- List of contributors
- Introduction: A Diversity of Selves
- History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self
- What is it Like to be a Newborn?
- Self in the Brain
- The Embodied Self
- Bodily Awareness and Self‐Consciousness
- The Sense of Body Ownership
- Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self‐Consciousness
- Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective
- The Minimal Subject
- The No‐Self Alternative
- Buddhist Non‐Self: The No‐Owner's Manual
- Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self
- Personal Identity
- On What we are
- On Knowing one's Self
- The Narrative Self
- The Unimportance of Identity
- Self‐Control in Action
- Moral Responsibility and the Self
- The Structure of Self‐Consciousness in Schizophrenia
- Multiple Selves
- Autism and the Self
- The Self: Growth, Integrity, and Coming Apart
- Our Glassy Essence: The Fallible Self in Pragmatist Thought
- The Social Construction of Self
- The Dialogical Self: A Process of Positioning in Space and Time
- Glass Selves: Emotions, Subjectivity, and the Research Process
- The Postmodern Self: An Essay on Anachronism and Powerlessness
- Self, Subjectivity, and the Instituted Social Imaginary
Abstract and Keywords
This article examines the metaphysics and phenomenology of the self or subject of experience. It suggests that the phenomenological description of the minimal subject requires no reference to body, environment, or social relations and argues for a thin conception of subjectivity which equates the subject with the experience itself. Under this principle of minimal conception, the subject does not exist if the person (or human animal) is asleep (unconscious). It contends that the profound metaphysical question about experience and experiential selves is whether experience is limited to certain types of physical processes, or is characteristic of all physical processes, which would entail panpsychism.
Galen Strawson is President’s Chair in Philosophy at University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of seven books, Freedom and Belief (1986), The Secret Connexion: Realism, Causation and David Hume (1989), Mental Reality (1994), Real Materialism and Other Essays (2008), Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (2009), Locke on personal identity: Consciousness and Concernment (2011), and The Evident Connexion: Hume on personal identity (2011). He is the keynote author in Models of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher and J. Shear (1999), and Consciousness and its Place in Nature, ed A. Freeman, 2006.
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