Abstract and Keywords
Naturalist theories of meaning aim to account for representation within a naturalist framework. This programme involves two ideas: representation and naturalism. Both of these call for some initial comment. To begin with the former, representation is as familiar as it is puzzling. Sentences can represent, and so can mental states. By and large, naturalist theories of meaning take mental representation to be basic, and linguistic representation to be derivative. Most such theories aim first to account for the representational powers of mental states — paradigmatically beliefs — and then to account for the representational powers of sentences in public languages by viewing the latter as in some sense ‘expressing’ mental states.
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