- List of contributors
- Introduction: A Diversity of Selves
- History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self
- What is it Like to be a Newborn?
- Self in the Brain
- The Embodied Self
- Bodily Awareness and Self‐Consciousness
- The Sense of Body Ownership
- Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self‐Consciousness
- Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective
- The Minimal Subject
- The No‐Self Alternative
- Buddhist Non‐Self: The No‐Owner's Manual
- Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self
- Personal Identity
- On What we are
- On Knowing one's Self
- The Narrative Self
- The Unimportance of Identity
- Self‐Control in Action
- Moral Responsibility and the Self
- The Structure of Self‐Consciousness in Schizophrenia
- Multiple Selves
- Autism and the Self
- The Self: Growth, Integrity, and Coming Apart
- Our Glassy Essence: The Fallible Self in Pragmatist Thought
- The Social Construction of Self
- The Dialogical Self: A Process of Positioning in Space and Time
- Glass Selves: Emotions, Subjectivity, and the Research Process
- The Postmodern Self: An Essay on Anachronism and Powerlessness
- Self, Subjectivity, and the Instituted Social Imaginary
Abstract and Keywords
This article re-examines the role of the brain in self-recognition. It reconsiders the idea that the frontal and cortical midline structures are important for self-specific experience in light of several recent reviews of neuroscience literature. The findings suggests that the frontal cortex and the cortical midline structure are not the only areas involved in self-related tasks and that these areas may be involved not because the tasks are self-specific, but because they are tasks that involve a specific kind of cognitive operation, specifically reflective evaluation.
Kai Vogeley, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cologne.
Shaun Gallagher is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Chair of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis and Research Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Hertfordshire. He is the author of How the Body Shapes the Mind (2005) and, with Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind (2008), and is editor of The Oxford Handbook of the Self (2011).
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