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date: 20 January 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter deals with preference-based views of well-being, according to which well-being depends exclusively on preferences or desires. The aim is to spell out this dependency in more detail and discuss the pros and cons of these views, seen as substantive theories of well-being. In particular, it is argued that the standard formulations of preference-based views are defective, mainly because they do not pay due attention to the distinction between comparative and monadic attitudes and values. Further, it is argued that in order to find out how well these views can answer the usual complaints levelled against them, it is crucial to distinguish between object preferentialism and satisfaction preferentialism.

Keywords: well-being, good for, better for, preferentialism, preferences, monadic attitudes

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