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date: 17 January 2021

Abstract and Keywords

Epiphenomenalism is not only at odds with our intuitive conception of ourselves as autonomous agents. It also faces a whole series of theoretical difficulties. Among other things, it appears to undermine freedom of the will, the possibility of an evolutionary account of the mind, our conviction that others enjoy a mental life similar to ours, the application of epistemic norms like justification, warrant, or reasonableness to processes of belief formation, the distinction between reasons for an action and the reasons for which it was performed, and our ability to refer to, have knowledge of, and have memories about mental states. This article briefly sketches two of the most important of them, saying why the epiphenomenalist's standard response to them appears unsatisfactory. Then it considers an issue that has so far been mostly neglected; namely, the question of which account of causation would allow for a coherent formulation of the epiphenomenalist's position. Finally, it suggests an alternative version of epiphenomenalism, which, though not free from problems, may be superior to the traditional version.

Keywords: epiphenomenalism, epistemic norms, mental life, justification, warrant, causation

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