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date: 19 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Two philosophers may accept the face-value theory and therefore agree that the things we believe are propositions — abstract, mind- and language-independent entities that have truth conditions, and have their truth conditions both essentially and absolutely — but disagree about the further nature of those propositions. This article presents a brief critical survey of some of the options. There are problems with the Russellian face-value theory of belief reports. These problems were first clearly stated in Frege's ‘On Sense and Reference,’ published in 1892, where he renounced the Russellian face-value theory he formerly held and supplanted it with a theory examined in this chapter.

Keywords: face-value theory, abstract, language-independent entities, mind-independent entities, truth conditions, belief reports, sense and reference

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