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date: 03 August 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article deals with issues of litigation based on claims of personal injuries. It briefly describes the way that economists have tended to think about the “litigation process.” It discusses a number of areas of empirical work. It begins with case outcomes and looks at the ways in which the legal system itself can influence matter through the encouragement of information transfer and the rules used for allocating legal costs. It considers the role of lawyers by looking at the effects of different legal fee arrangements on case outcomes. Furthermore, it discusses the liability-based legal system that produces the deterrence benefits often claimed for in conceptual work. The deterrent potentials of liability-based litigations are subject to objective and subjective contexts of the injurer. Finally, the article concludes that alternative means such as the “no fault” scheme that allots compensation irrespective of personal fault of the accused, require greater analysis.

Keywords: litigation process, contingent, deterrent, no fault, legal system, injurer

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