- [UNTITLED]
- List of contributors
- Abbreviations of Wittgenstein's works
- Editors' Introduction
- Wittgenstein and Biography
- Wittgenstein Reads Russell
- Assertion, Saying, and Propositional Complexity in Wittgenstein's <i>Tractatus</i>
- Wittgenstein and Frege
- Wittgenstein and Infinity
- Wittgenstein On Mathematics
- Wittgenstein On Surveyability of Proofs
- From Logical Method to ‘Messing About’: Wittgenstein on ‘Open Problems’ in Mathematics
- The Proposition's Progress
- Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein
- The <i>Tractatus</i> and The Limits of Sense
- The Life of The Sign: Rule-following, Practice, and Agreement
- Meaning and Understanding
- Wittgenstein and Idealism
- Private Language
- Very General Facts of Nature
- Wittgenstein on The First Person
- Private Experience and Sense Data
- Privacy
- Action and The Will
- Wittgenstein on Criteria and The Problem Of Other Minds
- Wittgenstein on The Experience of Meaning and Secondary Use
- Wittgenstein on Scepticism
- Wittgenstein and Moore
- Wittgenstein on Intuition, Rule-Following, and Certainty: Exchanges with Brouwer and Russell
- The Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy
- Wittgenstein's Methods
- Grammar in the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>
- Wittgenstein's Use of Examples
- Aspect Perception and Philosophical Difficulty
- Writing Philosophy as Poetry: Literary form in Wittgenstein
- Wittgenstein and The Moral Dimension of Philosophical Problems
- Wittgenstein on Religious Belief
- Wittgenstein on Aesthetics
- Wittgenstein and Ethics
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein developed different, though closely related, versions of logical atomism. Wittgenstein's version is presented in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and discussed in the various pre-Tractatus manuscripts. For Russell, analytical realism is a form of atomism because it maintains that the existence of the complex depends on the existence of the simple and not vice versa, and that the atomic entities in its ontology (universals and particulars) have their nature quite independently of the relations they bear to one another. The core tenets of Wittgenstein's logical atomism may be summarised as follows: Every proposition has a unique final analysis that reveals it to be a truth-function of elementary propositions; These elementary propositions assert the existence of atomic states of affairs; Elementary propositions are mutually independent — each one can be true or false independently of the truth or falsity of the others; Elementary propositions are immediate combinations of semantically simple symbols or ‘names’; Names refer to items wholly devoid of complexity, so-called ‘objects’; Atomic states of affairs are combinations of these simple objects.
Keywords: Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, logical atomism, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, analytical realism, elementary propositions, names, objects
Ian Proops, University of Texas, Austin
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- [UNTITLED]
- List of contributors
- Abbreviations of Wittgenstein's works
- Editors' Introduction
- Wittgenstein and Biography
- Wittgenstein Reads Russell
- Assertion, Saying, and Propositional Complexity in Wittgenstein's <i>Tractatus</i>
- Wittgenstein and Frege
- Wittgenstein and Infinity
- Wittgenstein On Mathematics
- Wittgenstein On Surveyability of Proofs
- From Logical Method to ‘Messing About’: Wittgenstein on ‘Open Problems’ in Mathematics
- The Proposition's Progress
- Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein
- The <i>Tractatus</i> and The Limits of Sense
- The Life of The Sign: Rule-following, Practice, and Agreement
- Meaning and Understanding
- Wittgenstein and Idealism
- Private Language
- Very General Facts of Nature
- Wittgenstein on The First Person
- Private Experience and Sense Data
- Privacy
- Action and The Will
- Wittgenstein on Criteria and The Problem Of Other Minds
- Wittgenstein on The Experience of Meaning and Secondary Use
- Wittgenstein on Scepticism
- Wittgenstein and Moore
- Wittgenstein on Intuition, Rule-Following, and Certainty: Exchanges with Brouwer and Russell
- The Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy
- Wittgenstein's Methods
- Grammar in the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>
- Wittgenstein's Use of Examples
- Aspect Perception and Philosophical Difficulty
- Writing Philosophy as Poetry: Literary form in Wittgenstein
- Wittgenstein and The Moral Dimension of Philosophical Problems
- Wittgenstein on Religious Belief
- Wittgenstein on Aesthetics
- Wittgenstein and Ethics
- Index
