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date: 26 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

The topic of this chapter is the difficult conclusion of Hegel’s Science of Logic, concerning what Hegel calls ‘Objectivity’ and the ‘Absolute Idea’. It is argued that there are two keys to finding Hegel’s argument and its philosophical strengths. First, Hegel takes a kind of metaphysics as basic to philosophy. Second, Hegel aims to support an ambitious metaphysics, but not (as is sometimes thought) a form of metaphysical monism; rather, Hegel argues that there is something with absolute metaphysical priority, but this is something that must be realized in something with less metaphysical priority. This is what Hegel means by the frequent refrain that the absolute cannot be a beginning, but must come at the end. The advantages of this metaphysical interpretive approach are compared with competing advantages of others, including an approach by means of a comparison with the deductions from the Transcendental Analytic of Kant’s first Critique.

Keywords: Hegel, absolute idea, Science of Logic, Kant, metaphysics

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