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date: 13 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) The first two sections of this article give a brief clarification of what this claim that ‘the intentional is normative’ actually means. The third section considers a number of arguments that philosophers have advanced in favour of this claim; as the discussion reflects, many of these arguments are inconclusive at best. However, the last section gives a sketch of a different argument, which the author regards as a persuasive argument for this claim.

Keywords: philosophy of mind, normativity, philosophy of language, meaning, intentional, persuasive argument

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