- Oxford Handbooks in Linguistics
- List of Abbreviations
- The Contributors
- Compositionality: Its Historic Context
- Composition A Lity In Montague Grammar
- The case for compositionality
- Compositionality Problems and how to Solve Them
- Direct Compositionality
- Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual Polyadicity
- Holism And Compositionality.
- Composition Ality, Flexibility, And Context Dependence
- Compositionality in Kaplan Style Semantics
- Formalizing the relationship between meaning and syntax
- Compositionality and The Context Principle
- Compositionality In Discourse From A Logical Perspective
- Lexical Decomposition In Grammar
- Lexical Decomposition in Modern Syntactic Theory
- Syntax in the Atom
- Co-composition Ality in Grammar
- Typicality and Composition a Lity: the Logic of Combining Vague Concepts
- Emergency!!!! Challenges to a Compositional Understanding of Noun–noun Combinations
- Can Prototype Representations Support Composition And Decomposition?
- Regaining Composure: A Defence Of Prototype Compositionality.
- Simple Heuristics For Concept Combination
- Compositionality and Beyond: Embodied Meaning in Language and Protolanguage
- Compositionality and Linguistic Evolution
- Communication And The complexity of semantics
- Prototypes and their Composition from an Evolutionary Point of View
- Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation
- The Dual-Mechanism Debate
- Compositionality and Biologically Plausible Models
- Neuronal Assembly Models of Compositionality
- Non-Symbolic Compositional Representation and Its Neuronal Foundation: To wards An Emulative Semantics
- The Processing Consequences of Compositionality
Abstract and Keywords
Prototype theory emerged out of two main sources. First, research on perceptual category learning suggested that people spontaneously abstract representations of the statistical central tendency when they are exposed to a range of similar images. The abstracted representation corresponds to the average or prototype for a range of training images and can be used to classify future examples. The second source was philosophical. On some versions, the prototype features are organized into structured lists, which divide into such subheadings as physical attributes, means of locomotion, and perhaps diet. In a connectionist framework, a prototype might be a collection of weighted feature-representing nodes, or, more graphically, points in a multidimensional space, whose dimensions correspond to nodes in the network. On an empiricist approach, prototype features might be interpreted as components of structured mental images, and imagistic simulations of prototype activities.
Jesse J. Prinz is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. His research focuses on the perceptual, emotional, and cultural foundations of human psychology. He is author of Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perception Basis (MIT Press 2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford University Press 2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford University Press 2009). He also has two forthcoming books: The Conscious Brain (Oxford University Press) and Beyond Human Nature (Penguin/Norton). All of these books bring research in the cognitive sciences to bear on traditional philosophical questions, and, in particular, all defend and extend core tenets of classical empiricism.
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