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date: 26 June 2022

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter describes and defends an account of virtuous motivation that differs from what one might call ordinary moral motivation. It is possible to be morally motivated without being virtuously motivated. The first half of the chapter explores different senses of moral motivation and the philosophical puzzles and problems it poses. The second half gives an account of virtuous motivation that, unlike ordinary moral motivation, requires the motivational structure characteristic of a fully virtuous person. It draws on Aristotle’s account of virtuous action to argue that a fully virtuous agent’s judgment reflects a robust form of moral knowledge about what features of an action render it virtuous and hence choiceworthy. Virtuously motivated actions are chosen in light of those features and are accompanied by the affective state appropriate to the overall moral landscape in which the judgment is made.

Keywords: Aristotle, moral motivation, philosophy, virtue, moral, judgment, choiceworthiness

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