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date: 17 August 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter examines connections between virtue epistemology and psychology. The authors’ interest is thus to explain, understand, and evaluate virtue theoretic forms of epistemic psychology. Section I provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; section II then discusses the two main types of virtue epistemological theories currently on offer (responsibilism and reliabilism). Section III examines empirical challenges to responsibilism from social psychology (epistemic situationism) and some lines of response. Section IV concludes by showing that a pressing problem for virtue reliabilism, namely providing an adequate account of epistemic agency, can be resolved by utilizing recent empirical work in the psychology of attention. The authors defend an empirically informed account of epistemic agency suitable for virtue reliabilism.

Keywords: psychology, responsibilism, reliabilism, epistemic situationism, virtue, epistemic agency

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