Show Summary Details
(p. 619) Index
(p. 619) Index
A&W, 389
Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M.
Abuse-of-dominance, 234–251
behavioral definition, 238
competition and, 237–239
corruption and, 238
in Costa Rica, 240
divestiture, 250
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and, 250
in El Salvador, 240
enforcement, 237–239
essential facilities doctrine and, 250
in EU, 236
examples of, 239–242
in Hungary, 237
legal standard, 235–236
in Lithuania, 237
in Mexico, 237
in Peru, 241
in Poland, 237
remedies in, 249–250
in Romania, 237
sanctions, 249–250
in Senegal, 241–242
in Slovak Republic, 237
structural definition, 238
in Ukraine, 238
in United States, 236
in Uzbekistan, 237
Added value, 260–261
Adelman, M.A., 43
AEC (As-efficient-competitor) test, 168–169
Agency costs, corporate governance and compliance and, 587
Aguzzoni, Luca, 596
Alcoa, 58
Alexander, Barbara, 449
Allied, 562
Allocative distortion, 79–80
Amemiya, Kei, 205
American Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section, 598
American Medical Association, 559
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 453
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 564–565
American Sugar Refining Company, 368
Angelucci, Charles, 588
ANSI. See American National Standards Institute
Anticompetitive nature of exclusionary conduct, 7–19
diminished ability to compete and, 26–29
enhanced market power and, 30
harm to consumers and, 30
negative contracting externalities and, 31–32
Antitrust Division. See Justice Department
Aoyagi, M., 508–509
Apesteguia, Jose, 436–437
Areeda, Phillip
on exclusive dealing, 320
on quantity commitment discounts, 94
on squeeze claims, 125
Arlen, Jennifer, 591
“Arrive by reasoning,” 482–486
Arrow's Information Paradox, 135
As-efficient-competitor (AEC) test, 168–169
ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers), 564–565
Assessment errors, dominant firms and, 169–170
AstraZeneca, 167
Attribution test
flaws with, 111–116
liability thresholds and, 110
overview, 105–109
uses of, 111–116
Aubert, Cecile, 429–430
Auctions
collusion in, 501–503
common value auction, 499–500
defined, 498
Dutch auction, 499–500
English auction, 499–500
Japanese auction, 499
one-shot auctions, bid rigging in, 504–507
overview, 498–499
private value auction, 499–500
repeated auctions, bid rigging in, 507–510
standard models, 499–500
Audretsch, David B., 444
Avraham, Raphael, 120
Azoulay, Pierre, 395–397
Baidu, 245
Bain, Joe S., 478
Baker, Wayne E., 598
Baldwin, L., 511–512
Bank of Japan, 536
Bar-Isaac, Heski, 368
Bayesian hypothesis testing, screening and, 525–528
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 488
Beckenstein, Alan R., 598
Beijing Netcom, 219–220
Below-cost pricing in Japan, 202–203
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 479
Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 491
Bergin, James, 492–493
Bessen, James, 138
Betamax, 558
Biddle, Brad, 555
Bid rigging, 498–519
in auctions, 501–503
in China, 501
in Cournot markets, 498
deterrence of, 517–518
empirical evidence, 510–515
in EU, 501
experimental evidence, 515–517
incentive for collusion, 503–504
in one-shot auctions, 504–507
in repeated auctions, 507–510
screening for, 602–604
theory of, 503–510
in United States, 501–502
Bigoni, Marta, 436–437
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, 314
Blundering into tacit collusion, 492–493
Blu-ray, 558
Bosch, Jean-Claude, 595–596
Bounties as incentives to induce detection, 599–600
Bowen, Robert M., 599
Bowman, Ward S., 333
Bradburd, Ralph, 449
Brandeis, Louis, 333–334
Brannon, I., 540
Breakup of cartels, causes of, 455–458
Brenkers, Randy, 398
British Banking Association, 536
British Standards Institution, 557
Brock, William A., 479
Brodley, Joseph F., 52
Bundling
explicit bundling, 104–105
implicit bundling, 104–105
intellectual property rights, 343–344
“Burning the dollar” game, 491
Burns, Malcolm R., 44
Bush, George H.W., 194
Business-format franchising, 390
Business strategy, 253–272
added value, 260–261
complementarities in, 258
economic framework, 253–254
enhancing value creation, 256–258
rivalry and, 258–260
sustainability of competitive advantage, 264–266
synergies, 267–268
trade-offs in, 257–258
value creation and capture framework, 255–261
“But for” prices, 180–182
Buyback options, 352
California Air Resources Board, 575
Call, Andrew C., 599
Can System, 203
Caremark, 101
Carlsson, Hans, 488–489
Carrefour, 329
Cartels
in Australia, 445
in Brazil, 453–454
breakup, causes of, 455–458
competition, effect on formation of, 447
competition and, 162
concerted squeezing and, 128–129
corporate governance and compliance, effect of firm indicia of cartel activity on, 589–594
detection, 430–433
effects on prices, 453–455
empirical evidence of collusion, 442–459
enforcement and, 424–433
in EU, 443–446
experimental evidence of collusion, 433–435
in Finland, 443
formation of, 446–449
hub-and-spoke cartels, 128–129
Nash equilibrium and, 426–428
in Netherlands, 596
prevalence of, 443–446
price setting by, 449–452
recession, effect on formation of, 447–449
screening, 430–433
in Sweden, 443–444
in United Kingdom, 443–444
in United States, 443–446
CDS (Credit default swaps), 536–537
Census Bureau, 390
Certification services, 280–281
Chang, Myong-Hun, 457
Charness, Gary, 489
Che, Y.-K., 517–518
Chen, J., 531–532
Chevron, 575
Chicago School
decision theory and, 165
dynamic efficiencies and, 171
intellectual property rights and, 140
on tying, 337–338
on vertical restraints, 352
Chicken Delight, 409
China
bid rigging in, 501
buying at unfairly low price in, 217–218
China Telcom, 219–220
China Unicom, 219–220
definition of market dominance in, 214
discriminatory practices in, 218–219
dominant market position in, 214–215
Draft Guidelines for Anti-Monopoly Enforcement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights, 225–226
Intellectual Property Division, 212
intellectual property rights in, 225–226
Japan compared, 230–232
joint dominance in, 215
Judicial Interpretation on the Application of Laws to Anti-Monopoly Private Actions, 213
legal provisions of AML, 211–212
liability in, 213
monopoly in, 210–232
non-price-related abuse of dominance in, 221–230
predatory pricing in, 218
presumption of market dominance in, 215
price discrimination in, 220–221
price-related abuse of dominance in, 217–221
private actions in, 212–213
Qihoo v. Tencent, 228–230
refusals to deal in, 221–222
Regulation on Prohibiting the Abuse of a Market Dominant Position, 212, 214, 217–218, 221–222, 224, 227, 230
Regulation on the Prevention of Below Cost Dumping Conduct, 218
relevant laws, 213–214
relevant market in, 215–216
rule-of-reason analysis in, 216–217
selling at unfairly high price in, 217–218
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), 211–212, 214–215, 217–218, 221–222, 224–225, 227, 230–231, 244–245
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 226–227
tying in, 224–225
US enforcement structure compared, 225
China Internet Network Information
Center, 229
China Netcom, 219
Church & Dwight, 326
Cisco, 565
Clark, John M., 41
Clayton Act of 1914
exclusive dealing and, 305–306
Japanese antitrust law compared, 189
predatory pricing under, 45
Coase, Ronald H., 267
Cohen, Mark A., 453
Collusion
in auctions, 501–503
in cartels. See Cartels
concentration and, 418
demand conditions and, 418–419
empirical evidence, 442–459
experimental evidence, 433–435
factors facilitating, 417–424
game theory and, 416–417
imperfect observability and monitoring and, 420–422
incomplete information and communication and, 422–423
multimarket contact and, 419–420
number of firms and, 418
self-enforcing nature of, 416
strong explicit collusion, 468–477
symmetry and, 418
theory of, 416–417
vertical mergers and, 423–424
vertical restraints and, 423–424
weak explicit collusion, 468–477
Comanor, William B., 288
Commerce Clearing House Trade Regulation Reporter, 444
Commerce Department, franchising and, 389–390
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, screening and, 606–607
Common value auction, 499–500
Communication in tacit collusion, 466–468
Compatibility standards, 555
Competition
cartels, effect on formation of, 447
cartels and, 162
in developing countries, 237–239
diminished ability to compete, exclusionary conduct and, 26–29
economic power versus, 162–163
monopsony compared, 74
Competitive advantage, 261–266
accumulated market experience and, 266
benefit-based advantage, 262–263
cost-based advantage, 262
defined, 261
niche-based advantage, 263
resource protection and, 264–265
sustainability of, 264–266
Competitive discounts. See Quantity commitment discounts
Complementarities in business strategy, 258
Complements, tying of, 339–341
Compliance. See Corporate governance and compliance
Compte, Olivier, 418
Concentration, collusion and, 418
Concerted squeezing
cartels and, 128–129
overview, 128–129
railroad industry and, 128
unilateral squeezing compared, 122–125
Consignment selling arrangements, 352
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 373
Consumers, exclusionary conduct and harm to, 30
Contract adaptation, franchising and, 405–408
Contracts that reference rivals (CRRs), 89–90
Convergent-elimination view, 483–486
Conwood, 325–326
Corporate governance and compliance, 586–611
agency costs and, 587
in Australia, 598
bid rigging, screening for, 602–604
bounties as incentives to induce detection, 599–600
cartel activity, firm indicia of, 589–594
compliance, use of screens in, 608–609
compliance culture, 596–597
culture, 594–597
empirical evidence, 597–599
employees and, 593–594
enforcement and, 591–592
in EU, 596
in Germany, 588
incentive pay, 590–591
internal monitoring, screens in, 607–608
in Japan, 588
LIBOR, screening for, 609–610
market share, screening for, 605
mathematical laws, screens based on, 606
middle management and, 593–594
norm creation, 594–595
organizational environment, 587–589
price fixing, screening for, 604–605
screens, use of, 600–610
senior management and, 592–593
in South Korea, 600
success of screens, 606–607
in Switzerland, 598
in United States, 597–598
Corruption, abuse-of-dominance and, 238
Costa Rica, abuse-of-dominance in, 240
Cotropia, Christopher A., 138
Cotter, Thomas F., 132
Counterstrategies, RRC theory and, 64
Cournot, Augustin, 355
Credit default swaps (CDS), 536–537
Cross-licenses of patents, 571–572
CRRs (Contracts that reference rivals), 89–90
Dach, Christian, 279
Dairy Queen, 343
Dal Bo, Pedro, 433
Dandong Yichuang Yaoye Co., Ltd., 223
David, Paul A., 554
Davidow, Joel, 444
Dealer property rights, exclusive dealing and, 324–326
Decision theory, 164–171
assessment errors and, 169–170
Chicago School and, 165
in EU, 165–166
information deficiencies and, 168–169
self-enforcement and, 166–170
special responsibility of dominant firms and, 166–167
TFEU and, 166–171
Defense Department, cartels and, 453
Degussa, 449
Dekel, Eddie, 491
Demand conditions, collusion and, 418–419
Demand curves, quality commitment discounts and, 95–97
Demand effects, RRC theory and, 64
DeNA Co., Ltd, 209
Deneckere, Raymond, 364
Dentsply, 321–324
Denture industry, exclusive dealing in, 321–324
Detection, cartels and, 430–433
Deterrence of bid rigging, 517–518
Detre, Joshua D., 596
Deutsches Institut für Normung, 557
Dick, Andrew R., 445
Dicke, Thomas S., 388
Digicel, 240
Diminished ability to compete, exclusionary conduct and, 26–29
Discounts. See Quantity commitment discounts; specific discount
Disparagement of alternative proposals, standard setting and, 564–565
Divestiture in abuse-of-dominance cases, 250
DLF, 247
Dnes, Antony W., 389
DOJ. See Justice Department
Dominant firms, 153–184
as-efficient-competitor (AEC) test, 168–169
assessment errors and, 169–170
attempted monopolization, 156
“but for” prices, 180–182
dynamic efficiencies and, 171–178
in EU, 153–184
exploitative abuses, 155–156
information deficiencies and, 168–169
innovation and, 171–178
interaction between, 176–177
interpretation differences between Sherman Act and TFEU, 156–160
monopolization versus abuse, 154–155
self-enforcement by, 166–170
in United States, 153–184
wording differences between Sherman Act and TFEU, 154–156
Donggang Hongda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 223
Dorfman, Robert, 360
Dorfman-Steiner theorem, 360–361
Double marginalization, tying and, 339–341
Dufwenberg, Martin, 436–437
du Pont, 58
Dutch auction, 499–500
DVDs, 558
Dyck, Alexander, 599
Eaton, 92
Economies of joint provision, 341–344
intellectual property bundling, 343–344
overview, 341
package licensing, 343–344
production cost efficiencies, 342
quality control efficiencies, 342–343
ECPR (Efficient Component Pricing Rule), abuse-of-dominance and, 250
Edwards, Corwin D., 419
Efficiencies
production cost efficiencies, 342
quality control efficiencies, 342–343
RRC theory and, 64
vertical restraints and, 359–364
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), abuse-of-dominance and, 250
Elhauge, Einer, 52
Eli Lilly & Co., 92
El Salvador, abuse-of-dominance in, 240
Employees, corporate governance and compliance and, 593–594
Empresa de Servicios Publicos de
Heredia, 240
Enforcement regimes
cartels and, 424–433
in developing countries, 237–239
in Japan, 195–199
predatory pricing and, 45–49
England. See United Kingdom
English auction, 499–500
Enhanced market power, exclusionary conduct and, 30
Entrant-tax-by-contract theory of exclusive dealing, 316–318
Euribor, 607
European Central Bank, 536
European Commission
abuse and, 155
Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restraints, 405–406
competition on merits and, 175
decision theory and, 167–169
excessive pricing and, 179–181
nonhorizontal merger guidelines, 69–70
RRC theory and, 69–70
screening and, 606
tacit collusion and, 494
European Community Treaty, intellectual property rights under, 147
European Court of Justice and General Court
decision theory and, 168–169
excessive pricing and, 179
predatory pricing and, 46
European Union. See also Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
abuse-of-dominance standard in, 236
bid rigging in, 501
cartels in, 443–446
corporate governance and compliance in, 596
decision theory in, 165–166
essential facilities doctrine in, 250
exclusive dealing in, 306–307
Japanese enforcement structure compared, 201
resale price maintenance in, 297–301
Evans, David S., 342
Evans, Phil, 449
Ex ante bargaining, patents and, 579–580
Excel (software), 206
Excessive pricing, 178–182
“but for” prices, 180–182
ordoliberalism and, 178–179
overview, 178
practical objections against enforcement, 179–180
Exclusionary conduct, 3–36
defined, 3
determination of, 20–26
diminished ability to compete and, 26–29
enhanced market power and, 30
evaluation of, 19–32
examples of procompetitive nature, 34–35
exclusionary conditions, 15–19
harm to consumers and, 30
in Japan, 200–209
mechanism of, 8–14
modes of conduct implicating mechanism, 15
100% exclusive deals, 15
practices involving exclusionary conditions, 15–17
practices not involving exclusionary conditions, 17–19
procompetitive nature of, 32–35
quality commitment discounts and, 102
rule-of-reason analysis, 4–6
in soft drink industry, 35
standard setting as venue for, 559
Exclusive dealing, 304–326
in China, 222–224
dealer property rights and, 324–326
in denture industry, 321–324
entrant-tax-by-contract theory of, 316–318
in EU, 306–307
ex post exclusive dealing, 318–320
externalities, role of, 311–313
franchising and, 393–395
in health insurance, 314–315
in hearing aid industry, 307–309
in Japan, 203–205
naked exclusion theory of, 313–316
in optical industry, 310–311
partial exclusive dealing, 304
as property right creation, 307–311
quantity commitment discounts and, 100
theories of, 311–320
vertical restraints and, 379–381
Exclusive distribution. See Franchising
Explicit bundling, 104–105
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 445
Ex post exclusive dealing, 318–320
Externalities
exclusive dealing, role in, 311–313
Facebook, 176
Faulkner, Robert R., 598
Federal Acquisitions Regulations, 519
Federal Reserve Bank, 536
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
bid rigging and, 501
Japanese enforcement structure compared, 195
Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines
quality commitment discounts and, 92
RRC theory and, 67
tacit collusion and, 477
tying and, 331
vertical restraints and, 353
Ferrari, Stijn, 407
Finland, cartels in, 443
Fisher, Franklin M., 48
Fölster, Stefan, 443
Fonseca, Miguel A., 434
Forest Service, 511–513
Fox, Eleanor M., 159
FPSB (First-price sealed-bid) auction. See First-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction
Franchising, 387–410
in Canada, 388–389
contract adaptation and, 405–408
exclusive dealing and, 393–395
in Germany, 388
historical background, 388–392
mandatory purchase requirements in, 401
role of antitrust law, 393–408
traditional versus business-format franchising, 390
in United States, 387–392
Frandata Corporation, 395–396
Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 519
Free-riding, 278–281
in brand image retail services, 280–281
certification services and, 280–281
in retail services, 278–279
“showrooming,” 279
Freiburg School. See Ordoliberalism
French Association for Standardization, 557
Friedman, James W., 478
FTC. See Federal Trade Commission
Fudenberg, Drew, 492
Fuji Iron and Steel Company, 193
Fuller, John, 598
Gabel, H. Landis, 598
Gal, Michal S., 159
Gallo, Joseph C., 444
Garces-Tolon, E., 494
Gasoline industry, tacit collusion in, 473–474
Gates, Bill, 338
Geis, Gilbert, 598
Geithman, Frederick E., 395
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 193
Geradin, Damien, 180
Germany
antitrust law in, 163
Competition Authority, 608
corporate governance and compliance in, 588
franchising in, 388
screening in, 608
vertical restraints in, 384
Gertner, Robert H., 469–471
Gilbert, Richard, 554
Gillette, 268
Glaxo, 101
Goeree, Jacob K., 500
Gould, J. R., 287
Gould, Jay, 128
Governance. See Corporate governance and compliance
Granitz, Elizabeth, 67
Grantback provisions, intellectual property rights and, 140–141
Great Britain. See United Kingdom
GREE, 209
Greenstein, Shane, 554
Grimes, Warren, 403
Günster, Andrea, 596
Haltiwanger, John, 419
Han, Martijn A., 588
Hanazono, Makoto, 423
Hand, Learned, 126
Harm to consumers, 30
Harper, Martha Matilda, 389
Harper Beauty Shops, 389
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.
on corporate governance and compliance, 600
on screening, 531–532
on tacit collusion, 477
Harris, H. Stephan, 195
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, 268
Health insurance, exclusive dealing in, 314–315
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 95
Hearing aid industry, exclusive dealing in, 307–309
Hemphill, C. Scott, 56
Herling, John, 598
Heyer, Ken, 370
Higgins, Richard S., 62
High-technology markets, tying in, 345–346
Hillman, Arye L., 564
Hinloopen, Jeroen, 436
HMOs (Health maintenance organizations), 95
Hopenhayn, H., 507–509
Hörner, J., 480
Housekeeper (software), 229–230
Hovenkamp, Erik, 329
Hovenkamp, Herbert
on exclusive dealing, 320
on quantity commitment discounts, 94
on vertical restraints, 380
Howard Johnson, 389
Hu, A., 518
Hub-and-spoke cartels, 128–129
Hubei Salt Industry Group, 224–225
Huck, Steffen, 434
Hungary, abuse-of-dominance in, 237
Husted, Thomas A., 433
Iacobucci, Edward M., 351
Ichitaro (software), 206
ICN. See International Competition Network
Idiosyncratic per se rule, tying and, 330–331
IEC (International Electrochemical Commission), 556
IFA (International Franchise Association), 395–396
Image Technical Service, 401
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 193
Imhof, Lorens A., 492
Imperfect observability and monitoring, collusion and, 420–422
Implicit bundling, 104–105
Incentive pay, 590–591
Incomplete information and communication, collusion and, 422–423
Indian Head, 562
Industry standard setting. See Standard setting
Inference, screening as problem of, 525–530
Bayesian hypothesis testing and, 525–528
testing versus screening, 528–530
Information deficiencies, dominant firms and, 168–169
Initial capital investment as communication of tacit collusion, 490–491
Injunctions, patents and, 572–574
Innovation, 132–149
aggressiveness of antitrust law and, 145–148
dominant firms and, 171–178
intellectual property rights and, 134–141
leniency toward joint conduct, role of antitrust law in, 144–145
patents and, 134–141
penalizing noncompetitive practices, role of antitrust law in, 143–144
role of antitrust law in promoting, 141–148
Intellectual property rights
bundling, 343–344
empirical evidence, 138–139
exclusive rights in, 135–136
grantback provisions and, 140–141
innovation and, 134–139
patents. See Patents
prospect theory and, 137–138
relationship with antitrust law, 139–141
social benefits versus social costs, 136–137
standard setting and, 567–580
venture capitalists and, 138
Internal monitoring, screening in, 607–608
International Electrochemical Commission (IEC), 556
International Franchise Association (IFA), 395–396
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 193
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 555–557
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 556–557
Internet
distribution restrictions, 367
online retailing, resale price maintenance (RPM) of, 277–301. See also Resale price maintenance (RPM)
Interoperability standards, 555
ISO (International Organization for Standardization), 555–557
Italy, screening in, 606
ITU (International Telecommunications Union), 556–557
Ivoclar, 322–324
Jamison, Julian, 480
Japan
Act against Delay in Payment of Subcontract Proceeds, Etc. to Subcontractors, 192
Action of Prohibition of Privation Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (AMA), 188–197, 199, 201–203, 209–210, 230–231
below-cost pricing in, 202–203
China compared, 230–232
civil procedure in, 199
competition policy versus industrial policy in, 193
control in, 201
corporate governance and compliance in, 588
discriminatory treatment in, 207–209
enforcement structure in, 195–199
entrepreneurs in, 200
EU enforcement structure compared, 201
exclusionary conduct in, 200–209
exclusive dealing in, 203–205
future trends, 209–210
Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act, 200–204, 206–207, 231–232
historical background of AMA, 190–194
Intel, 204–205
Intellectual Property Guidelines, 209
JASRAC, 205
Microsoft, 206
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 208
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 191
monopoly in, 188–210
1977 Amendment to AMA, 193–194
original AMA, 190–193
particular field of trade in, 201–202
procedures in monopoly cases, 196
refusal to supply in, 207–209
sanctions in, 196–199
screening in, 606
Shinpan hearings, 196
SSNIP test, 201–202
Structural Impediments Initiative, 194
substantial restraint of competition in, 202
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces and, 191
surcharges in, 196–199
Toshiba Elevator, 206–207
tying in, 205–207
Japanese auction, 499
Japanese Industrial Standards Committee, 557
Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC), 205
JEDEC (Joint Electron Device Engineering Council), 575
Jenny, Frédéric, 418
John Hancock, 314
Joint Economic Committee, 540
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), 575–576
Joint venture, standard setting as, 559–561
Juang, Wei-Torng, 492
Jullien, Bruno, 423–424
Justice Department (DOJ)
CRRs and, 89–90
exclusive dealing and, 314–315
intellectual property rights and, 139–140
Japanese enforcement structure compared, 195
Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines
monopolization and, 155
price fixing and, 605
RRC theory and, 67
tacit collusion and, 477
vertical restraints and, 353
Just Systems, 206
Kandori, Michihiro, 492
Kaplow, Louis, 425
Karpoff, Jonathan M., 596
Kaserman, David L., 596
Katz, Michael L., 554
Kell West Regional Hospital, 112–113
Kim, J., 517–518
Kime, Posey T., 190
Kitch, Edmund, 137
Klein, Benjamin
on franchising, 389
on quantity commitment discounts, 99
on reputation effects, 595
on resale price maintenance, 277
on RRC theory, 67
on tying, 343
on vertical restraints, 363
Klein-Murphy theorem, 368
Klemperer, Paul, 266
Klor's, 123–125
Koller, Roland H., 43
Koukou Guard (software), 229
Kraakman, Reiner, 591
Kreps, David, 44
Krishna, Vijay, 479
Krishnan, Ranjani, 364
Kroc, Ray, 396
Kwasnica, A., 516–517
Laitenberger, Ulrich, 600
Landeo, Claudia M., 315–316
Langus, Gregor, 596
Lanham Act of 1946, 399
Larouche, Pierre, 153
Lawrence, Paul R., 599
Lee, D. Scott, 596
Leegin Creative Products, Inc., 403–404
Leffler, K., 595
Lenovo, 101
Lerner Index, monopsony and, 73
Leverage theory, tying and, 333–334
Levin, J., 513–514
Liebowitz, Stan J., 345
Liefmann, Robert, 444
Lin, Ping, 188
Lipman, Barton L., 492–493
Li Qing, 219
Lithuania, abuse-of-dominance in, 237
Lock-in doctrine, 332
Long, Clarisa, 138
Lopatka, John E., 72
Lopomo, G., 505–506
Lotus 1-2-3 (software), 206
Loyalty contracts, 351
Magrane-Houston, 379
Malik, Arun, 425
Mandatory purchase requirements in franchising, 401
MAP (Minimum advertised price) policies, 291–292
Margolis, Stephen E., 345
Market share, screening for, 605
Markey, Edward, 524
Marshall, Robert C.
on corporate governance and compliance, 587
Martin, Gerald S., 596
Marx, Leslie M.
on corporate governance and compliance, 587
Mason, Charles F., 434–435
Masten, Scott E., 317
Master Kang, 217–218
Mathematical laws, screening based on, 606
Matsushima, Hitoshi, 420
Matutes, Carmen, 555
Mayer Laboratories, 326
Mazzeo, Michael J., 253
McCafferty, Stephen, 287
McCormick Harvesting Company, 388
McDevitt, Ryan C., 253
McGuire Act of 1952, 373
Medco, 101
Medicaid, 314
Medicare, 314
“Metering,” 334–335
Meurer, Michael J., 138
Mexico
abuse-of-dominance in, 237
Michael, Steven C., 400
Microsoft
competition on merits and, 175
competitive advantage and, 272
as dominant firm, 176–177
intellectual property rights and, 141
in Japan, 206
RRC theory and, 64
standard setting and, 565–566
tying and, 338
unilateral squeezing and, 126
value creation and capture framework and, 259
Microsoft Office (software), 556
Microsoft Word (software), 206
Middle management, corporate governance and compliance and, 593–594
Miksch, Leonhard, 178–179
Miller, Nathan H., 457
Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 373
Mills, David E., 40
Minimum advertised price (MAP) policies, 291–292
Misuse, tying and, 345–346
Miwa, Yoshiro, 195
Monopoly
Monopsony
competition compared, 74
dominant buyer and, 75–76
economics of, 73–77
input markets and, 74–76
Lerner Index and, 73
output markets and, 76–77
Morse, Adair, 599
Morton Salt, 345–346
Mossel Jamaica Limited, 240
Motchenkova, Evgenia, 595
Motion Picture Patents Company, 399
Motorola, 572
Mueller, Willard F., 395
Multimarket contact, collusion and, 419–420
Muris, Timothy J., 68
Myerson, R., 500
Naked exclusion theory of exclusive dealing, 313–316
National Electrical Code, 562
National Fire Prevention Association, 562
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 446
National Macaroni Manufacturer's Association, 559
National Semiconductor, 574
NavTeq, 69
Negotiated Data Solutions, 574
Neven, D., 494
Nigrini, Mark, 606
Nihon Network Vision, 203
Nike, 299
“Nine No-Nos,” 139–140
Nippon Soda, 449
Nippon Steel, 193
Nippon Telegraph, 208
Nocke, Volker, 423
Nokia, 69
Nonlinear pricing schedules, 351
Normann, Hans-Theo, 434
Norm creation, 594–595
Nowell, Clifford, 435
Number of firms, collusion and, 418
Observable posted prices, tacit collusion and, 473–474
OECD Global Forum on Competition Policy, 240–241
Oechssler, Jorg, 434
Oligopoly and the Theory of Games (Friedman), 478
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, 194
Onderstal, S., 518
One-shot auctions, bid rigging in, 504–507
Online retailing, resale price maintenance (RPM) of, 277–301. See also Resale price maintenance (RPM)
Optical industry, exclusive dealing in, 310–311
Orbach, Barak, 120
Ordoliberalism, 160–164
competition versus economic power, 162–163
excessive pricing and, 178–179
as general legal and economic theory, 160–161
in TFEU, 163–164
threat from economic power and, 161–162
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Global Forum on Competition Policy, 240–241
Over, Mead, Jr., 449
Overpurchasing model, RRC theory compared, 64
Package licensing, 343–344
Pareto efficiency, vertical restraints and, 358
Parker, Christine, 598
Partial exclusive dealing, 304
Patent and Trademark Office, RRC theory and, 67
Patents
cross-licenses of, 571–572
empirical evidence, 138–139
ex ante bargaining and, 579–580
exclusive rights in, 135–136
injunctions and, 572–574
innovation and, 134–141
overly broad declarations of standard-essential patents, 577–579
package licensing of standard-essential patents, 577–579
prospect theory and, 137–138
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing commitments, 569–574
royalties, 570–571
sale and assignment of, 574
social benefits versus social costs, 136–137
standard setting and patent holdup, 568–569
venture capitalists and, 138
Pathmark, 268
Peck, James, 364
Peltzman, Sam, 443
Perdiguero, J., 539
Pereira, P., 540
Peru, abuse-of-dominance in, 241
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978, 398
Philips, 578
Phillips, Owen R., 434–435
Phlips, Louis, 49
Pinto, Brijesh P., 523
Pioneer Foods, 248
Pittman, Russell, 235
Plastic bags, tacit collusion and, 474–477
Poland, abuse-of-dominance in, 237
Polo, Michele, 428–430
Porter, Robert H.
on cartels, 421
Predatory buying, 72–87
allocative distortion, 80
caselaw, 77–78
completely different rivals and monopoly power, 82–84
completely different rivals and no monopoly power, 78–82
dominant seller and, 83
economics of, 73–77
monopsony and, 72–73
no allocative distortion, 79
same competitors in input and output markets, 84–86
Predatory pricing, 40–58
Brooke Group, 49–53
in China, 218
economics of, 41–45
enforcement and, 45–49
intent, 46–47
Preston, L. E., 287
Price ceilings, 352
Price-cost comparisons in predatory pricing, 54–56
Price floors, 352
Price setting by cartels, 449–452
Price squeezes, 121
Pricing, predatory. See Predatory pricing
Princo, 578–579
Private value auction, 499–500
Procter & Gamble, 268
Production cost efficiencies, 342
Property right creation, exclusive dealing as, 307–311
Prospect theory, patents and, 137–138
PSKS, Inc., 403–404
Qihoo 360 (software), 229
Qualcomm, 576
Quality and safety standards, 555
Quality control efficiencies, 342–343
Quantity commitment discounts, 89–117
attribution test for exclusion, 105–109
contracts that reference rivals (CRRs), 89–90
demand curves and, 95–97
division of gains from, 98–100
economics of, 94–102
exclusionary conduct and, 102
flaws with attribution test, 111–116
foreclosure and, 102
HMOs and, 95
indicators of harm to competition, 116
legal context, 91–94
liability thresholds and attribution test, 110
loyalty discounts, 100–102
mutual gains from, 95–98
policy context, 91–94
potential harm to competition, 102–105
tests for harm to competition, 105
uses of attribution test, 111–116
Railroad industry, concerted squeezing in, 128
Raising rivals' costs (RRC) theory, 62–70
assessment of, 65–66
counterstrategies, 64
demand effects and, 64
efficiencies and, 64
limitations of, 65–66
overpurchasing model compared, 64
overview, 70
policy implications of, 67–68
strengths of, 65
vertical mergers and, 68–70
Rajgopal, Shivaram, 599
Rambus, 575–576
Ramey, Garey, 516
RAND (Reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing commitments. See Patents
Rapson, David, 541
Rasmusen, Eric B., 313–316
Reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) licensing commitments. See Patents
Recession, effect on formation of cartels, 447–449
Recoupment in predatory pricing, 56–57
Refusal to supply in Japan, 207–209
Regibeau, Pierre, 555
Renren, 245
Repeated auctions, bid rigging in, 507–510
Resale price maintenance (RPM)
anticompetitive motivations for, 292–297
antitrust standard of analysis, 297–298
brand image retail services, control of free-riding in, 280–281
certification services and, 280–281
compensation of retailers for providing interbrand retailing services, 283–286
discretion over retail services with interbrand but not interretailer demand effects, 281–283
effective retail distribution, preserving, 281–292
in EU, 297–301
free-riding, control of, 278–281
impulse purchases and, 287
manufacturer control of online retailing and, 299–301
manufacturer-motivated, 292–294
manufacturer's distribution network damaged by retailer price discounting, 286–289
minimum advertised price (MAP) policies and, 291–292
of online retailing, 277–301
outlets hypothesis, 287
procompetitive rationales for, 298–299
protection of retail distribution network, use for, 289–292
regulation of, 297–301
retailer-motivated, 294–297
retail services, control of free-riding in, 278–279
“showrooming,” 279
slotting allowances and, 285
in United States, 297–301
Restraint of trade in Japan, 202
Rey-Stiglitz theorem, 369
Riordan, Michael H., 52
Risk dominance as obstacle to tacit collusion, 486–490
Risk-sharing, tying and, 344–345
Rob, Rafael, 492
Roberts, John, 53
Rodger, Barry J., 598
Rojas, Christian, 434
Romania, abuse-of-dominance in, 237
Rosenfield, Andrew M., 469–471
RRC theory. See Raising rivals' costs (RRC) theory
Rubinstein, Ariel, 488
Sabourian, Hamid, 492
Saft, Lester F., 343
Saks Fifth Avenue, 367
Salant, Steven W., 431
Salinger, Michael A., 342
Samuelson, W., 500
Sanctions in abuse-of-dominance cases, 249–250
San Francisco Peace Treaty, 191
Sannikov, Yulij, 421
Saurman, David S., 398
Scharfstein, David, 588
Schechter, Laura, 606
Scheinkman, Jose A., 479
Schelling, Thomas, 478
Schenone, P., 479
Schinkel, Maarten Pieter, 153
Schmalensee, Richard, 334
Schmidt, Klaus M., 588
Schott Glass, 246
Schwartz, W., 65
Scott Morton, Fiona, 254
Screening, 523–551
Bayesian hypothesis testing and, 525–528
for bid rigging, 602–604
cartels and, 430–433
collusive markets other than price screens, based on, 548–549
compliance, use in, 608–609
in corporate governance and compliance, 600–610
in Cournot markets, 530
empirical screens, 534
first and second moments of price distribution, based on, 534–540
in Germany, 608
inference, as problem of, 525–530
in internal monitoring, 607–608
in Italy, 606
in Japan, 606
for market share, 605
mathematical laws, based on, 606
in Netherlands, 606
for price fixing, 604–605
in South Africa, 606
structural models, based on, 540–548
success of, 606–607
testing versus, 528–530
theoretical screens, 530–534
SCSI (Small Computer Systems Interface), 555
Seabright, Paul, 494
Sealy, 395
Seira, E., 513–514
Self-distribution, tying and, 344–345
Senegal, abuse-of-dominance in, 241–242
Senior management, corporate governance and compliance and, 592–593
Separate products test, tying and, 341
Shanda Interactive Entertainment Ltd., 244
Shane, Scott, 395–397
Shanghai Xuanting Entertainment Co. Ltd., 244
Shavell, Steven, 425
Shenzhen Tencent Computer System Co. Ltd., 228
Sherman Act of 1890
attempted monopolization under, 156
collusion under, 415
competition on merits under, 158
decision theory and, 169
exclusive dealing and, 305–306
franchising under, 395
intellectual property rights and, 140–142
Japanese antitrust law compared, 189
monopolization under, 154–155
quality commitment discounts and, 110
special responsibility of dominant firms under, 157
tying under, 330–331
Shire, 123
“Showrooming,” 279
Sibley, David S., 523
Sinclair, 394
Singer Sewing Machine Company, 388
Sivadasan, Jagadeesh, 454
Slovak Republic, abuse-of-dominance in, 237
Smith, Richard L., II, 398
Snider, Connan, 609
Soetevent, Adrian, 436
Soft drink industry, exclusionary conduct in, 35
Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, 599
South Africa
Competition Authority, 606
Competition Commission, 248
Competition Tribunal, 249
screening in, 606
South African Airways, 248
South Korea, corporate governance and compliance in, 600
Southwest Airlines, 265
Spar, Debora L., 445
Spengler, Joseph, 355
Spier, Kathryn E., 315–316
Spulber, Daniel F., 431–432
Squeeze claims, 120–129
cartels and, 128–129
essential facilities, 121
in nonintegrated firms, 127
price squeezes, 121
railroad industry and, 128
refusals to deal, 121
unilateral squeezing, 122–127
in vertically integrated firms, 125–127
SSOs. See Standard-setting organizations
Standard auction models, 499–500
Standard Fashion, 379
Standardization Administration of China, 557
Standard Oil Company, 41–42
Standard setting, 554–581
compatibility standards, 555
corruption of process, 561–565
development of standards, 555–557
disparagement of alternative proposals and, 564–565
ex ante bargaining and, 579–580
exclusionary conduct, as venue for, 559
failure to disclose standard-essential patents, 574–577
intellectual property rights and, 567–580
interoperability standards, 555
as joint venture, 559–561
overly broad declarations of standard-essential patents, 577–579
overly broad standard specifications, 577–579
package licensing of standard-essential patents, 577–579
patent holdup and, 568–569
price fixing, as venue for, 559
quality and safety standards, 555
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing commitments, 569–574
types of standards, 555
unilaterally determined standards, 565–567
vote stacking and, 561–564
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs)
ANSI-approved SSOs, 557
competition principles, 557–565
international SSOs, 556
national SSOs, 557
regional SSOs, 557
Steiner, Peter O., 360
Stewart, Potter, 116
Stock-based cartel event studies, 595–596
The Strategy of Conflict (Schelling), 478
Strong explicit collusion, 468–477
Sumitomo, 449
Summit Technology, 578
Sun, P., 505
Suppiger, 345–346
Sustainability of competitive advantage, 264–266
Sutton, John, 454
Sweden, cartels in, 443–444
Switzerland, corporate governance and compliance in, 598
Sylvania, 375
Symmetry, collusion and, 418
Synergies, 267–268
Tacit collusion, 464–494
antitrust litigation and, 493–494
“arrive by reasoning,” 482–486
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 488
blundering into, 492–493
“burning the dollar” game and, 491
communication in, 466–468
convergent-elimination view, 483–486
defined, 464
economics versus legal terminology, 467
evolution of theory, 477–480
game theory and, 478–479
in gasoline industry, 473–474
illustrations, 473–477
initial capital investment as communication, 490–491
initial phase of collusion, 480–493
observable posted prices and, 473–474
overview, 464–468
plastic bags and, 474–477
risk dominance as obstacle to, 486–490
strong explicit collusion versus, 468–477
unobservable bid prices and, 474–477
weak explicit collusion versus, 468–477
Taiwan, abuse-of-dominance in, 241
Tan, G., 506
Tan, Tommy C.-C., 483
Tarbell, Ida M., 41
TeleAtlas, 69
Telephone East Corporation, 208
Telser, Lester, 368
Tennessee Valley Authority, 603
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 128
Testing versus screening, 528–530
Thompson, John S., 596
TIBOR, 607
Tiffany, 367
TOK, 242
Tom Tom, 69
Topel, Robert H., 89
Toshiba, 204
Toshiba Elevator, 206–207
Toys “R” Us, 129
Trade-offs in business strategy, 257–258
Traditional franchising, 390
Transitions Optical, 310–311
Treaty of Rome (1957), 179
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2009)
abuse under, 154–155
collusion under, 415
decision theory and, 166–171
excessive pricing and, 178–181
exclusive dealing and, 306–307
exploitative abuses under, 155–156
interaction between dominant firms and, 176–177
predatory pricing under, 46
special responsibility of dominant firms under, 157
Twitter, 176
Tyco, 95
Tying, 329–348
in China, 224–225
of complements, 339–341
damages, 347–348
double marginalization and, 339–341
effects of, 333–338
foreclosure and, 337–338
in high-technology markets, 345–346
identification of, 329–330
idiosyncratic per se rule and, 330–331
in Japan, 205–207
leverage theory and, 333–334
lock-in doctrine, 332
market power and, 332–333
“metering,” 334–335
minimum conditions for competitive harm, 332–333
misuse and, 345–346
motives, 333–338
price discrimination and, 334–337
remedies, 347–348
risk-sharing and, 344–345
self-distribution and, 344–345
separate products test and, 341
statutory coverage, 330–331
variable proportion ties, 336
Ukraine, abuse-of-dominance in, 238
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 236
Unilateral squeezing, 122–127
concerted squeezing compared, 122–125
in nonintegrated firms, 127
in vertically integrated firms, 125–127
Union Oil Company of California, 575
United Kingdom
Board of Trade, 443
cartels in, 443–444
Competition Act of 1998, 598
Competition Commission, 407
vertical restraints in, 353
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 236
United States. See also specific Act or governmental entity
abuse-of-dominance standard in, 236
bid rigging in, 501–502
cartels in, 443–446
Chinese enforcement structure compared, 225
corporate governance and compliance in, 597–598
franchising in, 387–392
resale price maintenance in, 297–301
Uno, Sosuke, 194
Unobservable bid prices, tacit collusion and, 474–477
Usen Broadband Networks, 203
Uzbekistan, abuse-of-dominance in, 237
(p. 643)
Value creation and capture framework, 255–261
added value, 260–261
enhancing value creation, 256–258
overview, 255–256
rivalry and, 258–260
Van Baal, Sebastian, 279
van der Laan, Rob, 595
van Dijk, Mathijs A., 596
Variable proportion ties, 336
Varian, Hal, 606
Varney, Christine, 93
Veith, Tobias, 608
Venture capitalists, patents and, 138
Vertical integration
unilateral squeezing and, 125–127
Vertical restraints, 351–384
anticompetitive uses, 368–371
in Australia, 384
buyback options, 352
collusion and, 423–424
consignment selling arrangements, 352
economics of, 353–367
efficiencies and, 359–364
empirical evidence, 371
exclusive dealing and, 379–381
exclusive territories and, 374–376
in Germany, 384
Internet distribution restrictions, 367
law versus economics, 381–384
loyalty contracts, 351
Nash equilibrium and, 370
nonlinear pricing schedules, 351
Pareto efficiency and, 358
price ceilings, 352
price floors, 352
royalty contracts, 351
single firm incentives, 359–364
slotting allowances, 352
in United Kingdom, 353
VHS videotapes, 558
Vickers, John, 51
Vickrey, W., 500
Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), 575
VISX, 578
Vita Zahnfabrik, 322–324
Vote stacking, standard setting and, 561–564
W
Walker, J., 516–517
Weak explicit collusion, 468–477
Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 445
Weber, R., 499–500
WellPoint, 269
Wendy's, 354
White, Andrew, 555
White, Lucy, 423
Wiley, John S., Jr., 313–316
Wilson, Robert, 44
WiMax, 558
Woods, Sean, 555
Wuchang Salt, 224–225
Xu Kunlin, 221
Yamamoto, Y., 479
Yamey, Basil, 43
Yang, Huanxing, 423
Yawata Iron and Steel Company, 193
Youle, Thomas, 609
Young, Peyton, 492
Zemsky, P., 505–506
Zhang, X. J., 217
Zingales, Luigi, 599
