 226, 298, 942–3, 954–5, 970, 980, 999–1000
on knowledge of meaning as transparent 335–7
on language as social 131–3, 946 n. 10, 966–7
on names 461–2, 483, 502
on philosophy of language 61–2, 64, 942, 983–4, 989
on predicates 424 n. 1, 443, 444 n. 19, 451–4, 458, 460–5
and psychologism 121–3, 125, 993–4
on realism/antirealism 983–6
on sense 25 n. 56, 25 n. 57, 27 n. 63, 35 n. 78, 81
on theory of meaning as theory of understanding 81, 120–1, 942, 966–8, 998–1000
on T‐sentences and circularity objection 620
on Wittgenstein 162
E‐languages, 373 n. 28, 945–6
empty names, see names
Evans, Gareth
on definite descriptions 415 n. 26, 417 n. 32
on descriptive names 582–4
on indeterminacy of translation 243–4
on knowledge of reference 404–6, 520 n. 5
principle of rigidity for singular referring terms 417–19
on proper names 398–9, 401, 406–7, 503, 504, 582–4
(p. 1073)
on sense and reference 398–9, 706
on tacit knowledge 997
on temporal anaphora 709–10
and tense 704, 706, 708
and Wright 997–8
externalism, linguistic 129–33
platonist accounts 130, 946, 960–1
social accounts 131–3, 917–923, 946
externalism, semantic
extension to mental content 327–8
and inferential role semantics 318
and interpretation of indeterminacy of translation 240–4
and need of internal features 332–9
physical externalism 133–7, 325–7
social externalism 135–6
and triangulation in Davidson 1008–15 see also Burge; Putnam; Twin‐Earth arguments
fictional names, see names
Field, Hartry
on abstract objects 283, 284
on conceptual role semantics 214, 298, 299
deflationism 607–9, 616, 620
Fodor, Jerry 129, 176, 298, 1057
on compositionality 300, 655–6, 930 n. 22, 933
against holism 177, 215–17, 226–30
on modularity of mind 261–3, 351–2
on theory of content and semantics 129, 133–4, 179–80, 251 n. 5, 263 n. 35, 310–12, 314, 345, 375 n. 33
on language of thought 129, 345, 375 n. 33, 832 n. 9
Fogelin, Robert
on metaphor 852–3, 854–5
Forbes, Graeme 504
formal semantics 190–9, 264, 557–72
model theoretic semantics 195–6, 199
Frege, Gottlob
and belief‐reports 271–81 676–7, 680–2, 828 n. 6
and compositionality 13, 21–2, 191–2, 658–60
and compound thoughts 191, 192 n. 9
and concept horse paradox 457–8, 461 n. 28
on concepts and objects 6–13
context Principle 645–7, 659–60
Fregean sense and primary intensions 574, 575, 577, 596, 602–3
Frege's puzzle 22, 347, 478–80, 492
definition of ‘thoughts’ 26–34, 65, 330–2
on formal vs. natural languages 4–5, 41, 62, 190–93, 917 n. 6, 929 n. 21, see also Montague
on functions‐arguments and functional expressions 6–9
on judgement 18–20, 622 n. 36
on laws of logic 18, 28–9, 105–8, 110–13, 123–6
and mathematics 3–5, 22
on moods and non‐declaratives 870 n. 13
on predicates 9–13, 31–5, 424, 440–1, 449–58
on proper names 21, 24–5, 395, 398, 400–1, 478–80, 493 n. 4, 494–7, 538
and psychologism 105–126, 328 n. 11
on quantification 826–8
on quantification and second‐order logic 717 n. 4, 745 n. 41, 748, 796, 811, 831–2
and Reference Principle 455–7, 467–70
on sense and reference 21–34, 62–5, 330–2
on temporal indexical sense 694–5, 705–6
on tone 64, 94
on ‘true’ and conception of truth 17–20, 105–12, 623–4
on truth‐value and truth‐conditions 14–7, 62–5, 331
Geach, Peter T. 407 n. 17, 440, 458, 470 n. 33, 504, 750–1
Geach rule on quantification 814–6
Goldfarb, Warren 165
Goodman, Nelson
against abstract objects 283–4
on metaphor 846, 849
grammar 684–6
deep vs. surface grammar 834–6
and idiolects 141–2, 146–8
knowledge of vs. theory of 963–4, 970–7, 980, 1000
and logical form 42–3, 822–40
in the Tractatus, see Wittgenstein
universal, 114–15, 127–8, 958 n. 27, 956–9, 980, see also Chomsky
Grice, Paul 95–7
on conditionals 97, 777–8, 780–82
on conversational implicatures 95–6, 252–3, 775–8, 898–9
and intention‐based semantics 96, 251–4, 376–7
on reflective intentions 255 n. 22, 900
and semantics/pragmatics distinction 343, 376–7, 386, 769
and metaphor 855–7
vs. relevance theory 257–60, 265 n. 37, 341, 350, 353, 787–8, 857 n. 43
on what is said 96, 254 n. 16, 343, 386
Gupta, Anil
on minimal theory of truth 615
(p. 1074) Hale, Bob 159, 1003–4, see also Wright
Harman, Gilbert 900
inferential role semantics 177, 214–15, 205 n. 30, 296, 313
on reasoning 302–3, 900
Heidegger, Martin 64, 926
Heim, Irene 712
Hempel, Gustav 214, 220
Higginbotham, James 370 n. 22, 676 n. 9, 698
on indexicals 370n. 2
on tense 700–2, 704, 705, 710
on plurals 740 n34, 744, 749
on quantification 794, 807
Hill, Christopher 617–8
simple substitutional theory of truth 615, 617
Hintikka, Jaakko
on ‘believe’ as an operator 287–8
on quantified modal logic 563
Hodges, Wilfrid
on compositionality 640 n. 20, 644, 646–7
holism 213–30
and analytic/synthetic distinction 228, 229–30
belief holism 215–17, 227–8, 229–30
and inferential role semantics 217–19, 228
problems for communication 227
and problem of learning 226–7
and total change arguments 227, 230 see also Davidson; Quine
Hornsby, Jennifer 896
Horstein, Norbert 693, 836
Horwich, Paul
minimal theory of truth 609–10, 612, 614–18, 620, 622
on compositionality 643–44
Huang, C.T.J. 836–7
Humanity Principle 81–2
Hume, David 71, 84, 115–6, 118
I‐languages 373, 946 n. 8, 970, 974
identity‐statements 448–55
and Frege's Puzzle 348, 22, 347–8, 449–51, 478–80, 492
in relevance theory 347–8
idiolects 85, 128, 131, 140–8, 154–9
and compatibility with externalist views 143–4
illocutionary act 386–7, see also speech acts
implicatures
conventional 95–66, 775, 899, 253
conventional implicatures and conditionals 781–3
conversational 95–6, 97–8, 252–4, 775–8, 898–9
indeterminacy of meaning 78–9, 233–48
argument from above 78–9, 244–7
argument from below 239–44
and indeterminacy of translation argument in Quine 233–5
and indeterminacy of syntax 972
and inscrutability of reference 236–9
and underdetermination of semantics 383–4 see also Quine
indexicals
character/content 569, 578–80
and direct reference 550–1, 569
hidden indexicals 348–50
non‐referential uses 540–1
pure indexicals vs. demonstratives 544, 568–9
and proper names 490 n. 1, 599,
and sameness of meaning 329–30, 332–3, 335–6
and speaker's intentions 544
and tense 701–9
and two dimensional semantics 334 see also demonstratives; Higginbotham; Kaplan; Perry,
information‐based theories 310–11, see also Dretske; Fodor
intension 574–5
and Carnap 561–2, 575
diagonal intensions 577, 581
and Fregean senses 32, 575, 596
intensional vs. extensional contexts 456, 468, 663
and Kripke 563–5, 575–6
and Montague 565–8
primary intensions 585–604
secondary intensions 585–9, 583–4, 597, 600, 602–4
two‐dimensional intensions 577, 581, 585–7, 591, 595 see also context; opacity; two‐dimensionalism
intention
attribution of 352–4 see also theory of mind
and Grice 376, 379 n. 44, 255 n. 22, 900
as reflexive 252, 255, 900–1
not a part of context 384–5
object vs. non‐object involving 412–14 see also intention‐based semantics
intention‐based semantics
Gricean, 251–4, see also Grice
Relevance Theory, see Relevance Theory
internalism 127–38, 323–39, 944–6 (p. 1075)
and conceptual role semantics 296
and individualism 137–8, 144–8
language internalism with semantic externalism 129, 311, 313, see also Fodor
interpretation
logical notion 424
radical interpretation in Davidson 80–2, 85, 198, 199–200, 215–16, 1010
radical interpretation vs. Quine's indeterminacy of translation 81 n. 51, 198, 203, 240 see also Davidson
Jackendoff, Ray
and internalist semantics 922, 925 n. 16, 927 n. 18, 929n. 31, 934 n. 25, 935
on syntax 756
Jackson, Frank
causal descriptivism about proper names 504
on conditionals 781–3
on truth aptness 625 n. 43, 627 n. 51
and two‐dimensionalism 588, 591–3, 595, 604
Kamp, Hans 660–1, 693, 568, 570–1, 712
Kaplan, David
on character and content 334 n. 20, 396–7, 542n. 32, 569, 578–80
on direct reference and ‘dthat’ 491 n. 3, 530–1, 536, 550–1, 569
on indexicals/demonstratives 568–9
on opacity and quantification 678
on proper names 502–3, 580
on propositional attitudes 274–5, 597, 678
Katz, Jerrold 373 n. 29
on communication 297
and language as abstract object 129–30, 946 n. 9
metalinguistic theory of proper names 504
Keenan, Edward
on quantification 794, 801, 804–5
Kenny, Antony
on knowledge of language 133
on Wittgenstein 44 n. 4
Kittay, Eva
on metaphor 849, 854 n. 31
knowledge of language 943–81
and first‐person authority 947–9, 959–79
as holistic 216
and innateness 953, 957–8
object of 974–8
knowing how vs. knowing that 133, 999–1000
as represented 206–8, 958–9, 999–1000
as tacit 948, 997–1000
conscious vs. non conscious 970, 976–8
as non‐represented 947–8
as object of linguistic inquiry 961–72, 979–81 see also acquisition of language; Chomsky; competence; Dummett
Kripke, Saul 575–6
arguments against description theories 273–4, 483–4, 498–502, 509–11, 599
on meaning and normativity 171, 318
on natural kind terms 487–8, 491, 512–13
and possible‐world semantics 563–5, 575–7
a posteriori necessity 575, 589–90, 603
and proper names 35 n. 76, 94, 97, 329, 397n. 3, 406–7, 502–3
on rigid designation 416–419, 476 n. 1, 478–9, 486–7, 536
on Wittgenstein, rule‐following and private language 153–63 see also rule following argument
Kuhn, Thomas
on metaphor in science 854
Lakoff, George
on metaphor 303, 859
language of thought 175–6, 950 see also Fodor
languages 952–3
as abstract or platonic objects 129–30, 946, 960–1
as conventional and social 84–5, 96, 131–3, 135–8, 140–8, 160–1, 323, 402–4, 905–6, 915, 917–23, 946, 960–1
arguments against existence of 917–23
historical changes 140–1
as individual 140–8
as idealisations 921
normative aspect 142, 147
as products of linguistic acts 131
as sets of utterances 121 see also externalism; idiolects; internalism
Larson, Richard
on strong compositionality 636 n. 10
on quantifiers 807, 813
cognitivist semantics 205–8
and interpreted logical form 290–1, 691 n. 2, see also Ludlow
Leibniz G.W. 1062,
and Frege on innateness of logic 125
Lemmon, E.J. 904
Lepore, Ernest
against holism 177, 215–17, 1067
on compositionality 655–6
and insensitivity of semantics 348–9
arguments against CRS, see Fodor
Lewis, Clarence Irving 97 n. 90, 1063
Lewis, David 585, 601, 215
on conditionals 97, 597, 780, 782, 785
(p. 1076)
on indices and context 369–70, 567
languages as convention 84–5, 96
on meaning without use 963
on causal descriptivism about proper names 504
and truth‐conditional semantics 380–1, 621, 905, 906 n. 7, 937 n. 29
literal meaning
cognitive grasp of 258, 261–2
and Davidson 96, 873, 875, 1058–9
explicature in Sperber‐Wilson 256 n. 23
and metaphorical meaning 846, 848–60
and non‐literalness 899, 901
as proper object of semantics 264, 343
problem for names and indexicals 539–41, 671
of sentences vs. utterances 257, 354, 371
and “what is said” in Grice 96, 252–3, 343, 898 see also semantics/pragmatics distinction
linguistics
and cognitive psychology 203–4, 944–5
and formal vs. natural science 130, 929–33
as giving up semantics 923–9
as giving up truth conditional accounts 933–4
and reference to speakers' knowledge 961–72
as science of I‐languages 127, 137, see also Chomsky
and speaker's reference 937–8
and social sciences 132, 137–8
as underdetermined by data 78
Loar, Brian 219
Locke, John 125, 1062, 1063
locutionary acts 386–7; see also Austin; speech acts
logic
free logic 400–1, 406, 409, 411, 53
syllogistic 822–5
second order 736–7, 742–7
as non psychological 105–9, see also Frege; logical constants; logical form; Russell; Wittgenstein
logical atomism, 41–4, 213 see also Russell; Wittgenstein
logical constants 111, 770–3
pragmatics of 774–91
and logical quantifiers 805–6
and permutation invariance criterion 806
logical form 770–3, 822–40
in Frege 826–8
in Russell 829–30
interpreted logical form ILF 290–9
and variable binding of quantification 832–7
and natural language 830–2, 838–40
logical positivism 61, 72–6
Ludlow, Peter 704, 706–7
on logical form 691 n. 2
on E‐type temporal anaphora 709–12
Lycan, W. 852
McDowell, John
and psychologism 119, 123
on realism/antirealism debate 167–171, 990
on proper names 400–1, 405
and de re sense 417 n. 31
on linguistic facts and language as common practice 943–4, 946 n. 10, 950–2, 969
McGinn, Colin 328 n. 9, 334 n. 20
McTaggart, John, paradox of time 695–7, 709, 713
manifestation argument, see antirealism
mass terms 722–4, 728–30, 734
May, Robert
on quantification and logical form 807, 813 n. 12, 815–16, 836
meaning
dispositional account of 156–7
as external, see externalism
in Frege 20–34
as indeterminate, see indeterminacy
as internal, see internalism
as literal, see literal meaning
natural vs. non natural 353–4
and normativity 171
as private, 105–7, 154
as public 203, 207–8, 946, 951–2
as propositional 491
sentence meaning vs. speaker meaning 341–2, 350–1
in speech sounds 941–5, 949–54, 971–2, 978–9
stimulus‐meaning 239–44
as truth‐conditions, see truth conditional semantics see also determination; indeterminacy
meaning, theory of
and philosophy of language 62–4
as theory of understanding, 120–1, 966, 993, 996 see also Dummett
as theory of truth, 80–2, 200–2, 620 see also Davidson
as use 161–3, 962–4, 967, 617 see also meaning; semantics
metaphor 845–60
causal theory 858
dead metaphors 858–9
Gricean theories 855–7
interaction theories 853–5
non‐cognitivist theories 857–9
and psycholinguistics 356–7, 859–60
(p. 1077)
simile theories of 851–3
substitution theory of 851 n. 20.
Mill, John Stuart
on denotation 394 n. 3
on natural kind terms 508
on proper names 270, 399, 491–2, 528, 536, 539 n. 27
Millikan, Ruth, 181–2, 185–7
modularity 262–3, 351–2, 356, 915
Moore, George Edward 87, 91, 426, 915 n2, 926
Montague, Richard 199, 367–70, 563, 565–8, 772, 806, 832–3
Moravcsik, Julius 927, 929 n. 21, 933 n. 24
names
complex 455
descriptive 582–5
fictional 398, 401, 410, 493, 534
natural kind names, see natural kind terms
proper names, see proper names
natural kinds terms
as “indexicals” 333, 599
as rigid designators 486–8
in two‐dimensionalism 599 see also Kripke; Putnam; Rigidity; Twin‐earth arguments
naturalist theories 175–87
and indicator semantics 178–80
and success semantics 180–1
Neale, Stephen 415, 534 n. 20, 254 n. 16, 386 n. 64
necessity
a posteriori 575, 589–90, 603
deep vs. superficial 582–3
epistemic 590–1
metaphysical 591
negation
pragmatics of 787–91
scope ambiguity 408–410, 482, 497 n. 11, 790, 829
Neurath, Otto Von 75, 83
Nunberg, Geoffrey
on indexicals 541, 544n. 2
on figurative language 849
opacity 667–87
in attitude reports 506, 676–82
in Davidson 667–8, 682–4
in Frege 676–7, 680–2
and modalities 672–3
and names 673–5
and quantification 676–82
in Quine 668–70, 677–9
in quotation 667, 675, 682–6
and tenses 671–2
ostension
and demonstratives, 42–54
and intentions 254–5, 352–3
linguistic vs. behavioural 259–61, 264, 353–4
and Wittgenstein 54–7, 1067
Papineau, David 181, 185
paradox
Frege's paradox of the concept Horse 457–9,
McTaggart's paradox of time 695–7
Russell's paradox 472, 735–6, 746, 760–4, 831
Kripke‐Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox, see rule‐following argument
liar paradox 558, 629 n. 58
paratactic theory
of belief reports 288–90
of non‐declarative sentences 874–6
Parsons,Terence 717, 749, 751, 761
Partee, Barbara
on time and temporal anaphora 697, 710, 790
and quantification 806, 815
Peacocke, Christopher
and conceptual role semantics 297, 303, 307, 314–5, 319
on analytic/synthetic distinction 313
Peano, Giuseppe 5, 827, 831
performatives, see speech acts
Perry, John 544–5, 695, 699–700, 701–4, 706
and unarticulated constituents 348, 860.
phonology 142, 20,4 949–55, 971–2
Pietroski, Paul
kimu thought experiment 183–4
on natural language semantics 929–30, 937
on quantification 735 n. 25, 750
Plato 1062, 1063
argument against relativism 1046
plurals 716–764
and distributivity 725, 728, 731, 737, 751–5, 757–9, 761–4
essential plurals 747–64
morphology 722–4
and partitive constructions 723, 726, 730–3, 742–7
and quantification 742–6, 752–5
semantics of 395, 398, 737–47
possible worlds semantics 574, see also two‐dimensionalism
pragmatics 98–9
and cognitive pragmatics 342, 354–7
and cognitive process 351–4
and lexical adjustment 343–6
and logical constants 774–791
(p. 1078)
predicates 422–473
in natural language 423
disquotationalist conception of 427–432
objectivity of predication 432
realist vs. nominalist accounts 433–8
ascription of reference to 465–7
Prior, Arthur 284 n. 30
on beliefs 287–8, 292
on quantification 444–8
on tense 692, 695, 696, 703
private language argument 53, 55, 89, 158–9
proper names 398–403, 491–507
causal‐descriptive theory 504
causal theory 35 n. 76, 329, 404–7, 502–4
in conceptual role semantics 304, 504
and definite descriptions 272–6, 409, 411, 477–80, 483–97, 829–30
descriptive names 582–3, 584–5
and direct reference 327–8, 337, 491–3, 502–3, 505–7, 543, 741
empty names 271–4, 279, 401, 405–6
as generalised quantifiers 805–6
as indexicals 490 n. 1, 599
logical proper names 394–5, 535, 671
metalinguistic theory 504, 539 n. 27
and quantification 438–44, 831 n. 8
as rigid designators 274, 399, 406–7, 418–9, 476–488, see also Kripke; Rigidity
as rigidified descriptions 486, 550–1, 593, 599–600
and substitution of 98–9, 455–6
in two‐dimensionalism 505, 582–3, 587–8, 599
propositional attitudes
as part of meaning 224
and psychologism 103
Quine's rejection of 77–9
and thought in Frege 26
propositional attitudes reports 267–93
and belief reports 284–6
in Carnap 562
de re attitude ascriptions 597
and face‐value theory 267–76, 278–82
and fictionalism 283 n. 22
hidden‐indexical theory 276–8
in Montague 567
and opacity 676–82
paratactic theory 288–91
and pluralistic minimalism 1048–50, 1052
and proper names 639 n. 18
and quantification 742
and speech acts 864 n. 2
and substituability and compositionality 468, 639–40
and two‐dimensional semantics 597
propositions
as abstract objects 283–4
individuation problem 283–4
Fregean 278–81
Russellian 270–3
Schiffer's pleonastic account 281–2
and sentences 822–3, 830–40
as sets of possible worlds 281 see also content; literal meaning; utterances
protocol‐sentences 75, 77
Putnam, Hilary 123, 227, 275
as a physical externalist 133–5, 296–7, 325–7, 329
as a social externalist and ‘division of linguistic labour’ 131, 135, 142, 327, 513
on natural kind terms as rigid designators 329, 333, 509–10, 512–13 see also Twin‐earth thought experiments
quantification 794–818
as binding variables at LF 811–13
conservativity 801–5
covert displacement 836–7
as generalised in natural language 795–807
existential 438–48, 570–2, 661–2, 718, 752, 771, 827, 829, 832
local vs. global 797, 800
on names vs. predicates 438–48
neutralist conception 444–6
plural quantification 742–6, 752–5
ontological commitment of 286–7, 438–48
and opacity 676–82
and scope 808–817
restricted 800–3, 832–3
substitutional 286–7, 445–6
and type‐shifting account 813–15
Quine, Willard O. 76–9
on analytic/synthetic distinction 77
and behaviourism 78–9, 115–16, 234–6, 247, 980,1063–4
and characteristics of stimulus‐meaning 239–44
and conceptual role semantics 220, 298–9, 309
on conventionality 77, 82
and disquotationalism 238–9, 427–32, 607–9
and holism 213–14, 220–1, 229, 239, 246–7
on indeterminacy of grammar 115, 972
on indeterminacy of translation and radical translation thesis 78, 197–8, 233–48
on inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity 236–9, 432
(p. 1079)
and learning problem 980, 1063–4
and logical empiricism and Carnap 76–7, 233–4, 247 n. 21
on opacity 668–70, on propositions 283–4, 830
on propositional attitudes 77–9
and quantification in propositional‐attitude reports 668, 677–9
and quantification about names vs. predicates 438–44, 831 n. 8
on singular terms and existence commitments 403 n. 13, 669–70
on synonymy 235–6, 246–8
on underdetermination of theory 244–7
on revisability 220
as a verificationist 77–8, 214, 220–1, 246–7
Ramsey, Frank 72, 315
on truth 610–2 on conditionals 598, 779, 783
on subject/predicate 422, 441
success semantics 180 see also Ramsey‐sentences
Ramsey sentences 592 n. 4, 603
realism/antirealism debate 983–1004
in Dummett 984–6, 992
and metaphysics 983, 991–2
realism, metaphysical 431, 433–8, 987–993
realism, semantic 984–6, 993–1001
arguments against 153–67, 1001–4
Récanati, François
on inferential process in communication 258 n. 25, 350, 900
on “what is said” and pragmatic determination 387 n. 68, 788, 1034
on “pragmatic ambiguity” 537 n. 23
on metaphor 860
reference 393–4, 516–54, 518 n. 2
in Frege 190
as indirect 28 n. 65
direct reference theories 327–8, 337, 491–3, 503, 505–7, 543, 550–1, 569
as a practice 397, 406–7
and scope 407–10
and simplicity 394–7
and uniqueness 397–403
and truth‐conditions 401–2 see also singular terms
reflexivity, token 701–4
Reichenbach, Hans 693, 698, 701–3
relativism
and contextual disagreement problem 361–3, 1044
about of truth 236–9, 368, 1044–7, 1063
linguistic relativism 432, see also translation; truth
Relevance Theory 254–6, 341–360
and cognitive pragmatics 354–7
difference with Grice 98–9, 257–63, 341
difference with contextualism 343, 350
and lexical adjustment 344–6, 356
on logical constants 787–91
on metaphor 345–6, 849, 857
and semantic/pragmatic distinction 98–9, 350–1, 371–5
Rey, George 311, 313, 318
on analytic/synthetic distinction 229–30
Richard, Mark
on relativism and contextualism 1044–5
Richards, I.A.
interaction theory of metaphor 853
rigidity 416–19, 476–488, 536
and definite descriptions 410, 415, 418–19
and natural kinds terms 511–13
and proper names 274–5, 279, 499–500
rigidified descriptions 486, 593, 599–600
rigidifiers 531, 550–1
Rorty, Richard
and “linguistic turn” 60
on metaphor 849–50
rule‐following argument 151–71
Kripke's sceptical reading 153–63
anti‐factualist reading 163–7
and McDowell 167–71
Rumelhart David E.
on literal meaning 849
Rumfitt, Ian 704, 707
Russell, Bertrand 68–72
and acquaintance 72, 528–9, 535
on definite descriptions 395–6, 408–15, 829–30
on descriptions as semantically incomplete units 481–4, 518 n. 2
and Frege 5, 9 n. 13, 21, 29 n. 67, 69–70
on logical proper names 394–5, 535, 671
on natural language 197 n. 18, 917 n. 6
on proper names as descriptions 273–6, 479, 483–97, 829–30
on relations 427, 468–70
Russellian propositions and belief‐reports 270–8
Russell's paradox 735–6, 831
on Wittgenstein 71–72
Ryle, Gilbert
on meaning 297, 298
and ordinary language philosophy 91–3, 775
Sadock, Jerrold 849
Salmon, Nathan 275, 492, 501, 502, 506, 507, 512, 513, 534, 538
satisfaction conditions 866, 1016
for desires in success semantics 181
and felicity in speech acts 92–3, 867, 904–5
(p. 1080)
and fulfilment conditions for imperatives and interrogatives 876–82
for predicates 1016
and sincerity conditions 866–7, 884–8
and truth‐conditions, see truth conditions
Saussure, Ferdinand de 314
scepticism about meaning, see rule following argument
Schein, Barry
on plurals 749, 751–3, 758–9
Schiffer, Stephen
on context and demonstratives 554n. 33
on hidden indexical theory of belief reports 276–8
on knowledge of language and ‘actual language relation’ 962–4
objection to two‐dimensionalism 600
on Russellian propositions 270 n. 4
on singular proposition and thought 552n. 6
Schlick, Moritz 72, 75
Searle, John 326, 343–4, 897, 377 n. 42, 465 n. 30
Chinese room and arguments against CRS 297, 313–8
classification of illocutionary acts 866–7, 902–3
on intentions 379 n. 44
on metaphor 849, 855–7
on speech acts 866, 897, 898, 900, 904, 931 n. 23
on proper names 493, 496
Segal, Gabriel
and cognitivist semantics 205–8, see also Larson
Sellars, Wilfrid
on conceptual role semantics 296–9, 314
on language games 214, 624 n. 40
on quantifiers and ontological commitment 445 n. 20
semantics
causal or indicator semantics 178–9
cognitivist semantics 208
conceptual and inferential role semantics 295–320 see also conceptual role semantics
intention‐based semantics 250–63
naturalist semantics 175–87
and non‐declaratives 864–890
as a part of linguistic competence 375
referential vs. translational 375
relativist semantics 1044–5
success semantics 133, 146, 180–2, 542 n. 31, 708–9, 886, 1007, 1034
teleosemantics 181–7, 296,
truth‐conditional semantics, see truth conditions; truth conditional semantics
semantics/pragmatics distinction 361–389,
cognitivist conception 371–5
indexical conception 368–71
and relevance theory 98–9, 350–1, 371–5
and reference problem 516–554
semiotic conception 364–7
in utterance theory 375–9
Gricean accounts 98, 343, 376–7, 386, 769
semiotics 364–7, 368, 379
sense and reference 23–4, 32, 330–2, see also Frege
sentences 627
imperative 870–81
interrogative 870–83
optative 883–9
sentences moods vs. utterances forces 864–8
and truth‐aptness 625–7 see also proposition, utterance
sincerity conditions, see satisfaction conditions
singular terms 517,
in Russell 272–3
and predication 465–72
as rigid 499, see also Rigidity
and existential commitment 443–5, 447
as simple expressions 395–7, 417
in reference theory 347
and single reference constraint 398–403 see also definite descriptions; proper names; reference
Smith, Barry C. 993 n. 11
on first‐person linguistic authority 976–8
Smith, Neil
on Chomsky 131
Soames, Scott 275
and Kaplan 386, 699
on names and natural kind terms 505–7, 512, 513, 538
on sceptical challenge 165–6
objections to two‐dimensionalism 599, 601
speech acts 893–907
classifications 894–6
felicity vs. truth conditions 92–3, 904–5
illocutionary acts 386–7, 866–8, 897–906
locutionary acts 386–7, 527 n. 11, 895–6
perlocutionary acts 377, 895, 900–1
and performativity 866, 903–6
semantics of 93, 897, 904–6
and sentences moods 864–8
speech sounds
physical properties 949–50
Sperber, Dan
on cognitive pragmatics 262 n. 34, 342 n. 1, 352, 356, 357, 373 n. 30
Relevance, see Relevance Theory
on unarticulated constituents 349
Stalnaker, Robert
on conditionals 783–7
on diagonal and expressed propositions 281, 580–1
on individuation of content 335 n. 22
on pragmatics and context 364 n. 1, 384 n59, 569–70
and two‐dimensionalism 598, 601, 604
Stampe, Denis
and indicator semantics 178, 310
Stanley, Jason
on hidden indexicals and logical form 349–50, 790–1, 860
on quantifiers 1025–7
Stavi, Jonathan
on quantification 801, 804–5, see also Keenan
Stern, Josef
on metaphor 860
Stich, Stephen 229
Strawson, Peter F.
on communicative intentions 900
on context 402–3, 516, 831
illocutionary account of truth 612
pragmatic account of conditionals 774, 777
on predicates 436–7, 452, 455
on presupposition 93
on proper names 455, 493–6, 497 n. 13
on reference 93, 325 n. 3, 401–5, 408–9, 516, 535, 542
symbols
and conceptual roles 300–5
syntax
indeterminacy 972
and hidden constituents 248, 348–9, see also unarticulated constituents
and truth‐aptness 625–8
and semantics 315–18 see also grammar
syntacticism, disciplined 625–8
Szabo, Zoltan G.
on compositionality 635 n. 6, 637–8, 639 n. 18
on quantifiers 1025–7
Tarski, Alfred 34, 80, 193–7, 201, 237–9, 557–60, 608, 773, 806, 838–9, 916
on quotation 683–4
and Davidson 289, 291, 620, 683–4
teleosemantics 181–7
tense 689–714
A‐theories (in tensed metalanguage) 691–2, 694–7, 698
B‐theories (in detensed metalanguage) 693–4, 695–7
complex tenses 692, 698, 710
and indexicality 699–709, 711
and opacity 671–2
tense logic 15 n. 33, 690–2 see also anaphora, temporal
theory of mind 262, 265, 352, 356–7, 992, 1018 n. 15
and Gricean theories 252 n. 6
and modularity 262–3, 356 see also autism; intension‐based semantics
translation
indeterminacy of, see indeterminacy
radical in Quine, see indeterminacy
radical translation experiment and Davidson, see radical interpretation
as a test and account of meaning in CRS 299–300, 306–9, 314
in T‐sentences, 193, see also T‐sentences
Travis, Charles 209–10, 897
true
as content‐redundant in Frege 18, 105–9, 125, 623–4
as a disquotational predicate 607–8, 616
as a eliminable predicate 610–11
as a logical property 612
not even a predicate 611–12
as a performative mark 612
scope 616–17
in ‘taking true’ commitment 624
truth
analytic/synthetic distinction, see analytic/synthetic
by convention 77
disquotationalism 607–9, 613–19
first order vs. second order 619
illocutionary deflationism 612
minimalism 177n. 9, 609–10, 617
and public answerability 105–9
prosentential theory 611–12
redundancy theory 610,
relative vs. absolute 196
as relative in Tarski 194–7
as relative in Quine 236–9
as relative to context of use in Montague 368
robust theory 613
in Russell 69–70
simple substitutional theory 615
and syntacticism 625–8
truth‐aptness 625–8
truth‐conditions
absolute vs. relative 381
(p. 1082)
vs. assertibility conditions 162, see also assertibility conditions
in causal theories 178–80
and context 209–10, 332, 344, 380–5
and propositions 269, 380 n. 50
and reference 401–10
in success semantics and teleosemantics 180–3
and truth‐value in Frege 62–5
truth‐conditional semantics 380–1
in Davidson 80–5, 94–5, 620
vs. deflationist accounts 620–2
as insufficient account of meaning, 64, 94, 96–7, 380–7
for non‐declaratives 870–6
vs. relevance theory accounts 255–7, 264, 265 n. 37, 350–1
standard view 380–1,
as underdetermined 383, 385
T‐sentences 193–7, 405–6, 558–9, 607–8, 620–1, 625–8, 651
and substitutional quantification 614–15
Twin‐Earth thought‐experiments 134–5, 325–8, 333–5, 337
Chomsky's criticism of 134–5
two‐dimensionalism 575–604
and “actually” operator 583–5
diagonal intensions 577, 581
epistemic two‐dimensionalism 588–93
and Fregean sense 596
on indexicals 568, 578–80
primary intensions 585–604
on propositions 595–6
secondary intensions 585–9, 583–4, 597, 600, 602–4
two‐dimensional intensions 577, 581, 585–7, 591, 595
and semantic pluralism 593–6
unarticulated constituents 348–50, 860
underdetermination, see determination, indeterminacy
utterance
individuation of 895 n. 3, 898
and propositions 343, 1047–51
and sentences 948 n. 16
and speech acts 895–6
theory of utterance interpretation 375–8
vagueness
in ordinary language vs. formal languages 86, 130, 191
and thruth 190, 628
vague predicates 190
as context sensitive 1021–2
as interest‐relative 1038–1040
validity
as acceptation (validating principle) 219–20
and meaning determination 219–20, 223–5, 228
verification‐conditions, see verificationism
verificationism 73, 81–2, 309
and holism in Quine 214, 229, 246–7, 309
and Dummett 82, 229
and metaphor 847
and realism 246–7
Walton, Kendall 860
Warnock, Geoffrey
on performatives 904
Weatherson, Brian
on conditionals 597–8
Westershal, Dag
on compositionality and quantification 651 n. 46, 652–3, 803, 805
Wiggins, David
on language as social object 946 n. 10
reference of predicates 461, 463–5
Williams, Bernard 114 n. 15, 115–16
Williams, Michael 618
Williamson, Timothy 745
on ‘every’ and quantification 743, 1026
Wilson, Deirdre
and cognitive pragmatics 352, 353, 357, 373 n. 30
on metaphor 346
Relevance, see Relevance Theory; see also Sperber
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
on beliefs 67, 90–1
conception of philosophy 40–2, 46–7, 58, 60, 66–8, 86
and Davidson 1016 n. 11, 1065
on first‐person 90–1
and Frege 41, 43, 65–6, 162
on language‐games 48–53, 56–7, 87–8
on logic and grammar 42, 51–2, 57, 66–8, 86–7, 90–1
and logical atomism 43–4, 47–8
on logical constants 426, 772–3
and logical empiricists 72–3
on meaning as use 50, 53–6, 88–9
Philosophical Investigations 40, 45, 48, 50, 53, 86–91, 151–2, 216
pictorial theory of language 44–6, 65
on private language argument 55–6, 88–9, 90, 158–9
and proper names 493, 496
on rule‐following 53–5, 87–9, 151–2
and Russell 41–3, 68, 70–2, 772–3
(p. 1083)
on samples 48–53, 56–7
on sense and reference 66
Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus 40–8, 50–3, 56, 57, 60, 65–8, 70–1, 73, 86, 151, 162, 773
and truth‐conditional semantics 44–6, 65–8, 89, 120–3, 871 n. 15 see also Private Language Argument; rule following argument
Wright, Crispin
on ascription of reference to predicates 465–7
on Frege 441, 456 n. 23
and manifestation argument 1001–4
“platitude” about meaning and truth 1001
on rule following 154, 159–61, 164–6
and tacit knowledge 997–9
and truth 625–6, 991, 995–6
Yablo, Stephen 603–4, 740, 744
Zadrozny, Wlodeck,
on compositionality 641–2