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date: 07 March 2021

Abstract and Keywords

The chief virtue of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes, besides getting right the semantic nature of attitude predicates, is precisely that, as Davidson suggests, it enables one to embrace the very plausible relational conception of attitude attributions without thereby having to embrace the much more dubious relational conception of the attitudes themselves. To be a non-relationalist about the attitudes one does not, as Quine, Fodor, and others have assumed, have to be a non-relationalist about attitude predicates. It is entirely possible that propositional attitudes are monadic properties of their possessors, even though they are predicated of individuals by means of relational predicates.

Keywords: attitudes, relational conception, attitude predicates, propositional attitudes, monadic properties, relational predicates

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