- Consulting Editors
- List of Contributors
- A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct
- Predatory Pricing
- Raising Rivals’ Costs
- Predatory Buying
- Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy
- Squeeze Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes
- Innovation and Antitrust Policy
- Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to Section 2 Sherman Act
- Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and China
- Monopolization in Developing Countries
- Business Strategy and Antitrust Policy
- Resale Price Maintenance of Online Retailing
- Exclusive Dealing
- Tying Arrangements
- Vertical Restraints Across Jurisdictions
- Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and Antitrust
- Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics
- Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence
- Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly
- Auctions and Bid Rigging
- Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference
- Competition Policy for Industry Standards
- Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on bid rigging in auctions. In particular, it reviews the theory and practice of bidding rings in one-shot auctions and in repeated auctions. The main theme is how the type of auction, whether it is first-price or second-price, sealed bid or oral, affects the incentive of bidders to collude and the way in which they collude.
R. Preston McAfee, Research Leader, Google.
Michael Williams, Director, Competition Economics LLC.
Kenneth Hendricks, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin.
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