- Consulting Editors
- List of Contributors
- A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct
- Predatory Pricing
- Raising Rivals’ Costs
- Predatory Buying
- Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy
- Squeeze Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes
- Innovation and Antitrust Policy
- Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to Section 2 Sherman Act
- Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and China
- Monopolization in Developing Countries
- Business Strategy and Antitrust Policy
- Resale Price Maintenance of Online Retailing
- Exclusive Dealing
- Tying Arrangements
- Vertical Restraints Across Jurisdictions
- Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and Antitrust
- Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics
- Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence
- Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly
- Auctions and Bid Rigging
- Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference
- Competition Policy for Industry Standards
- Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter provides a selective review of economic theory and experimental evidence on cartels and collusion. In particular, it highlights the role of incentives in collusion and cartel formation and identifies conditions that are conducive to collusive behavior. It then discusses enforcement against collusion with a particular focus on the recent work on leniency programs and cartel screening. Finally, we look at experimental evidence on cartel formation and the effects of competition policy.
Jay Pil Choi, Professor of Economics, Michigan State.
Heiko Gerlach, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Queensland.
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