Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 13 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This article begins with a brief exposition of a theory that has been presented in various publications. Then it describes two other non-Meinongian theories of the ontology of fiction, those of Nicholas Wolterstorff and Amie Thomasson. Wolterstorff and Thomasson's theories are, in a sense, in substantial agreement with this article's; they differ from this one in being much more specific about the metaphysical nature of fictional characters. A non-Meinongian theory of fiction (that is, a theory of fiction that allows only one sort of existential quantifier) must answer questions such as: How are we to deal with the fact (or is it a fact?) that when fictional discourse is translated into the quantifier-variable idiom, it can be seen to imply that fictional characters like Tom Sawyer and Mr Pickwick are or have being, that they exist?

Keywords: existence, non-Meinongian theories, ontology of fiction, fictional characters, existential quantifier, ontological commitments

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.