Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 24 May 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article explores the relation between language and thought. The term ‘thought’ is an abstraction. It has its uses: for many philosophical purposes one may simply want to abstract from the linguistic forms that structure propositions, and concentrate on their content alone. But that should not confuse us into believing in an ontology of such entities as ‘thoughts’ – quite apart from the fact that, if we posit such entities, our account of them will not be generative and be unconstrained empirically. Where the content of forms of thought that have a systematic semantics corresponds to a so-called grammatical meaning – meaning derived from the apparatus of Merge, phasing, and categorization – minimalist inquiry is a way of investigating thought, with syntax–semantic alignment as a relevant heuristic idea. Having the computational system of language in this sense equates with having a ‘language of thought’, with externalization being a derivative affair, as independent arguments suggest. Thus, a somewhat radical ‘Whorfian’ perspective on the relation of language and thought is developed, but, it is a Whorfianism without the linguistic-relativity bit.

Keywords: thought, language, meaning, Whorfian perspective, semantics, minimalism

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.