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date: 22 January 2020

Abstract and Keywords

Many philosophical accounts of love hold that love is a thoroughly arational phenomenon, that it is not a response to value, or that we do not love for reasons. This chapter argues these accounts are mistaken: when we love we are typically responding to positive qualities of the beloved, and in rendering our love appropriate and intelligible these qualities provide reasons for love. However, the role of reasons in love is highly complex. This is, in part, because love’s reasons are nondeontic: love is never rationally required, no matter how many positive qualities a person may possess or how positive they may be. Although we love for reasons, there is a sense in which when we love we go beyond our reasons. Love is neither thoroughly arational nor pervasively rational; it is “something in between.”

Keywords: deontic reason, judgment-sensitive attitude, love, nondeontic reason, reason, universality

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