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date: 12 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article evaluates whether personal identity should be sought only in the biological or embodied existence of the person or exclusively in psychological existence. It suggests that whatever the answer turns out to be, it would involve causality. It argues against the animalist view of personal identity and defends the classical neo-Lockean view by arguing that the thick properties of person are psychological or mental ones. The author's answer to the question of what we are is in part that we are creatures having certain kinds of mental properties as the thick properties whose causal profiles determine their persistence conditions.

Keywords: personal identity, embodied existence, psychological existence, causality, animalist view, neo-Lockean view, mental properties

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