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date: 25 January 2022

Abstract and Keywords

This article explores Ludwig Wittgenstein's views on the proposition by tracing a path, in steps, from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to Philosophical Investigations. It focuses on one intermediate step, found in Philosophical Grammar. As things now stand, a language unfolds the notions proposition and truth. In one way among indefinitely many it adds enough content to these notions for there to be an extension for ‘is a proposition’ and for ‘is either true or false’. Its grammar provides this content. Still bracketing conflict between grammar and logic, there is no perspective from outside a language from which its grammar is criticisable. The idea of language-games as objects of comparison gives the parochial a certain purchase on thought and its objects. Among other things, the parochial gains a role in how logic applies to thought, which raises questions about Gottlob Frege's conception of logic's distance from psychology.

Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations, Philosophical Grammar, proposition, truth, grammar, logic, Gottlob Frege, language-games

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