Abstract and Keywords
Is self-deception really a matter of deliberately getting oneself to believe something contrary to something else one already believes and, if so, how can one succeed at it? Colloquial phrases for it, like ‘fooling yourself’ and ‘lying to yourself’, evoke paradox. Although this article stresses the more recent philosophical work on the subject, most work on self-deception has focused on this paradox and sought ways to clear the air of it. The article focuses on the puzzles and questions of contemporary philosophical interest.
Keywords: self-deception, contemporary philosophy, irrationality, lying model, epistemic support, intentional action
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
Please subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.
For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.
