- The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science
- About the Contributors
- It Depends
- Why and How Philosophy Matters
- The Socialization of Epistemology
- Political Ontology
- Mind, Will, and Choice
- Theory, Fact, and Logic
- Why and How Psychology Matters
- Motivation and Emotion
- Social Preferences, <i>Homo Economicus</i>, and <i>Zoon Politikon</i>
- Frames and Their Consequences
- Memory, Individual and Collective
- Why and How Ideas Matter
- Detecting Ideas and Their Effects
- How Previous Ideas Affect Later Ideas
- How Ideas Affect Actions
- Mistaken Ideas and Their Effects
- Why and How Culture Matters
- How to Detect Culture and Its Effects
- Race, Ethnicity, Religion
- Language, Its Stakes, and Its Effects
- The Idea of Political Culture
- Why and How History Matters
- Historical Knowledge and Evidence
- Historical Context and Path Dependence
- Does History Repeat?
- The Present as History
- Why and How Place Matters
- Detecting the Significance of Place
- Space, Place, and Time
- Spaces and Places as Sites and Objects of Politics
- Uses of Local Knowledge
- Why and How Population Matters
- The Politics of Demography
- Politics and Mass Immigration
- Population Change, Urbanization, and Political Consolidation
- Population Composition as an Object of Political Struggle
- Why and How Technology Matters
- The Gender Politics of Technology
- Military Technologies and Politics
- Technology as a Site and Object of Politics
- Duchamp's Urinal: Who Says What's Rational When Things Get Tough?
- The Behavioral Revolution and the Remaking of Comparative Politics
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article examines the repetition in history in relation to contextual political analysis. It attempts to determine how political science can explain outcomes in a way that does not contradict their fundamentally historical character given that repetition is often considered necessary for making general, explanatory statements in the social sciences. The article explains that history can usefully be seen as repeating and argues that even the most radical critics accept some forms of repetition, and these forms are not logically different from those they reject. It suggests that explanation does not require repetition because explanatory approaches that are usually seen as requiring repetition are those based on correlational arguments. It also considers how political phenomena can be seen as repeating, both in terms of description as cases of the same thing and in terms of common causal patterns.
Ruth Berins Collier is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.
Sebastián Mazzuca is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.
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