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date: 17 September 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter provides a selective review of economic theory and experimental evidence on cartels and collusion. In particular, it highlights the role of incentives in collusion and cartel formation and identifies conditions that are conducive to collusive behavior. It then discusses enforcement against collusion with a particular focus on the recent work on leniency programs and cartel screening. Finally, we look at experimental evidence on cartel formation and the effects of competition policy.

Keywords: cartel, collusion, leniency, leniency program, cartel screening

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