- List of Contributors
- Homeric Ethics
- Plato's Ethics
- Aristotle's Ethics
- Epicurus: Freedom, Death, and Hedonism
- Cynicism and Stoicism
- Ancient Scepticism
- Platonic Ethics in Later Antiquity
- The Franciscans
- Later Christian Ethics
- Nature, Law, and Natural Law
- Seventeenth-Century Moral Philosophy: Self-Help, Self-Knowledge, and the Devil's Mountain
- Rousseau and Ethics
- Utilitarianism: Bentham and Rashdall
- Rational Intuitionism
- Moral Sense and Sentimentalism
- Butler's Ethics
- Hume's Place in the History of Ethics
- Adam Smith
- Kant's Moral Philosophy
- Kantian Ethics
- Hegel and Marx
- J. S. Mill
- British Idealist Ethics
- Ethics in the Analytic Tradition
- Free Will
- Emotion and the Emotions
- Happiness, Suffering, and Death
- Egoism, Partiality, and Impartiality
- Conscience, Guilt, and Shame
- Moral Psychology and Virtue
- Justice, Equality, and Rights
- Styles of Moral Relativism: a Critical Family Tree
- Moral Metaphysics
- Constructing Practical Ethics
Abstract and Keywords
The dominant consequentialist, Kantian, and contractualist theories by virtue ethicists such as G.E.M. Anscombe, Alisdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, and Michael Stocker have been criticized for their neglect of the emotions. There are three reasons why it might be a mistake for moral philosophy to neglect the emotions. (1) Emotions have an important influence on motivation, and proper cultivation of the emotions is helpful, perhaps essential, to our ability to lead ethical lives. (2) It is a plausible thesis that an ethical life involves feeling certain ways in certain circumstances and acting from certain feelings in certain circumstances. (3) Some emotions are forms of ethical perception, judgment, or even knowledge. This chapter examines the Ancient ethical tradition that inspires the virtue ethicists' critique, revealing versions of each of these three theses in one guise or another. It first considers the medieval transformations of the ancient doctrines, and then focuses on the third, more contentious thesis, distinguishing several versions of it in the moral philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and indicating some contemporary exemplars as well.
Susan Sauvé Meyer is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, where she has taught since 1994. A historian of Greek and Roman philosophy, she has special interest in the ethical tradition. Her publications include Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (1993) and Ancient Ethics (2008).
Adrienne M. Martin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, where she has taught since 2006. She works in moral philosophy and moral psychology, with particular interest in the nature of moral agency and deliberation.
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