Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 15 September 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter characterizes screening for collusion as a problem of inference whose essential elements include competitive null hypothesis (H0), a collusive alternative (H1), and an empirical indicator (X) to differentiate between them. Using this framework, the chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical efforts to design screens and finds that screens fail for one of three reasons: (1) the empirical indicator cannot distinguish between H0 and H1; (2) H0 is not indicative of competition or H1 is not indicative of collusion; or (3) the world is neither H0 nor H1. The often underappreciated, second and third conditions imply that before using a screen, the practitioners should make sure that the industry in question “fits” the theoretical model or assumptions on which the screen is based.

Keywords: collusion, screening, screen, Bayesian hypothesis testing, natural experiments, structural modeling

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.