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date: 29 February 2020

(p. 1066) Subject Index

(p. 1066) Subject Index

accountability:
and coalition governments 729
and electoral systems 468, 724, 726–7
direct effects of 727–8
indirect effects of 729–30
and income redistribution 85
and representation 724–5
and retrospective voting 468
actor‐network‐theory (ANT) 940
Administrative Procedure Act (USA, 1946) 214
and implications of 278–80
administrative state 256–7
advertising, see political advertising
Africa, and democratization 664
African Financial Community 588
age, and international trade 825–6
agency discretion 214–16
agenda‐setting:
and centralized agenda powers 155–6
omnibus bills 156–7
policy direction 156
and judiciary 211
and legislative organization:
agenda‐setting offices 145
evolution of agenda‐setting powers 146–7
types of agenda power 149–51
and negative agenda power 149–50
gridlock 151–2
reactions to gridlock 152
roll rates of veto players 153
and parliamentary systems 125–6
and positive agenda power 153–5
counterbalancing of 154–5
decentralization of 154
and presidential veto power 245
and procedural cartel theory 229, 230
agglomeration, see economic geography
alliances, and anarchy 892–3
Allnut vs Inglis (King's Bench, 1810) 350
ally principle, and delegation 260, 262–3, 264, 266, 267, 269
altruism:
and cooperative behavior 953
parental 18 see also behavior; cooperation
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) 538
American politics, new separation‐of‐powers approach to 199–202, 218–19
and the bureaucracy 212–16
agency discretion 214–16
control of 213–14
development of new approach 212–13
and causality 201
and decision‐making sequence 219
and degrees of freedom problem 201
and implications for empirical analysis 201
and institutional interactions 200, 216–17
telecommunications policy 217–18
and judicial review 217–18
and judiciary 207–12
agenda‐setting 211
appointments process 211
interactions with other institutions 207–8
judicial decision‐making 208–10
legislative override 209–10
limits on policy‐making capacity 210–11
and the presidency 202–7, 241–2
appointments process 204–7
interactions with other institutions 202
spatial model of budget problem 202–4
veto rights 202–4
and strategic interactions 200, 218–19
anarchy:
and absence of higher authority 881, 882
and alliance formation 892–3
and commitment problems 890–2
and contracts 881, 882
and guns vs butter trade‐off 882–3
determination of power 884–6
technologies of conflict 883–4
and hierarchical governance 893–4
and impact of norms and institutions 890
and international relations 881
and motives for negotiated settlement:
complementarities in production/consumption 888
destructiveness of war 886–7
risk aversion 887
uncertainty 887–8
and role of the future 890–1
and rules of division and level of arming 888–90
and trade and security policy 893
anthropology, and the state 709
appeasement 837
appointments process:
and American presidency 204–7, 247–9
and judiciary 211
approval voting. and voting theory 396–7 see also voting behavior; voting theory
(p. 1067) Argentina 314
and federalism 359
and financial crisis 595
and repression 681
Arrow's theorem, see impossibility theorem
audience costs:
and international conflict 841
and war 874–5
audience democracy 304
Australia, and constitution of 338
authoritarian government, see dictatorships and authoritarian government
balance of power, and conflict 831 see also international conflict
Ballot Act (UK, 1872) 686
bargaining:
and bicameralism 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
malapportionment 191
super‐majorities 189
and cabinet stability (Diermeier‐Merlo model) 173–4
and coalition formation:
demand bargaining 170–1
sequential bargaining (Baron‐Ferejohn model) 168–70
and committee decision‐making 917–18, 921–2
and international bargaining 766–8
and partisanship 607
and presidential veto power 245–7, 250–1
Baron‐Ferejohn model, and coalition formation 168–70
Baumol's ‘disease’ 538
behavior:
and cooperation 952, 953–4, 963–4, 978
altruism 953
evolution of strong reciprocity 960–1
explanation of 953–4
internal norms 961
as means not end 954
mutualistic cooperation 954–7
pro‐social emotions 962–3
requirements for model of 955–6
strong reciprocity 957–60
and evolutionary models of 4–5
co‐evolution of memes/genes 18–20
equilibrium 17
evolution of strong reciprocity 960–1
internal norms 961
mutualistic cooperation 954–5
other‐regarding behavior 17–18
parental altruism 18
pro‐social emotions 18–20, 962–3
reciprocal altruism 954–5
shirking 19
survival 17
vengeful behavior 18
and game theory:
cooperation 956–7
strong reciprocity 957–60
and mutualistic cooperation 953
and other‐regarding preferences 17–18, 952
and rational behavior 1034
and self‐regarding preferences 952
and shortcomings of standard models 951–2
and social preferences 952–3, 957
evolution of 953
behavioralism 30
Belgium:
and budget process 473
and ethnicity 854
and federalism 366
beliefs 1005–6
and colonial America 1006–7
and inequality 637–8
bicameralism 193–4
and chamber preferences 184
and coalition formation 175–6
and definition 180 n1
and information aggregation 192–3
and multi‐dimensional models 186–7
and multilateral bargaining theory 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
malapportionment 191
super‐majorities 189
and origins of 180–1
and rationale for:
compromise effect 182–3
minority protection 181
preservation of federalism 181
stability 182–3
and role of political parties 183
and spatial models of malapportionment 184–6
and spatial models of policy‐making 181–4
and super‐majority requirements 183 see also legislatures
borders:
and border regions 788
and defense/security issues 794–6
and determination of 792
and economic impact of 741
and state size 779–80 see also state size
bounded rationality 977–8
bravery 19
Brazil 325
and authoritarian government 702
and federalism 359
and financial crisis (1999) 524
Bretton Woods system 588, 590, 759
budget process:
and American presidency 202–4
and coalition governments 734–5
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
and public finance 470–4
centralization 470–1
contract approach 471–2
delegation 471–2
enforcement 472
impact of centralization 473–4
impact of electoral rules 472
stages of 470–1
bureaucracy:
and administrative state 256–7
and centrality of 256
and delegation 214–16, 256
administrative dominance 265–6
agency design 261–2
ally principle 260, 262–3, 264, 266, 267, 269
assumptions underlying models of 257–8, 268–9
bureaucratic capacity 267
commitment problem 268–70
empirical tests of 261–4
information asymmetries 266–7
instruments of 257
judiciary 269
modeling of delegation strategies 257–61
multi‐principals issue 267–8
nature of legislation 262–3
policy uncertainty 259–60, 262, 263, 266, 269
political context 264–5, 269–70
political control 265
political oversight 257, 264
political uncertainty 260–1, 263–4, 266
substitution effect 260, 263, 266
and legal control of 277–81
Chevron decision 280–1
implications of Administrative Procedure Act 278–80
and new separation‐of‐powers approach to 201, 212–16
agency discretion 214–16
control of 213–14
development of 212–13
Burma 681
Burundi 679
cabinet stability 165
and non‐cooperative bargaining 173–4
and structure‐induced equilibrium 166–7
California, and special interest gridlock 530
Cambodia, and terror 699
campaign financing 46, 61–2
and expenditure function 59–60
and interest groups 50, 52
and micro‐founded models of 51
and political advertising
directly informative 57–9
indirectly informative 54–7
and public funding 59, 60
and regulation of 51
and vote share 50–1, 59–60
Canada:
and economic openness 827
and ethnicity 855
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
candidates:
and electoral framework 66–7
and laboratory experiments on elections 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
and policy‐positioning 64, 81–2
deterministic voting 67–72
probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship model 72–7
probabilistic voting, stochastic preference model 77–81
and political advertising:
directly informative 57–9
indirectly informative 53–7 see also elections
capital mobility:
and fiscal competition 504–5, 508–9, 518–19
dynamics 514–17
and welfare implications of 505
capitalism:
and democracy 23, 601
class compromise 603
coexistence with 601–2
diversity of capitalist democracies 603–4
role of political power 604–5
and institutional diversity 602
and varieties of capitalism approach 602–3, 614–17
coordinated market economies 615
institutional complementarity 615
liberal market economies 615
relationship of economic/political institutions 616
role of economic institutions 614–15
state's economic role 650–1
welfare state 615–16
and welfare state 601–2
cartels 767
censorship, and United States Supreme Court 346
central banks:
as domestic and international non‐issue 523–5
and independence of 533, 536
centralization:
and budget process 470–1, 473–4
and policy outcomes 185
and voter preferences 185–6
charity 446
Chicago School 455, 767
Chile 314, 325
China 679
and economic development 531–2
and economic openness 827
and ethnicity 854
and repression 681
and terror 699
cities:
and attraction of 749
and economic geography 739
and economic policy 750–1
and equilibrium size 750
and labor mobility 743
and market size/access 743
and transport costs 749–50 see also economic geography
(p. 1069) citizen duty, and voting behavior 40–1
citizen‐candidate model 909
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 450–1, 452
and partisanship 607
and political failure 456
Civil Rights Act (USA, 1964) 276
class:
and class coalitions 609
and democracy and capitalism 603, 604–5
and electoral systems 613
clubs 780
clustering 742–3
and cities:
attractions of 749
economic policy 750–1
equilibrium size 750
transport costs 749–50
and firm linkages 744
and industrialization in New World 747–8
and Krugman‐Venables trade/location model 745–6
and labor mobility 743
and market size/access 743
and sequential growth 748–9
and technological externalities 745
and thick labor market 744–5 see also economic geography
coalitions:
and accountability 729
and agenda power 150
and budget deficits 734–5
and cabinet stability 165
non‐cooperative bargaining 173–4
structure‐induced equilibrium 166–7
and distributive politics 602, 608–11
class coalitions 609
public policy‐making 609
racial politics 610–11
re‐bundling of issues 610
and electoral cycles 549, 550
and formation of:
bicameralism 175–6
demand bargaining 170–1
efficient negotiations 171–2
ethnicity 860–2
sequential bargaining 168–70
structure‐induced equilibrium 165–8
and government spending 732–4
and institutionalism 162–5
cabinet stability 165
minority governments 164–5
reappraisal of existing theory 163–4
and non‐cooperative approach, consequences for research 175–6
and parliamentary systems 163
and veto rights 150
Coase theorem 529
coercion:
and organization of 719–20
and public sector economics 446
and societies with states 712–15
and stateless societies 710–11
cognition:
and change 1005
and paradoxes 971–2
collective action:
and cooperative behavior 963–4
altruism 953
evolution of strong reciprocity 960–1
explanation of 953–4
internal norms 961
as means not end 954
mutualistic cooperation 953, 954–7
pro‐social emotions 18–20, 962–3
strong reciprocity 957–60
and de facto power 676
and economic development 530
and the individual 985
and objects of 986–7
and organic state model of 981
and political parties 9–10
and unanimity rule 990–1
and unitary or multiple decision‐makers 983–4
collective choice:
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and game theory 905–6
core emptiness 910–12
and individual choice processes 973
and public sector 443–7, 457
collective preference theory 902–5
and core emptiness 908–9
and large populations 907
and opportunities for trade 906–7
collectivities, and social choice 972–3
committee decision‐making 916–17
and bargaining in multidimensional policy spaces 917–18
and committee bargaining 921–2
and core clustering 919–21
and Fiorina and Plott's experiments 918–19
and information aggregation 927–9
commitment problem 268–70, 675, 677, 890–2
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 803
common‐pool problem:
and public finance 465, 473–4
budget process 470–1
electoral rules 468–9 see also pork‐barrel politics
comparative institutional analysis 223
and pivot theories 238
analysis of roll rates 230–2, 234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
Comparative Manifestoes Project (CMP) 137–8
competitive federalism 360
compromise effect, and bicameralism 182–3
Condorcet criterion 103, 392, 403
conflict, and intergenerational conflict 536–8 see also international conflict; war
constitutional political economy 991–2
and constitutions as rules of the game 330–2
(p. 1070) constitutionalism 289–91, 307–9
and citizen motivation 290–1
and constitutions:
as consequentialist devices 290
costs of changing 308
diversity of 307–8
and contemporary work on 289
and contractarian theories 289, 291–7
contractual obligations 293
contractualist argument 293–6
falsity of 320–1
moral theory 293–4
objections to 291–3
rationalist agreement 294
reasonableness 293–4, 295–7
and conventions 295, 297–8, 308
and coordination theories 289, 297–9, 307–8, 321
acquiescence 297, 298
dual‐convention theory 297–8
and Hobbes 298–9
mutual advantage 298–9
and establishing government 299
coordination 299–301
empowerment of 301
and justice 301–2
and liberal distrust 291
and limitations of constitutions 302
and limited government 289, 305–7
and mutual advantage 291
and political economy approach 290–1
and representative democracy 303–5
audience democracy 304
corporate democracy 304–5
virtual representation 303–4
as two‐stage problem 301
constitutions 336–8
as consequentialist devices 290
and constitution‐level decision‐making 330–1, 336
and costs of changing 308
and diversity of 307–8
and economic policy 723–4
as expressive documents 329, 333–5, 339–40
constitutional relevance 336–8
and in‐period decision‐making 330–1, 336
and instrumental activity 329, 333, 334, 339–40
as legal documents 329, 331, 339–40
enforcement 331–2
intended audience 332
reform of 332
and limitations of 302
and popular ratification of 336
and procedural change 1042–3
admission of new members 1046
amendment procedures 1040–1, 1043
emergency powers 1046–7
escape clauses/nullification 1044–5
interpretative courts 1043–4
secession 1045–6
suspension of rules 1044
as rules of the game 329, 330–2, 339–40
distinction from constitutional document 331
enforcement 331–2
intended audience 332
reform of 332
and social choice 973
and state intervention 342
and survival of democracy 320–2
contractarian theories:
and constitutionalism 291–7
contractual obligations 293
contractualist argument 293–6
moral theory 293–4
objections to 291–3
rationalist agreement 294
reasonableness 293–4, 295–7
and falsity of 320–1
contracts:
and anarchy 881–2
and United States Supreme Court 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
conventions, and constitutionalism 295, 297–8, 308
cooperation 952, 953–4, 963–4, 978
and altruism 953
and explanation of 953–4
and game theory 956–7
strong reciprocity 957–60
and internal norms 961
as means not end 954
and mutualistic cooperation 953, 954–7
and pro‐social emotions 18–20, 962–3
and reciprocal altruism 954–5
and requirements for model of 955–6
and strong reciprocity 957–60
evolution of 960–1 see also behavior
coordinated market economies 615, 650–1
coordination:
and citizens in authoritarian regimes 1007–8
and constitutionalism 297–9, 307–8, 321
acquiescence 297, 298
dual‐convention theory 297–8
and Hobbes 298–9
mutual advantage 298–9
and establishing government 299–301
and international monetary relations 589
and political organizations 42
and political parties 10
Copenhagen Consensus 525
core:
and committee decision‐making 919–21
and core emptiness 908–9, 910–12
and hypotheses of 834
corporate democracy 304–5
corporate governance 724
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act (UK, 1883) 686
corruption:
and ballot structure 725, 727–8
and district magnitudes 729
and electoral reform 730
and electoral systems 469
and inequality 633–4
and intra/inter‐party competition 728
(p. 1071)
and judiciary 632
and plurality voting 725
Cuba 702
culture, and survival of democracy 324–6
currency policy, see exchange rates
cut‐points, and spatial theory of voting 33–4
Cyprus, and ethnicity 855
Czech Republic, and democratization 664
Czechoslovakia 314
and repression 681
decentralization:
and policy outcomes 185
and voter preferences 185
decision‐making:
and Administrative Procedure Act (USA, 1946) 278
and bicameralism 192–3
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and committees 916–17
bargaining in multidimensional policy spaces 917–18
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
Fiorina and Plott's experiments 918–19
information aggregation 927–9
and game theory 905–6
core emptiness 910–12
and judiciary 208–10
and social choice 972
and unanimity rule 990–1
deindustrialization 646
delegation:
and agency discretion 214–16
and budget process 471–2
and bureaucracy 256
administrative dominance 265–6
agency design 261–2
ally principle 260, 262–3, 264, 266, 267, 269
assumptions underlying models of 257–8, 268–9
bureaucratic capacity 267
commitment problem 268–70
empirical tests of 261–4
information asymmetries 266–7
instruments of 257
judiciary 269
modeling of delegation strategies 257–61
multi‐principals issue 267–8
nature of legislation 262–3
policy uncertainty 259–60, 262, 263, 266, 269
political context 264–5, 269–70
political control 265
political oversight 257, 264
political uncertainty 260–1, 263–4, 266
substitution effect 260, 263, 266
demand bargaining, and coalition formation 170–1
demand management, and the state 643–6
and impact of international liberalization 645–6
and impact of rational expectations 644–5
and institutional environment 644–5 see also economic policy
demand‐revealing mechanisms, and allocation of public goods 487–9
democracy:
and capitalism 23, 601
class compromise 603
coexistence with 601–2
diversity of capitalist democracies 603–4
role of political power 604–5
and characteristics of 312
and Coase theorem 529
and democratic transitions 617
and distributive politics 601
coalitional politics 602, 608–11
institutional design 602, 611–14
median voter theorem 604
partisanship 602, 605–8 see also Downsian model
and inequality 632–3
and paradoxes of rationality 43, 333
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non‐participation 38–40, 304
and representative democracy 303–5
audience democracy 304
corporate democracy 304–5
virtual representation 303–4
and survival of 312
constitutions 320–2
culture 324–6
economic crises 318–19
electoral chances 320
ethnic divisions 322–4
income redistribution 315–18, 319–20
institutional choice 320
military power 319
moderate government 321
nineteenth‐century doubts over 313
per capita income 314–15, 684–5, 705
in poor countries 319, 320
and theory of 679–82
allocation of political power 679–80
concessions by elites 680
democratic consolidation 680
elite coups 680–1
emergence of 683–4
relative political equality 679
repression by elites 681
transitory nature of de factor power 679, 680
and uninformed voters:
information aggregation 15–17
information revelation 11–15 see also democratization
democratic peace:
and international conflict/war 838
audience costs 874–5
institutional constraints 840–1
institutional incentives 842–5
normative explanation of 840
public opinion constraints 871–3
selectorate theory 842–5
(p. 1072) democratization 656–7, 665
as commitment mechanism 690
and elections 664
and elite agency 658–9
institution formation 659
role of regime crises 658–9
and political costs of 715
and post‐communist experience 659–60
elite competition 662–3
elite use of structures 661–3
role of informal institutions 664
role of the states 663–4
structural legacies 662
structures enabling elites 660–1
and redistribution 604
and structural preconditions 657–8
authoritarian legacies 658
economic performance/reform 657–8
and theory of 679–82
demography, and intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
dependency theory 760–1
developing countries:
and assumptions about 1003–4
and comparative political economy 530
dictatorships and authoritarian government 22, 704–5
as benign despots/stationary bandits 697–8
and citizen coordination 1007–8
and democratic transitions 705
and economic growth 693, 697
under co‐opting regime 702
organizational proliferation 703
under terror regime 700
and economic literature 694–5
and insecurity of 694–5
and lack of understanding of 693–4
and launching organizations:
co‐optation of 701–2
need for 696
organizational proliferation 702–4
strategies for dealing with 696–7, 704
terrorisation of 698–700
threat from 696
and natural resource exploitation 700, 704–5
and organizational theory of 695–7
and political sociology literature 694
and predatory nature of 698
and property rights 693, 694, 697
benign despots 697–8
under co‐opting regime 701–2
organizational proliferation 703–4
under terror regime 699–700
and selectorate theory 842–5
and social choice 972
and survival of democracy 315, 325, 326
and threats to 695
and typologies of 694
Diermeier‐Merlo model, and cabinet stability 173–4
‘Director's Law’ 610
discretion:
and bureaucracy 214–16, 258–9
and judicial independence 282 see also delegation
distance, and economic impact of 740–2
distributive justice:
and microeconomic approach to 374–6
and representative democracy 303
distributive politics:
and bicameralism 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
malapportionment 191
super‐majorities 189
and cross‐national variations 603–4
and democracy 601
coalitional politics 602, 608–11
federalism 613–14
impact of electoral rules 612–13
institutional design 602, 611–14
partisanship 602, 605–8
and impact of electoral systems 731–2
and international trade 823–4, 827
compensation mechanisms 826
economies of scale model 822–3
factor specificity 824–5
gender 825
Heckscher‐Ohlin model 815–18
neo‐Ricardian model 820–2
specific factors model 818–20
surveying of attitudes/support 826–7
types of trade 824
and median voter theorem 313–14, 604
and new structuralism 617–18
and state size:
income inequality 790–1
prevention of secession 788–90
and varieties of capitalism 614–17
coordinated market economies 615
institutional complementarity 615
liberal market economies 615
relationship of economic/political institutions 616
role of economic institutions 614–15
welfare state 615–16 see also income redistribution; inequality
distrust, and constitutionalism 291
divided government (USA) 134–5, 224–5
and judicial independence 282
dollarization, in Latin America 590–1
domestic politics:
and international conflict 832, 838–9, 875–6
audience costs 841
foreign aid 845–6, 847–8
institutional constraints 840–1
institutional incentives 842–5
leaders' motivations 838, 839, 870, 871–2
nation‐building following conflict 845–7
role of opposition 841
selectorate theory 842–5
tax and spending constraints 839
theories of influence of 839
(p. 1073)
and war 869, 875–6
audience costs 874–5
leaders' motivations 870
political institutions 870
public opinion constraints 870, 871–3
Dominican Republic 701
dual‐convention theory, and constitutionalism 297–8
duty, and voting behavior 40–1
economic and financial crises:
and budget process 473–4
and exchange rates 595
and political impact of 716
and survival of democracy 318–19
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 590, 591
economic development:
and collective action 530
and development theory 760–1
and electoral systems 735–6
and inequality 626–7
economic geography:
and agglomeration mechanisms 742–3
firm linkages 744
labor mobility 743
market size/access 743
technological externalities 745
thick labor market 744–5
and borders 741
and cities:
attractions of 749
economic policy 750–1
equilibrium size 750
transport costs 749–50
and costs of distance 740–2
implications for remote economies 742
and cumulative causation 751
and definition of 739–40
and externalities 751–2
and patterns of development:
‘great divergence’ 747
industrialization in the New World 747–8
Krugman‐Venables trade/location model 745–6
sequential economic growth 748–9
and spatial disparities 751
and spatial relationships 739, 740
economic growth, and authoritarian governments 693, 697
under co‐opting regime 702
organizational proliferation 703
under terror regime 700
economic liberties, and United States Supreme Court 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
economic methods in political science 912
and Arrow's influence 900
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and Downs's influence 900
and game theory 900–1, 905–6
core of cooperative games 901–2
non‐cooperative game theory 902, 906
Poisson games 910–12
and rational choice theory 899, 900–1
and Riker's influence 900–1
economic policy:
and cities 750–1
and constitutions 723–4
and form of government 724
and impact of electoral systems 723–4, 735, 765
direct effects on accountability 727–8
direct effects on government spending 730–2
electoral policy cycles 729–30
indirect effects on accountability 729–30
indirect effects on budget deficits 734–5
indirect effects on government spending 732–4
and role of the state 642–3, 652–3
macroeconomic demand management 643–6
socio‐economic institutional environment 649–52
supply‐side strategies 646–9 see also political‐economic cycles
economic sociology:
and definition of 937
and different approach required 937–8
and economic‐social action 948
and embededness 938–40
criticism of concept 939
network theory 939–40
uses of concept 938–9
and the field 941–3
definition of 941
organizational field 941
structure of society 941
uses of concept 942–3
and institutions:
definition of 945–6
interest‐based concept of 945–7
and interest 943–4
social relations 944
and perspectives of 938
and reciprocity‐redistribution‐exchange 948
economic voting:
and clarifying incumbent responsibility 578–82
and electoral cycles 548
and Fair's model 567–9
and Kramer's model 566–7
and prospective voting 569–71
pure prospective voting 571
as rational retrospection 572–5
and research on:
challenges facing 584
development of 582–3
origins of 565–6
and retrospective voting 569–71
principal‐agent relationships 570
(p. 1074) economics, and foundations of 976
economies of scale model of international trade 822–3
education policy, and inequality 629, 638
efficiency, economic 974
efficient negotiations, and coalition formation 171–2
El Salvador 681
electioneering, and political‐economic cycles 545
elections:
and analysis of 64
and democratization 664
and deterministic voting 67–8
office motivation 68–70
policy motivation 70–2
and forecasting of 34
and framework for 66–7
and laboratory experiments 917, 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
and legislature/parliament distinction 121–2
and median voter theorem 29, 31
and position‐taking by candidates 64
and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship model 72–3
vote motivation 73–5
win motivation 75–7
and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference model 77–8
policy motivation 80–1
vote motivation 78–9
win motivation 79–80
and public funding 59, 60
and spatial theory of voting 29–30
candidate divergence 35–8
criticisms of 30–1
cut‐points 33–4
paradoxes of rationality 38–42, 43
valence issues 32–5
and timing of 32, 549
parliamentary systems 124–5
voter behavior 12
and turnout 929–32
and voters' sources of information 43–6 see also candidates; economic voting; electoral cycles; electoral systems; median voter theorem;
political advertising; political competition, and theory of; political‐economic cycles; voting
behavior; voting theory
Electoral College (USA) 295, 298
and impact on government spending 731
electoral cycles:
and adaptive retrospective citizens 547–50
and coalition governments 549, 550
and context conditionality of 548–9, 550, 551, 559–60
and economic policy 729–30
and economic voting 548
and election timing 549
and electoral challengers 551–2
and evidence of 548–9
and exchange rates 595
and monetary policy:
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
and policy manipulation 550
and policy targeting 549
and policy timing 549
and post‐election electioneering 552
and rational expectations 550–1
and rational prospective citizens 550–1 see also economic voting
electoral equilibrium 81–2
and deterministic voting 67–8
office motivation 68–70
policy motivation 70–2
and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship model 72–3
vote motivation 73–5
win motivation 75–7
and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference model 77–8
policy motivation 80–1
vote motivation 78–9
win motivation 79–80
electoral systems:
and accountability 468, 724, 726–7
direct effects on 727–8
indirect effects on 729–30
and ballot structure 726
and categorization of 726
and class 613
and corruption 725, 727–8, 730
and cross‐country correlations 726
and distributive politics 612–13
and district magnitudes 726
impact on accountability 729
impact on government spending 730–1
impact on policy 765
and Electoral College (USA) 295, 298
and electoral formulas 726
impact on budget deficits 734–5
impact on government spending 730–4
and electoral incentives 102–3
district magnitude 109
ideological spread 111–12
party divergence 110–11
party factionalism 114–15
personal votes 112–13
and electoral rules 102
Condorcet criterion 103
and future research on 115
and government ideology 733–4
and impact of:
bias toward large parties 109–10
ideological spread 111–12
localism of representatives 112–13
on number of parties 106–8
party factionalism 114–15
party ideological homogeneity 113–14
party non‐convergence 110–11
(p. 1075)
on proportionality of party representation 108–9
voting outcomes 527
and impact on economic development 735–6
and impact on economic policy 723–4, 735
direct effects of accountability 727–8
direct effects on government spending 730–2
electoral policy cycles 729–30
indirect effects of accountability 729–30
indirect effects on budget deficits 734–5
indirect effects on government spending 732–4
and income redistribution 87–8, 90–2
and list proportional representation 104
and modeling outcomes of 452–3
and monetary policy manipulation 547–8
and plurality voting 104
and politicians' incentives:
direct effects on 727–8
indirect effects on 729–30
and presidential systems 107–8
and proportionality continuum 104–5
measures of proportionality 105
swing ratio 105
and public finance 468–9, 472
and responding to external shocks 765
and single non‐transferable vote 113, 114–15
and single transferable vote 112
and stability of 725
and strategic voting 102, 110
and threshold of exclusion 104–5, 106
proportionality of party representation 108–9
elites:
and democratization 658–9
elite competition 662–3
portable skills 660–1
use of structures 661–3
and European integration 803–4, 812
embededness 938–40
and criticism of concept 939
and network theory 939–40
and uses of concept 938–9
emergency powers 1046–7
emotions, and evolutionary models of behavior 18–20
endogenous institutions 4
and legislative organization:
committee expertise 10–11
committee system 8–9
political parties 9–10
preference‐based approach 7–8 see also legislatures
endstate justice 376–8
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate/procedural justice complementarity 379–81
equilibrium:
analysis of, and public finance 447–9
applications of 451–3
citizen‐candidate model 450–1, 452
issues to be covered 448–9
median voter theorem 448
party coalition model 451, 452
probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50, 451–2
problems faced by models 452–3
spatial voting model 452–3
and bargaining games 188
and coalition formation:
cabinet stability (Diermeier‐Merlo model) 173–4
demand bargaining 170–1
efficient negotiations 171–2
sequential bargaining (Baron‐Ferejohn model) 168–70
structure‐induced equilibrium (Laver‐Shepsle model) 165–8
and evolutionary models of behavior 17
and income redistribution:
restricted tax schemes 86–7
targeting of heterogeneous groups 92–8
unrestricted transfer schemes 88–92
and institutions as 1033–5
and pivot theories:
pivotal politics theory 227
procedural cartel theory 229
and political advertising 52
directly informative advertising 57–9
indirectly informative advertising 55–7
and political behavior 4
and statutory interpretation 275
and survival of democracy 312, 321–2, 323, 324–5 see also electoral equilibrium
equity flows, and impact of distance 741
essential states, and neo‐realism 835
Estonia, and democratization 664
ethnicity 852
and definition of ethnic group 852–3
and ethnic violence 857–8
cross‐national variation 857–8
definition of 857
deliberate provocation of 863–4
intraethnic politics 863
unitary actor explanations 862–3
and politicization of 853
as basis for coalition‐building 860–2
conflicting ethnic preferences 858–9
cross‐national variation 854–5
impact of economic modernization 859–60
political boundaries 856
pork‐barrel politics 861–2
post‐colonial environments 860
primordialist explanation of 858
research on 864–5
temporal variations 856 see also common‐pool problem
and racism and redistribution 1026
and social relevance of 853
cross‐national variation 854
and survival of democracy 322–4
Eurobarometer surveys 807
European Central Bank 591, 799, 803, 804, 810–11
European Coal and Steel Community 799, 801–2
European Commission 802, 804
and delegation 263
European Council of Ministers 804–5
(p. 1076) European Court of Human Rights, and Bowman vs UK (1998) 51 n2
European Court of Justice 799, 802
European Economic Community 799
European Exchange Rate Mechanism 524
European integration:
and attitudes towards, survey data on 807
and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 803
and constitutional convention 804, 810
and coordination problems 801
and Council of Ministers 804–5
and decision‐making processes 805–6
and democratic deficit 804, 806
and development of scholarship on 799–800
and economic motives 805, 806–7
and European Coal and Steel Community 801–2
and European Payments Union 801, 803
and exchange rates 803
and foreign policy 809–10
and historical‐institutionalist accounts 812
and institutional approach 800–1, 802, 808
commitment issues 802
and interest group politics 806, 807
and intergovernmental approach 800–1
and issue linkage 802
and monetary union 803–4
attitudes towards 806–7
and national preferences 806
and neo‐functionalist view of 808
spillover effects 802–3
and normalization of studies of 805–8
and path dependency 808–11
and political integration 804
and role of elites 803–4, 812
principal‐agent slack 804
and security concerns 801–2
and Single Market Program 803
and synthetic view of 807–8
and transnational bureaucracy 803
European monetary integration 589
European Monetary System 589, 590, 591
European Monetary Union 469
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
European Parliament 799, 802, 804
and policy positions of legislators 137
European Payments Union 799, 801, 803
European Single Market 799, 803
European Union:
and delegation 263
and federalism 359
evolutionary fitness 4
exchange:
and economics 989–90
and politics as 992–3
exchange rates 591
and Bretton Woods system 588, 590
end of 759
and centrality of 588
and dollarization 590–1
and domestic political economy of:
choice of regime 591–3
competitiveness/purchasing power trade‐off 593–4
electoral cycles 595
electoral politics 593, 595
exchange rate level 593–4
interest groups and regime choice 592
and European integration 803, 806–7
and fixed rate systems 588, 589, 590, 591–2
and free floating systems 588, 589
and gold standard 588, 589
and interest groups:
exchange rate level 595
regime choice 592
and internation political economy of 588–9
cooperation 590–1
coordination 589
nation state 588–9
and regional regimes 588, 590–1
and research on:
challenges facing 596
integration of domestic/international factors 595–6
policy substitutes 595
executive:
and parliamentary systems 122
control of legislative agenda 125–6
elections 124
election‐timing 124–5
executive coalitions 128
investiture votes 123
minority governments 128–9
no‐confidence votes 122–3
opposition parties 130
parliamentary support coalition 128
role of political parties 126–7
single‐party majority governments 129–30
and presidential systems:
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
executive/legislature dependence 130–1
role of political parties 131–2
executive orders, and American presidency 249–50
exit, and fiscal competition 512–14
experiments, see laboratory experiments
expertise, and legislative committee system 10–11
expressive activity 329
and political behavior 333–5
constitutional relevance 336–8, 339–40
expressive voting 41, 333–5
expropriation:
and authoritarian governments 699–700
and inequality 633–4
factor mobility:
and fiscal competition 504–5, 508–9, 512–14, 518–19
dynamics of 514–17
and international trade models:
Heckscher‐Ohlin model 815–18
neo‐Ricardian model 820–2
specific factors model 818–20
and state size 794
fair division 425, 435
and endstate justice 377
and indivisible goods 432–5
assumptions made 432–3
(p. 1077)
Borda Count 435
efficiency 432, 433
envy‐free division 432, 433, 434
paradoxes 432, 433, 434
Rawlsian maximin criterion 434
and procedural justice 378
and several divisible goods:
adjusted winner 429–32
efficiency 431
equitability adjustments 430
equity 431
and single heterogeneous good:
assumptions made 426
cut‐and‐choose 426–7
envy‐free division 426–9
squeezing procedure 428–9
and social choice 373 see also resource allocation
Federal Reserve System 541
federalism:
and bicameralism 181
and centralization/decentralization tension 358–9
and distributive politics 613–14
and economic problems 361
and economic theories 359–60
competitive federalism 360
‘Leviathan’ theory 360
public finance theory 359
welfare economics 359–60
and endogenous institutions 364
intergovernmental fiscal systems 365–7
political parties 367
representation 365
and goal of 358
and necessity of 359
and normative tradition 357, 367
and perspectives on 357, 367–8
and positive political economy literature 357–8, 361, 368
intergovernmental fiscal systems 363
nature of representation 361–3
political incentives 361
political parties 363–4
field, and economic sociology 941–2
and definition of 941
and organizational field 941
and structure of society 941
and uses of concept 942–3
filibusters 143
and pivotal politics theory 225, 226–7
financial crises, see economic and financial crises
fiscal competition 502–3
and basic model of 505–9
American local government 505–6
capital investment 506–7
capital mobility 508–9
interpretations and applications of 509–12
property taxes 505–9
and capital mobility 504–5
and exit and voice 512–14
and implications of 505
and institutional change 517–18
and labor mobility 504
and models of 504–5
tax competition 504–5
and nature of 503–4
and normative implications of 512
and perfect competition 503
and policy choice 502
and resource mobility 512–14, 518–19
fiscal institutions 465, 474
and budget process 470–4
centralization 470–1
common‐pool problem 473–4
contract approach 471–2
delegation 471–2
enforcement 472
impact of centralization 473–4
impact of electoral rules 472
stages of 470–1
and electoral rules 468–9
common‐pool problem 468–9
evidence of impact of 469
political competition 469
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
effectiveness of 466–7 see also fiscal competition; public finance
fiscal systems, and federalism 361–3, 365–7
flat taxes 527–8
flypaper effect 1025–6
folk theorem 710, 955
foreign aid policy 845–6, 847–8
foreign direct investment, and impact of distance 741
foreign policy:
and audience costs 874–5
and public opinion constraints 871–3 see also international conflict
free riding, and spatial theory of voting 39
free trade 758
and state size 782, 793–4 see also international trade
freedom of speech, and United States Supreme Court 344–6
Gallagher Index 105
game theory:
and application in political science 900–1, 905–6
and bicameralism 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
information acquisition 193
malapportionment 191
super‐majorities 189
and coalition formation:
cabinet stability 173–4
demand bargaining 170–1
efficient negotiations 171–2
sequential bargaining 168–70
structure‐induced equilibrium 165–8
and committee decision‐making:
bargaining in multidimensional policy spaces 917–18
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
(p. 1078)
Fiorina and Plott's experiments 918–19
and cooperation 956–7
and cooperative game theory 901
core of the game 901–2
and folk theorem 710
and non‐cooperative game theory 902, 906, 978
and Poisson games 910–12
and political economy 528
and social choice:
endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
endstate vs procedural justice 376–8
endstate/procedural complementarity 379–81
microeconomic approach to 374–6
strategy‐proof mechanisms 383–6
and strong reciprocity 957–60
Gamson's Law 172
gatekeeping authority, and legislatures 6
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 759
genes, and evolutionary models of behavior 18–20
geographical economics, see economic geography
geography, and fundamental importance of 740 see also economic geography
Germany:
and bicameralism 181
and budget process 473
and constitution of 320
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
and federalism 366
and special interest gridlock 530
Gibbard‐Satterthwaite theorem 383–4, 403
Gini coefficient 625
globalization 757
and demand management 645–6
and development theory 760–1
and global governance 769–70
and international financial crises 524
and nascent phase of 759
and sequential development 748–9
and supply‐side economic policy 648–9 see also international trade
gold standard 588, 589, 590
governance, and global governance 769–70
government:
and distribution of income 84–5
and fiscal competition 503–4
and purpose of 342 see also income redistribution
Great Britain:
and American colonies 1006–7
and colonial America 1038–9
and ethnicity 854
and political and economic development 673, 685
concessions by elites 688–90
education reform 687
emergence of democracy 686–7
interpretation of 688–90
origins of economic supremacy 685
political reform 685–7
reform of economic institutions 687
gridlock:
and legislative organization 151–2
and pivot theories:
pivotal politics theory 225, 228
procedural cartel theory 229–30
group rule utilitarianism, and voting behavior 41–2
Guatemala 681
habitus 941
Haiti 690
and political/economic development 673–4
Heckscher‐Ohlin theory:
and international trade
migration and investment 816–18
trade in products 815–16
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762
hegemonic stability theory 761–2
heresthetics 130
Hungary 320
and democratization 659, 661–2, 664
and repression 681
Hyde Park riots (1866) 686
identity, and constitutions as expressive documents 337–8
ideology:
and electoral systems 733–4
and party labels 44
and voter behavior 32, 34
imperfect information, and income redistribution 98–9
impossibility theorem 373, 601, 972
and economic outcomes 973–4
and markets 974
and political competition 1028–9
and social evaluation 409, 419
and voting theory 405–6
income, per capita, and democracy 314–18, 684–5, 705
income inequality, see inequality
income redistribution 84–5, 99–100, 313–14
and cross‐national variations 603–4
and electoral systems 87–8, 90–2
and ethnic heterogeneity 630
and federalism 365–7
and imperfect information 98–9
and increased preference for 631–2
and intergenerational conflict 536–8
and political institutions 630–1
and proportional representation 87–8, 635–6
and restricted tax schemes 85–8
and role of government 84–5
accountability of 85
and survival of democracy 319–20
and targeting of heterogeneous groups 92–8
and unrestricted transfer schemes 88–92
and voluntary redistribution 446 see also distributive politics; inequality
India:
and economic development 531–2
and economic openness 827
and election timing 549
and ethnicity 856
and federalism 359
indoctrination, and beliefs about inequality 637–8
(p. 1079) Indonesia 702
industrialization:
and inequality 626–7
and the New World 747–8
and newly industrializing countries 760
inequality 624–5, 639
and American exceptionalism 634–8
beliefs about inequality 637–8
economic explanations of 634
ethnic heterogeneity 635
failure of left‐wing movements 636–7
political institutions 635–7
and causes of 625–31
demand for skilled workers 627
distribution of skills 627–8
economic development 626–7
education policy 629
ethnic heterogeneity 628–9, 630
political factors 627
political institutions 630–1
religion 628
technology 627
welfare spending 629–30
and cross‐national variations 627–8
and measurement of 625
Gini coefficient 625
Kuznets curve 626
share of national income 625
and political impact of 631–4
corruption 634
democracy 632–3
expropriation 633–4
increased preference for redistribution 631–2
institutional structure 632–4
reduced redistribution 632–3
and state size 790–1
inflation:
and macro political economy 532–3
and public opinion 524 see also demand management, and the state
information 4
and aggregation of:
bicameralism 192–3
in committees 917, 927–9
voting behavior 15–17, 44–5, 46
and income redistribution 98–9
and social evaluation and information invariance 417–19
and voting behavior:
information aggregation 15–17, 44–5, 46
information revelation 11–15
sources of information 43–6
institutional analysis 223
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) 367
institutionalism, and coalitions 162–5
cabinet stability 165
minority governments 164–5
reappraisal of existing theory 163–4
structure‐induced equilibrium 165–8
institutions:
and approaches to study of 6
and choice of 1035–7
preference drift 1037
status quo bias 1036–7
uncertainty 1036–7
veil of ignorance 1035–6
and comparative analysis of 7
as constraint 1034
and definition of 945–6, 1032
and distributive politics 611–14
and dynamic nature of 1032
as equilibria 1033–5
as game forms 1032–3
and interest aggregation 764–6
and interest‐based concept of 945–7
and maintenance of 1037–40
incomplete awareness 1038–9
self‐confirming equilibrium 1038–9
self‐generating revision 1038, 1039–40
self‐stability 1041
and new structuralism 617–18
and origins of 617
and problems in studying 976
and procedural change 1042–3
admission of new members 1046
amendment procedures 1040–1, 1043
emergency powers 1046–7
escape clauses/nullification 1044–5
interpretative courts 1043–4
secession 1045–6
suspension of rules 1044
and research process 4
and Riker Objection 1032, 1040–2, 1047–8
and strategic social interaction and choice 1033
and varieties of capitalism:
coordinated market economies 615
institutional complementarity 615
liberal market economies 615
relationship of economic/political institutions 616
role of economic institutions 614–15
welfare state 615–16
instrumental activity 329
and constitutions 333, 334, 339–40
interdependence 759
interest groups:
and campaign contributions 50, 52
and economic practice 530–1
and European integration 806, 807
and exchange rates:
level of 595
regime choice 592
and older people 537–8
and political actors 528
and political advertising:
directly informative 57–9
indirectly informative 53–7
and political economy approach 528–9
and special interest gridlock 530
interests:
and interest‐based concept of institutions 945–7
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762–4
institutional aggregation of interests 764–6
and sociological concept of 943–4
social relations 944
intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
(p. 1080) International Coffee Organization 767
international conflict 838
and democratic peace 838
institutional constraints 840–1
normative explanation of 840
and domestic politics 832, 838–9, 875–6
audience costs 841, 874–5
foreign aid 845–6, 847–8
institutional constraints 840–1
institutional incentives 842–5
leaders' motivations 838, 839, 870, 871–2
nation‐building following conflict 845–7
public opinion constraints 871–3
role of opposition 841
selectorate theory 842–5
tax and spending constraints 839
theories of influence of 839
and international political economy 770–1
and national interest 831–2
and the state 710
and state size 781, 794–6
and structural theories 832, 833, 837–8
neo‐realism 833–6
power transition theory 836–7
and transformation of field of study 831 see also anarchy; international relations
international economics 739
international institutions, and monetary policy 541–2
International Monetary Fund 532, 541, 542, 589, 759
international monetary relations:
and cooperation 590–1
and coordination 589–90
international political economy (IPE):
and early approaches of:
dependency theory 760–1
domestic theories 762
hegemonic stability theory 761–2
and future research areas:
conflict and war 770–1
endogenous state formation 768–9
global governance 769–70
and globalization 757
and growth of 771–2
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 757–8, 762–3
characteristics of 772
institutional aggregation of interests 764–6
interests 762–4
international bargaining 766–8
success of 772
and origins of 758–60
and subject matter of 758
international relations, see anarchy; international conflict
international trade:
and distributional consequences 814–15, 823–4, 827
compensation mechanisms 826
factor specificity 824–5
gender 825
surveying of attitudes/support 826–7
types of trade 824
and economies of scale model of 822–3
and Heckscher‐Ohlin model of:
migration and investment 816–18
trade in products 815–16
and impact of distance 741
and neo‐Ricardian model of 820–1
migration and investment 821–2
trade in products 821
and specific factors model of:
migration and investment 820
trade in products 818–19
interpersonal comparisons, and social evaluation 408
intuitionism 294
investiture votes, and parliamentary systems 123
investment, and international trade models
Heckscher‐Ohlin model 815–18
neo‐Ricardian model 821–2
specific factors model 820
Iran, and ethnicity 855
Iraq:
and ethnicity 855
and terror 699
Ireland, Republic of, and constitution of 337
Italy:
and corruption 728
and electoral reform 469, 723
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
and federalism 366
Japan:
and election timing 549
and electoral reform 723
and electoral system 113, 115
and ethnicity 854
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
and political/economic development 674
judicial review:
and approach to 344, 354–5
and balancing private rights/government interest 343–4
and constitutional interpretation 1044
and intermediate scrutiny standard 343
and policy‐making 217–18
and protection of contract and property:
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
and rational basis standard 343
and social and moral issues:
equal protection of the laws 346–7
freedom of speech 344–6
and strict scrutiny standard 343
judiciary:
and bureaucratic delegation 269
and judicial independence 281–4
strategic interactions 282–3
and legal control of bureaucracy 277–81
Chevron decision 280–1
(p. 1081)
implications of Administrative Procedure Act 278–80
and new separation‐of‐powers approach to 207–12
agenda‐setting 211
appointments process 211
interactions with other institutions 207–8
judicial decision‐making 208–10
legislative override 209–10
limits on policy‐making capacity 210–11
and policy‐making 273
statutory interpretation 276–7
and positive political theory 273–4, 284
control of bureaucracy 277–81
judicial independence 281–4
statutory interpretation 274–7
and strategic interactions 274
judicial independence 282
statutory interpretation 274–7
and subversion of 632
and traditional legal analysis 273
justice:
and choice of institutions 1035–6
and constitutionalism 301–2
and distributive justice 303
microeconomic approach to 374–6
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate justice 376–8
and endstate/procedural justice complementarity 379–81
and procedural justice 378
Kikuyu 856
kleptocracy 85
Korea:
and ethnicity 854
and terror 699
Kuznets curve 626
Laasko‐Taagepera Index 106–7
labor market:
and agglomeration 745
and service sector 646–7
labor mobility:
and agglomeration 743
and fiscal competition 504
laboratory experiments:
and committee decision‐making 916–17
bargaining in multidimensional policy spaces 917–18
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
Fiorina and Plott's experiments 918–19
and competitive elections 917, 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
and future research areas 932–3
and importance of institutions 916
and information aggregation in committees 917, 927–9
and link with experimental economics 915–16
and requirements of 915
and voter turnout 917, 929–32
laissez‐faire 84–5
Latin America:
and democratization 664
and ethnicity 855
Laver‐Shepsle model, and coalition formation 165–8
law, and statutory interpretation 274–7
leadership theory 761
learning 1005–6
Lebanon, and ethnicity 855
legislative committee systems (LCS):
and acquisition of expertise 10–11
and exchange postulate 9
and legislative choice 8–9
and political parties 10
legislatures 4
and definition 121
and distinction from parliaments 121–2
and gatekeeping authority 6
and legislative choice 6
and measuring policy positions of legislators 136–8
and organization of 157–8
agenda‐setting offices 145
centralized agenda powers 155–7
committee expertise 10–11
committee system 8–9
creation of inequality 144–5
evolution of agenda‐setting powers 146–7
legislative state of nature 141, 143–4
negative agenda power 149–50, 151–3
plenary bottleneck 143–4
plenary time 142
political parties 9–10, 147–9
positive agenda power 149–50, 153–5
preference‐based approach 7–8
regulation of plenary time 141–2
types of agenda power 149–51
and parliamentary systems 122
elections 124
election‐timing 124–5
executive coalitions 128
government control of agenda 125–6
investiture votes 123
minority governments 128–9
no‐confidence votes 122–3
opposition parties 130
parliamentary support coalition 128
party discipline 126–7
role of political parties 126–7
single‐party majority governments 129–30
and presidential systems 130–1
committee system 135–6
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
role of political parties 131–2
and separation of powers 121 see also bicameralism
‘Leviathan’ theory, and federalism 360
liberal market economies 615, 650
liberalism, and international relations 832, 833
(p. 1082) liberalization:
and demand management 645–6
economic and political 531–2
and supply‐side economic policy 648–9 see also globalization
limited government:
and constitutionalism 289, 305–7
and United States Constitution 343
list proportional representation 104
Lithuania, and democratization 661–2
local government:
and basic model of fiscal competition 505–9
exit and voice 512–14
interpretations and applications of 509–12
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
and transfers from central government 465, 467
and United States 505–6
localism, and electoral systems 112–13
logrolling, and legislative choice 8
Loosemore‐Hanby Index of Distortion 105
Louisiana 308
Luxembourg Income Study 604
Maastricht Treaty 806
macro political economy:
and Coase theorem 529
and death of 525
and depoliticization of monetary policy 536
and extreme unforeseeable events 525, 539–40
requirements of international institutions 541–2
and independent central banks 533, 536
and inflation 532–3
and inflation/stabilization goals 533
and intellectual background:
comparative political economy 530
liberalization 531–2
political economy 528–30
public choice theory 527–8, 532
social choice 526–7
special interest politics 530–1, 532
and intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
and monetarist revolution 536
and political business cycle 534
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
and political vulnerability 533–4
and rationalization obsession 534–6
and research program of 526
and voter rationality 534–5 see also monetary policy
macroeconomic voting, see economic voting
majoritarian postulate:
and exchange postulate 9
and legislator preferences 7–8
majority rule:
and allocation of public goods 485–7, 489–91
and core in committee decision‐making:
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
Fiorina and Plott's experiments 918–19
multidimensional policy bargaining 917–18
as object of study 985
malapportionment, and bicameralism 184–6, 191
Malawi, and ethnicity 860–1
market access, and agglomeration 743
markets:
and impossibility theorem 974
and legislative interference with 342
and perfect competition 503
and public goods allocation 480–1
and public sector economics, property rights 444
and regulation 342–3
mechanism design 373
median voter theorem 65, 70, 71
and bicameralism 184
and candidate divergence 35
candidate preferences 37
political parties' platform choices 37–8
third parties 36–7
valence issues 36
and criticisms of 31
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 448
and income redistribution 313–14, 604
and inequality 631–2
and laboratory experiments on 923–4
and paradoxes of rationality 43
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non‐participation 38–40
and partisanship 606
as pivot theory 224, 239
analysis of roll rates 230–2, 234–8
and spatial theory of voting 29–30
and tax rates 86–7
and voters' sources of information 43–6
memes, and evolutionary models of behavior 18–20
methodology, and political economy 3–4 see also economic methods in political science; laboratory experiments
Mexico 367
and authoritarian government 702, 703–4
and economic openness 827
and financial crisis (1994–5) 524, 595
migration:
and agglomeration 743
and international trade 823–4
Heckscher‐Ohlin model 815–18
neo‐Ricardian model 821–2
specific factors model 820
types of trade 824
military power, and survival of democracy 319
minority governments:
and agenda power 150
and cabinet stability 173–4
and institutionalism 164–5
and parliamentary systems 128–9
and veto rights 150
moderate government, and survival of democracy 321
monetary policy:
and depoliticization of 536
as domestic and international non‐issue 523–5
and electoral cycles 547–8
and extreme unforeseeable events 525, 539–40
requirements of international institutions 541–2
and improvement in 524
(p. 1083)
and independent central banks 533, 536
and inflation 532–3
and inflation/stabilization goals 533
and intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
and international financial crises 524
and monetarist revolution 536
and political business cycle 534
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
and political vulnerability 533–4
money supply, and monetary policy 533–4
motivation, and expressive activity 333–5
multimember districts 104
mutual advantage, and constitutionalism 291, 298–9
mutualism, and cooperative behavior 953, 954–7
nation state, see state, the
national identity, and constitutions as expressive documents 337–8
national interest, and international conflict 831–2
National Labor Relations Board 206–7, 213–14
national policy, and political economy research 1000
National Reform Union (UK) 686
National Rifle Association 14
nationalism, and modernist theories of 859–60
nation‐building, post‐military intervention 845–7
natural resources:
and authoritarian governments 700, 704–5
and state failure 715–16
neo‐liberal institutionalism 767
neo‐realism:
and international relations 832, 833–6
assumptions about 833
bipolarity/multipolarity 834
core hypotheses of 834
defection strategy 835–6
essential states 835
evidential weakness 836
falsity of theorems 835
as non‐cooperative game 833–4
resource allocation 835
stability 834–5
and the state 837
neo‐Ricardian model of international trade 820–1
and migration and investment 821–2
and trade in products 821
network theory, and embededness 939–40
new institutionalism, see institutionalism
New International Economic Order 759
new structuralism 617–18
New World, and industrialization 747–8
New Zealand 319
and economic openness 827
and electoral reform 723
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
Nicaragua 701–2
no‐confidence votes 122–3
NOMINATE, and measuring policy positions of legislators 136–7
oil price shocks 524, 759
open access orders 1004
Open Economy Politics (OEP), see international political economy (IPE)
opinion polls, and election‐timing 124–5
opposition parties, and parliamentary systems 130
order:
and anthropological perspective 709
and international relations perspective 710
and societies with states 712–15
and stateless societies 710–11
Organization of European Economic Cooperation 801
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 759
other‐regarding behavior 17–18, 952
paradoxes:
and fair division 432, 433, 434
and ranking paradoxes 398–9
and reconciling 971–2
and voting behavior 38–42, 304, 333, 971–2
Paraguay 703
Pareto indifference 409, 412
Pareto optimality 379, 988–9
parliamentary systems:
and distinction from legislatures 121–2
and election‐timing 32
impact on voter behavior 12
and legislature:
elections 124
election‐timing 124–5
executive coalitions 128
government control of agenda 125–6
investiture votes 123
minority governments 128–9
no‐confidence votes 122–3
opposition parties 130
parliamentary support coalition 128
party discipline 126–7
role of political parties 126–7
single‐party majority governments 129–30
and policy choice 6 see also coalitions
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) 703
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 703–4
partisan cycles:
and adaptive retrospective citizens 552–5
and context conditionality of 555, 559–60
and electoral surprises 555–6, 557
and evidence of 554–5, 556–8
and partisan divergence 553
and rational partisan theory 555, 556–9
and rational prospective citizens 555–8
and unemployment/inflation aversion 553–4
partisaneering, and political‐economic cycles 545–6
partisanship:
and citizen‐candidate models 607
and commitment issues 606–7
and cross‐national variations 607
and demand management 644
and distributive politics 602, 605–8
and median voter theorem 606
(p. 1084)
and party activists 606
and political bargaining 607
and probabilistic voting 606
and voter/party preferences 608
party coalition model, and equilibrium analysis of public finance 451, 452
party identification 997
path dependency:
and European integration 808–11
and political/economic development 674
peer effects 975
pension reform, and democratic support for 456–7
perfect competition 503
performance, and politicians 304
personal votes 32, 34
and localism of representatives 112–13
Philippines 701
Pivot mechanism 487–9
pivot theories 223–4, 238–9
and endogenous status quo points 233–4
and gridlock interval 223
and median voter theorem 224, 239
and pivot points 223
and pivotal politics theory 224–8, 239
analysis of roll rates 234–8
criticisms of 228
divided government 224–5
equilibrium 227
gridlock 225, 228
status quo points 227–8
super‐majoritarianism 225–6
and procedural cartel theory 228–30, 238–9
gridlock 229–30
and roll rates analysis:
comparative analysis 230–2, 234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
median voter theorem 230–2
procedural cartel theory 230–2
status quo points 231–2
and status quo points 223, 227–8, 231–2
endogenous 233–4 see also median voter theorem
pivotal legislators 182, 275–6
plenary time 142
and bottlenecks 143–4
and legislative state of nature 143–4
and organization of 157–8
agenda‐setting offices 145
centralized agenda powers 155–7
creation of inequality 144–5
evolution of agenda‐setting powers 146–7
negative agenda power 149–50, 151–3
political parties 147–9
positive agenda power 149–50, 153–5
types of agenda power 149–51
and regulation of 141–2
plurality elections 726
and bias toward large parties 109–10
and definition 104
and electoral policy cycles 729
and impact on budget deficits 734–5
and impact on government spending 730–3
and leverage effect of 725
and party non‐convergence 110–11
and public finance 468
and voting theory 392 see also electoral systems
Poisson games 910–12
Poland:
and constitution of 337–8
and democratization 659, 661, 664
policy uncertainty, and delegation 259–60, 262, 263, 266, 269
policy‐making:
and bicameralism:
multi‐dimensional models 186–7
spatial models of 181–4
spatial models of apportionment 184–6
and centralization 185–6
and decentralization 185
and electioneering 545
and institutional arrangements 6–7
and institutional interactions 217–18
and judicial decision‐making 210–11, 273
statutory interpretation 276–7
and legislative choice:
committee expertise 10–11
committee system 8–9
preference‐based approach 7–8
role of political parties 9–10
and partisaneering 545–6
and public opinion 43–4 see also political‐economic cycles
political advertising 61–2
and candidate quality 52
and directly informative 52, 53–7
and equilibrium behavior 52
directly informative advertising 57–9
indirectly informative advertising 55–7
and expenditure function 59–60
and indirectly informative 51, 53–7
and public opinion 43
and rational voters 51
and role of 455–6
and vote share 50–1
and voter behavior 12–13, 45–6
political and economic development 690–1
and democracy 679–82
allocation of political power 679–80
concessions by elites 680
democratic consolidation 680
elite coups 680–1
emergence of 683–4
relative political equality 679
repression by elites 681, 689
transitory nature of de factor power 679, 680
and development of ‘good’ economic institutions 682–3
and Great Britain 685
concessions by elites 688–90
education reform 687
emergence of democracy 686–7
interpretation of 688–90
origins of economic supremacy 685
(p. 1085)
political reform 685–7
reform of economic institutions 687
and human cognition 1005
and inadequate knowledge of 1003–4, 1008
and non‐incremental change 1004–5
and path dependency 674
and role of political institutions 683
and role of the state 718–20
anthropology 709
creation of institutions 709
equilibrium path 712–15
international relations 710
necessity of 708
state failure 715–16
state formation 716–18
stateless societies 710–12
and theoretical framework:
changes in political institutions 678–9
commitment problem and power 675, 677
conflicting interests 675, 677–8
de facto political power 676
de jure political power 675–6
persistence of behavior 677
political institutions 676–7
potential for change 677
power as determinant of economic institutions 675
primacy of political power 677–8
resource distribution 675, 677, 678
role of economic institutions 674
and variations in 673–4
political behavior, see behavior
political business cycle, and monetary policy
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
political competition, and modeling of 1010–11
political competition, and theory of:
and citizen‐candidate equilibrium 1022–3
and endogenous‐party Wittman equilibrium 1015–17, 1027
and impossibility theorem 1028–9
and inadequacy of Hotelling‐Downs model 1027
and multidimensional generalizations 1017–23
and party faction model 1019–20, 1027–8
and party‐unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) 1020–2, 1027–8
flypaper effect 1025–6
progressive taxation 1023–4
racism and redistribution 1026
taxation and non‐economic issues 1024–5
and the political environment 1011–13
and unidimensional competition 1013–17
political economy:
and bounded rationality 977–8
and constitutional political economy 991–2
and diverse approaches of 3
and ethical norms 982–3
and extending exchange nexus 989–90
and future research areas 977
and the individual 985
and mathematization of 978
and meaning of 3–4
and methodology of 3–4
and micro‐foundations of 982
and national policy 1000
and normative relevance 988–9
and object of collective action 986–7
and omissions from 1003
beliefs and learning 1005–6
knowledge of development 1003–4, 1008
nature of cognition 1005
non‐incremental change 1004–5
political and economic development 1004
and operational science of politics 987–8
and Pareto optimality 988–9
and political motivation 987
and politics as a process 985
and politics as exchange 992–3
and problems for future research 997–1000
adherence to strict rationality 999
lack of common knowledge 999
multidimensional issues 998
need for interdisciplinarity 997–8
non‐linearity of political/economic systems 999
oversimplification of game theory 998
and size of nations 20–2
and spread of 5, 20
and the state 981–2
and unanimity benchmark 990–1
and unitary or multiple decision‐makers 983–4
and utilitarianism 983, 988
political parties:
and candidate divergence 37–8
and electoral systems:
bias toward large parties 109–10
ideological spread 111–12
impact on ideological homogeneity 113–14
impact on party factionalism 114–15
impact on party numbers 106–8, 732
impact on proportionality of representation 108–9
non‐convergence of parties 110–11
and federalism 361–3, 367
and ideological identification 44
and legislative choice 9–10
and legislative organization:
access to high office 147–8
agenda‐setting powers 149–51
party‐rule symbiosis 148–9
and normative analysis of public finance 454–5
and parliamentary systems 126–7
minority governments 128–9
party discipline 126–7
single‐party majority governments 129–30
and partisan cycles 552–5
and presidential systems 131–2
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
and procedural cartel theory 228–30
and redistributive politics 92–8
and roll rates (US Congress) 153
endogenous status quo points 233–4
pivot theories 230–2, 234–8
and voter behavior 31 see also political competition, and theory of
(p. 1086) political‐economic cycles 545–7
and context conditionality of 546–7, 559–60
and electioneering 545
and electoral cycles:
adaptive retrospective citizens 547–50
coalition governments 549, 550
context‐conditionality 548–9, 550, 551
economic voting 548
election timing 549
electoral challengers 551–2
evidence of 548–9
monetary policy manipulation 547–8
policy manipulation 550
policy targeting 549
policy timing 549
post‐election electioneering 552
rational expectations 550–1
rational prospective citizens 550–1
and evidence for 546
and partisan cycles:
adaptive retrospective citizens 552–5
context‐conditionality 555
electoral surprises 555–6, 557
evidence of 554–5, 556–8
partisan divergence 553
rational partisan theory 555, 556–9
rational prospective citizens 555–8
unemployment/inflation aversion 553–4
and partisaneering 545–6 see also economic voting
politicians:
and bureaucratic delegation 256
administrative dominance 265–6
administrative state 256–7
agency design 261–2
ally principle 260, 262–3, 264, 266, 267, 269
assumptions underlying models of 257–8, 268–9
bureaucratic capacity 267
commitment problem 268–70
control of 265
empirical tests of 261–4
information asymmetries 266–7
modeling of delegation strategies 257–61
multi‐principals issue 267–8
nature of legislation 262–3
oversight of 257, 264
policy uncertainty 259–60, 262, 263, 266, 269
political context 264–5, 269–70
political uncertainty 260–1, 263–4, 266
substitution effect 260, 263, 266
and incentive effects of electoral system:
direct effects 727–8
indirect effects 729–30
and legislature/parliament distinction 121–2
and performance 304
and public finance:
budget process 470
common‐pool problem 465
ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
principal‐agent relationship 464–5
pork‐barrel politics 530–1 see also common pool problem
and ethnicity 861–2
and presidential governance 251
positive political theory (PPT) 912
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and game theory 905–6
Poisson games 910–12
and judicial independence 281–4
and judiciary 273–4, 284
and legal control of bureaucracy 277–81
Chevron decision 280–1
implications of Administrative Procedure Act 278–80
and statutory interpretation 274–7
poverty 23
power:
and democracy and capitalism 604
and political and economic development:
allocation of 679–80
commitment problem 675, 677
de facto political power 676
de jure political power 675–6
as determinant of economic institutions 675
emergence of democracy 683–4
primacy of 677–8
transitory nature of de factor power 679, 680
power transition theory:
and international relations 832, 836–7
and the state 837
preferences:
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and legislative choice 7–8
and peer effects 975
and preference drift 1037
presidential systems:
and budget process 472
and legislature 130–1
committee system 135–6
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
role of political parties 131–2
and political parties 107–8 see also United States presidency
pressure groups, see interest groups
primordialism, and politicization of ethnicity 858
principal‐agent relationship:
and economic voting 570
and principal‐agent slack 804
and public finance 464–5
probabilistic spatial voting models 606
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 449–50, 451–2
procedural cartel theory 228–30, 238–9
and analysis of roll rates 230–2, 234–8
procedural justice 378
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate/procedural justice complementarity 379–81
(p. 1087) property, and United States Supreme Court 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
property rights:
and authoritarian governments 693, 694, 697
benign despots 697–8
co‐opting regime 701–2
organizational proliferation 703–4
under terror regime 699–700
and public sector economics 444
property taxes, and basic model of fiscal competition 505–9
proportional representation 726
and distributive politics 612–13
and electoral policy cycles 730
and ideological spread of parties 111–12
and impact on budget deficits 734–5
and impact on government spending 730–3
and income redistribution 87–8, 635–6
and list system 104
and modeling outcomes of 452–3
and party factionalism 114–15
and proportionality continuum 104–5
measures of proportionality 105
swing ratio 105
and proportionality of party representation 108–9
and public finance 468
and single transferable vote 112 see also electoral systems
proposal rights/powers:
and American presidency 242, 247–9
and legislative organization 149–50
and positive agenda power 153–5
counterbalancing of 154–5
decentralization of 154
prospective voting 569–71
and pure prospective voting 571
as rational retrospection 572–5 see also economic voting; voting behavior; voting theory
protectionism 759–60
and gender 825 see also international trade
protest movements, and United States Supreme Court 344–5
proto‐coalitions 163–4
psychology, and economics 976
public appeals, and American presidency 250, 251–2
public choice theory 989
and economic development 532
and macro political economy 527–8
and political corruptibility 528
and taxation 527
and United States Constitution 343
public constraints, and war 871–3
public finance:
and allocation of, majority rule 485–7
and collective choice 443, 444, 446, 457
and common‐pool problem 465 see also pork‐barrel politics
and electoral rules 468–9
and equilibrium analysis 447–9, 457–8
applications of 451–3
citizen‐candidate model 450–1, 452
issues to be covered 448–9
median voter theorem 448
party coalition model 451, 452
probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50, 451–2
problems faced by models 452–3
spatial voting model 452–3
and federalism 359
and governing institutions 443
and maximization of social welfare 442
and normative analysis 453–4, 458
citizen‐candidate model 456
creeping constraints 457
democratic support for policies 456–7
efficiency and political competition 454–5
political advertising 455–6
political equilibria 455
political failure 455–6
and political economy approach 448–9
and principal‐agent relationship 464–5
and public sector economics 443–7
behavioral assumptions 444
coercive action 446
decision externalities 447
decision mechanisms 444
equilibrium outcomes 446–7
policy choices 446
political competition 446
role of markets 443–4
taxes and spending 444–6
voluntary redistribution 446
and social planner model 442, 443, 457
and transfers from central government 467
and transfers to local government 465 see also fiscal competition; fiscal institutions
public goods 84, 479, 987
and allocation of 479, 481–2, 499
Bayesian approach 492–4
best mechanism for 490–1
consumer behavior 483
demand‐revealing mechanisms 487–9
doubts over ‘Voting Works’ 497–8
incentive compatibility 484–5
majority rule 489–91
market processes 480–1
mechanism performance 483–4
mechanisms 482–3
multidimensional issues 498–9
public good environment 482
Vickrey‐Clarke‐Groves mechanisms 487–91
virtual cost‐benefit mechanisms 494–5
voting in large Bayesian environments 495–6
voting in large environments 497
and clubs 780
and state size 781, 782
public opinion:
and constraints on war 871–3
and monetary policy 523–4
and non‐economic issues 524
(p. 1088)
and policy 43–4
and political advertising 45–6
public sector:
and collective choice 443, 457
and governing institutions 443
and maximization of social welfare 442
and social planner model 442, 443, 457 see also public finance
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) 928–9
Quebec 21
race:
and inequality 628–9, 630
United States 630, 635
and United States Supreme Court 346–7 see also ethnicity
racial politics 610–11
racism, and redistribution 1026
rational choice theory, and application in political science 899, 900–1
rational expectations:
and demand management 644–5
and electoral cycles 556
and expressive voting 333–4
and monetary policy 534–5
and political‐economic cycles 546
and rational partisan theory 555, 556–8
and voting behavior 335, 550–1
prospective voting 572–5
rational partisan theory, and partisan cycles 555, 556–9
rational retrospection, and voting behavior 572–5, 583
rationalist approach to war (RAW) 770–1
Redistribution Act (UK, 1885) 687
Reform Act (UK, 1832) 673, 686
Reform League (UK) 686
regional economics 739
regionalism, and growth of 799–800, 805
regulation, and markets 342–3
regulatory politics 609
religion, and inequality 628
representation:
and accountability 724–5
and federalism 361–3, 365
and voter preferences 185–6
Representation of the People Act (UK, 1919) 673, 687
representation theorem 454
representative democracy 303–5
and audience democracy 304
and corporate democracy 304–5
and virtual representation 303–4
repression 681, 689
resource allocation:
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate justice 376–8
and endstate/procedural justice complementarity 379–81
and modeling of 89, 374–6
and neo‐realism 835
and procedural justice 378
and public goods 479, 481–2, 499
Bayesian approach 492–4
best mechanism for 490–1
consumer behavior 483
demand‐revealing mechanisms 487–9
doubts over ‘Voting Works’ 497–8
incentive compatibility 484–5
majority rule 485–7, 489–91
market processes 480–1
mechanism performance 483–4
mechanisms 482–3
multidimensional issues 498–9
public good environment 482
Vickrey‐Clarke‐Groves mechanisms 487–91
virtual cost‐benefit mechanisms 494–5
voting in large Bayesian environments 495–6
voting in large environments 497
and selectorate theory 842–4
and strategy‐proof mechanisms 383–6
and strategy‐proofness 382–3 see also fair division
retrospective voting:
and accountability 468
and economic voting 569–71
and laboratory experiments 923–4
and principal‐agent relationship 570
and pure retrospective voting 575–8 see also economic voting; voting behavior; voting theory
Ricardo‐Viner theory:
and international trade:
migration and investment 820
trade in products 818–19
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762
rights, and welfare 374, 376
Riker Objection 1032, 1040–2, 1047–8
Riot Act (Great Britain, 1714) 1046
risk‐pooling, and labor market 744
roll calls:
and analysis of 136–7
and United States Congress 133
roll rates (US Congress), and analysis of 153, 230–2, 234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
Russia:
and democratization 662
and federalism 359
and financial crisis (1998) 524
and political/economic development 674
Rwanda 300, 302
Samuelson‐Jones specific factors model 819, 820
Schelling conjecture 767
Second Reform Act (UK, 1867) 687
selectorate theory, and international conflict/democratic peace 842–5
self‐interest, and voting behavior 38–42, 304
separation of powers:
and judicial independence 281
sequential bargaining (Baron‐Ferejohn model), and coalition formation 168–70
Serbia, and democratization 662
service sector, and employment in 646–7
shame, and pro‐social emotions 962–3
shirking, and evolutionary models of behavior 19
single non‐transferable vote 113, 114–15
single transferable vote 112
single‐member districts 104
Slovakia, and democratization 662
Slovenia, and democratization 661–2, 664
social choice:
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and collectivities 972–3
and constitutional design 973
and decision‐making 972
as descriptive theory 974
and dictatorships 972
and distributive justice 374–6
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate justice 376–8
and endstate/procedural justice complementarity 379–81
and fair division 373
and game theory 905–6
core emptiness 910–12
and impossibility theorem 373
and macro political economy 526–7
and mechanism design 373
and origins of 373
and procedural justice 378
and resource allocation, modeling of 374–6
and social welfare functions 526–7
and strategy‐proof allocation mechanisms 383–6
and strategy‐proofness 382–3 see also social evaluation
social contract, see contractarian theories
social evaluation 421–2
and alternatives 408–9
and Arrow's theorem 409, 419
and axioms 413–16
anonymity 413–14
continuity 414
independence condition 415
independence of irrelevant alternatives 409, 412
minimal equity 414–15
Pareto indifference 412
unlimited domain 412
and information invariance 417–19
and interpersonal comparisons 408
and Pareto indifference 409
and social evaluation functionals 409, 411–12
and social evaluation orderings:
dictatorial 415–16
leximin 416
utilitarianism 416
and theorem statements 419–21
and utility functions 409, 410
and utility profiles 409, 411
and welfarism 409, 411–13, 421–2
and well‐being 409–10
interpersonal comparisons 409, 410–11
measurability 409–10
social groups, and voting behavior 41–2
social planning, and public sector 442, 443
social relations, and interest 944
social welfare:
and inequality 629–30
and maximization of 442
and social welfare functions 526–7
sociology, see economic sociology
South Africa 681
South‐East Asian crisis (1997–8) 524
Soviet Union, and democratization 662
Spain:
and ethnicity 854
and federalism 366
spatial models of policy‐making, and bicameralism 181–4
spatial relationships, see economic geography
spatial theory of voting 29–30, 65
and candidate divergence 35
candidate preferences 37
political parties' platform choices 37–8
third parties 36–7
valence issues 36
and criticisms of 30–1
and cut‐points 33–4
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 452–3
probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50, 451–2
and median voter theorem 29, 31
and paradoxes of rationality 43
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non‐participation 38–40
and valence issues 32–5
and voters' sources of information 43–6 see also voting behavior; voting theory
specific factors model, and international trade 818–20
speech, freedom of, and United States Supreme Court 344–6
stability:
and bicameralism 182–3
and neo‐realism 834–5
state, the:
and anthropology 709
and formation of 716–18
and international bargaining 766–8
and international monetary relations 588–9
cooperation 590–1
coordination 589–90
as object of study 981–2
and organic conceptualization of 981
and political competition 1010–11
and role in development 718–20
creation of institutions 709
equilibrium path 712–15
international relations 710
necessity of 708
(p. 1090)
state failure 715–16
stateless societies 710–12 see also state, economic role of; state size
state, economic role of 642–3, 652–3
and demand management 643–6
impact of globalization 645–6
impact of rational expectations 644–5
institutional environment 644–5
and socio‐economic institutional environment 649–52
actors' policy preferences 651–2
as constraint 652
regime types 650
resistance to changes in 651–2
varieties of capitalism 650–1
and supply‐side policy
impact of globalization 648–9
institutional environment 647–8
service sector 646–7
structural continuity 649
wage levels 647–8
welfare state policies 647, 648 see also economic policy
state intervention, and constitutions 342
state size 20–2, 768–9
and analytical framework for understanding 783–8
average utility 785–6, 787–8
border determination 792
break‐ups 791
compensation for the dissatisfied 788–90
efficient borders 787
government type 783
income inequality 790–1
inefficient break‐ups 786
‘Leviathans’ 792
majority voting 786, 787
preferred government type 783–4
taxes per capita 784–5
and benefits of large size 781–2
and costs of large size 782
and defense/security issues 794–6
and factor mobility 794
and historical concern with 778–9
and international economic integration 793–4
and literature on:
clubs and local public goods 780
conflict and appropriation 781
national borders 779–80
trade blocs 780–1
statutory interpretation 274–7
strategic pre‐action, and American presidency 242, 249–51
strategic voting 102, 110, 403–4
strategy‐proofness:
and allocation mechanisms 383–6
and social choice 382–3
strong reciprocity 957–60
and evolution of 960–1
structure‐induced equilibrium, and coalition formation 165–8
substitution effect, and bureaucratic delegation 260, 263, 266
suicide bombers 18
super‐majorities, and pivotal politics theory 225–6
filibuster pivots 226–7
supply‐side economics, and role of the state 646–9
and impact of globalization 648–9
and institutional environment 647–8
and service sector 646–7
and structural continuity 649
and wage levels 647–8
and welfare state policies 647, 648 see also economic policy
survival:
and evolutionary models of behavior 17
and political behavior 4
Sweden 308
and budget process 473
swing ratio 105
Switzerland, and ex ante fiscal rules 466
Taiwan 701
takings clause, and United States Supreme Court 351–4
taxation:
and basic model of fiscal competition 509–12
and federalism 363, 365–7
and flat taxes 527–8
and flypaper effect 1025–6
and income redistribution:
restricted tax schemes 85–8
targeting of heterogeneous groups 92–8
unrestricted transfer schemes 88–92
and non‐economic issues 1024–5
and progressive taxation 1023–4
and public choice 527
and public sector economics 444–6 see also fiscal competition; fiscal institutions; public finance
technology, and inequality 627
terror, and authoritarian governments 698–700
terrorism 1008
third parties:
and candidate divergence 36–7
and plurality voting 109–10
Third Reform Act (UK, 1884) 687
Thirty Years War 719–20
trade blocs 780–1
trade unions 644
and inequality 627
transfer spending 609–10
Transparency International 727
Trinidad and Tobago 319
trust 975
Turkey:
and ethnicity 855
and political/economic development 674
turnout, and laboratory experiments on 917, 929–32
ultimatum game 18
unanimity rule 990–1
uncertainty, and choice of institutions 1036–7 see also policy uncertainty
underdevelopment, and development theory 760
(p. 1091) United States:
and bicameralism 181
and campaign financing 51
and colonial period 1006–7, 1038–9
and ethnicity 854
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
and inequality 634–8
beliefs about 637–8
economic explanations of 634
ethnic heterogeneity 630, 635
failure of left‐wing movements 636–7
impact of technology 627
political factors 627
political institutions 635–7
and local government 505–6
United States Congress 4
and divided government 134–5, 224–5
and judiciary:
judicial independence 282–3
statutory interpretation 274–7
and legislative organization:
acquisition of expertise 10–11
agenda‐setting powers 149, 150, 154–5
committee system 8–9, 135–6, 145
preference‐based approach 7–8
role of political parties 9–10
and measuring policy positions of legislators 136–7
as ‘model generator’ 131
and political parties 131–2
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
and presidential veto power 245–7, 250–1
and roll calls 133
analysis of 136–7
and roll rates:
analysis of 153, 230–2, 234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
and suspension of rules 1044
United States Constitution:
and Constitutional Convention (1787) 1040
and establishment of 299–300
and judicial review:
approach to 344
balancing private rights/government interest 343–4
intermediate scrutiny standard 343
rational basis standard 343
strict scrutiny standard 343
and limited government 343
and procedural change:
amendment procedures 1040, 1043
interpretative courts 1043–4
and public choice theory 343
and representative democracy 303–4
United States presidency:
and constitutional foundation of 243
and judiciary:
judicial independence 282–3
statutory interpretation 274–5
and legislature:
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
role of political parties 131–2
and new separation‐of‐powers approach to 202–7, 241–2
appointments process 204–7
interactions with other institutions 202
spatial model of budget problem 202–4
veto powers 202–4
and political economy approach 253
appointments process 247–9
executive orders 249–50
features of 241–2
going public 250
intellectual roots of 244–5
legislative program 249
proposal powers 242, 247–9
research opportunities 252–3
strategic context 245
strategic pre‐action 242, 249–51
veto powers 242, 245–7
veto threats 250–1
and presidential governance 243–4
normative implications of 251–2
and relative weakness of 131
United States Senate, and presidential appointments 204–5
United States Supreme Court:
and Abrams vs United States (1919) 344
and Adair vs United States (1908) 349
and Allgeyer vs Louisiana (1897) 349
and appointments process 248–9
and Baker vs Carr 183
and Baldwin vs GAF Seelig, Inc (1935) 351
and Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969) 344
and Brown vs Board of Education (1954) 346
and Buckley vs Valeo (1976) 51 n2
and Carolene Products Co vs United States (1938) 344
and Chevron vs Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) 280–1
and compliance problem 283–4
and constitutional interpretation 1043–4
and Coppage vs Kansas (1914) 349
and Corfeld vs Coryell (1823) 348
and Duquesne Light Co vs Barasch (1989) 350
and Eastern Enterprises vs Apfel (1998) 348
and Euclid vs Ambler Realty (1926) 353
and Grutter vs Bollinger (2003) 346
and Hawaiian Housing Authority vs Midkiff (1984) 352
and Home Building & Loan Association vs Blaisdell (1934) 348
and judicial independence 281
and judicial review 354–5
and Lochner vs New York (1905) 349–50
and Loretto vs Teleprompter (1982) 351
and Loving vs Virginia (1967) 346
and Lucas vs South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 354
and Marbury vs Madison (1803) 273
and McConnell vs Federal Electoral Commission (2003) 345, 346
(p. 1092)
and Minnesota vs Clover Leaf Creamery Co (1981) 347
and Munn vs Illinois 350
and Nebbia vs New York (1934) 350
and New York Times vs Sullivan (1964) 345
and Penn Central Transp Co vs New York (1978) 353
and Penn Central vs New York (1978) 353
and Pennsylvania Coal Co vs Mahon (1923) 352–3
and Plessy vs Ferguson (1896) 346
and protection of contract and property 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
and Reed vs Reed (1971) 347
and Slaughterhouse Cases (1872) 348, 349
and Smyth vs Ames (1898) 350
and social and moral issues:
equal protection of the laws 346–7
freedom of speech 344–6
and Tahoe‐Sierra Preservation Council, Inc vs Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 354
and Truax vs Raich (1915) 349
and United States vs Addyston Pipe & Steel Co (1899) 349
and Usery vs Turner Elkhorn Mining Co (1976) 348
and Virginia Board of Pharmacy vs Virginia Consumer Council (1976) 346
and West Lynn Creamery vs Healy (1994) 351
and Yee vs Escondido (1992) 351
urban economics 739
utilitarianism 983, 988
utility maximization 4
and voting behavior 38–9
valence issues:
and candidate divergence 36, 926
and spatial theory of voting 32–5
varieties of capitalism 614–17
and coordinated market economies 615
and institutional complementarity 615
and liberal market economies 615
and relationship of economic/political institutions 616
and role of economic institutions 614–15
and state's economic role 650–1
and welfare state 615–16
veil of ignorance 1035–6
Venezuela 319, 701
vengeance 18
veto rights/powers:
and American presidency
new separation‐of‐powers approach 202–4
political economy approach 242, 245–7, 250–1
and negative agenda power 149–50
gridlock 151–2
reactions to gridlock 152
roll rates of veto players 153
Vickrey‐Clarke‐Groves mechanisms 384–5
and allocation of public goods 487–92
Virginia School 455
virtual representation 303–4
voice, and fiscal competition 512–14
vote motivation, and monetary policy 534–5
voting, and allocation of public goods
in large Bayesian environments 495–6
in large environments 497
majority rule 485–7, 489–91
voting behavior:
and citizen duty 40–1
and consumption approach 42
and deterministic voting 67–8
office motivation 68–70
policy motivation 70–2
and economic voting 548
and electoral framework 66–7
and expressive activity 333–5
and expressive voting 41
and game theory 910–12
and group rule utilitarianism 41–2
and impact of electoral rules 527
and information aggregation 15–17, 928–9
and information revelation 11–15
candidate quality 15
election‐timing 12
pressure group finance 12–14
and laboratory experiments on elections 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
and median voter theorem 29, 31
and paradoxes of rationality 43, 304, 333
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non‐participation 38–40
and party identification 997
and political advertising 12–13, 45–6
directly informative 57–9
indirectly informative 53–7
role of 455–6
and political‐economic cycles:
electioneering 545
partisaneering 545–6
and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship model 72–3
vote motivation 73–5
win motivation 75–7
and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference model 77–8
policy motivation 80–1
vote motivation 78–9
win motivation 79–80
and prospective voting 569–71, 572–5
and rationality 333–4, 335, 550–1
and retrospective voting 468, 569–71, 575–8, 923–4
and sources of information 43–6
and spatial theory of voting 29–30
candidate divergence 35–8
criticisms of 30–1
cut‐points 33–4
valence issues 32–5
and strategic voting 102, 110
(p. 1093)
voting paradox 38–42, 304, 333, 971–2
voting theory 390–1
and antiplurality voting 392
and Arrow's theorems 405–6
and axiomatic representations 397–400
chaotic dynamics 399
ranking consistency 399–400
ranking paradoxes 398–9
shortcomings of 398
and Borda Count 392, 399–400,