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date: 16 June 2021

Abstract and Keywords

After describing the origins and nature of the value-free ideal for science, this chapter details three challenges to the ideal: the descriptive challenge (arising from feminist critiques of science, which led to deeper examinations of social structures in science), the boundary challenge (which questioned whether epistemic values can be distinguished from nonepistemic values), and the normative challenge (which questioned the ideal qua ideal on the basis of inductive risk and scientific responsibility). The chapter then discusses alternative ideals for values in science, including recent arguments regarding epistemic values, arguments distinguishing direct from indirect roles for values, and arguments calling for more attention to getting the values right. Finally, the chapter turns to the many ways in which values influence science and the importance of getting a richer understanding of the place of science within society in order to address the questions about the place of values in science.

Keywords: values in science, value-free ideal, descriptive challenge, boundary challenge, epistemic values, normative challenge, cognitive values, inductive risk, responsible science, science in society

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