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date: 04 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines the relationship between the self and moral responsibility. It shows that what makes an action the person's own (what keeps the agent in the picture) with regard to responsibility is better expressed in terms of practical identity than in terms of personal identity. It argues that all such criteria of personal identity (psychological, biological, narrative) fail to provide a sufficient account of how a person can be morally responsible for an action and suggests that identity does not matter for moral responsibility.

Keywords: self, moral responsibility, action, practical identity, personal identity

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