- [UNTITLED]
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Mental Causation
- The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
- Dualism
- Epiphenomenalism
- Anomalous Monism
- Non‐Reductive Materialism
- Functionalism
- What is Property Physicalism?
- What is the Physical?
- Idealism
- Panpsychism
- Subjectivity
- Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness
- Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
- The Explanatory Gap
- Phenomenal Concepts
- The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
- Intentional Systems Theory
- Wide Content
- Narrow Content
- Information‐Theoretic Semantics
- Biosemantics
- A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
- The Normativity of the Intentional
- Concepts and Possession Conditions
- The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
- Intentionalism
- The Content of Perceptual Experience
- Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
- The Self
- Unity of Consciousness
- Personal Identity and Metaphysics
- Imagination
- Thinking
- Language and Thought
- Consciousness and Reference
- Memory
- Emotions: Motivating Feelings
- Intention and Intentional Action
- Folk Psychology
- Other Minds
- Introspection
- Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge
- Self‐Deception
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
Intentional systems theory is in the first place an analysis of the meanings of such everyday ‘mentalistic’ terms as ‘believe’, ‘desire’, ‘expect’, ‘decide’, and ‘intend’: the terms of ‘folk psychology’ that we use to interpret, explain, and predict the behaviour of other human beings, animals, some artefacts such as robots and computers, and indeed ourselves. In traditional parlance we seem to be attributing minds to the things we thus interpret, and this raises a host of questions about the conditions under which a thing can be truly said to have a mind, or to have beliefs, desires, and other ‘mental’ states. According to intentional systems theory, these questions can best be answered by analysing the logical presuppositions and methods of our attribution practices, when we adopt the intentional stance toward something.
Keywords: intentional systems theory, folk psychology, mentalistic terms, human behaviour, mental states, intentional stance
Daniel C. Dennett is university professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is also the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies there. His most recent book on free will is Freedom Evolves (2003) and among his recent articles are “Toward a Science of Volition,” with W. Prinz and N. Sebanz, in Disorders of Volition, edited by N. Sebanz and W. Prinz (2006), and “Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking about Free Will,” in Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will, edited by John Baer, James C. Kaufman, Roy F. Baumeister (OUP, 2008).
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- [UNTITLED]
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Mental Causation
- The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
- Dualism
- Epiphenomenalism
- Anomalous Monism
- Non‐Reductive Materialism
- Functionalism
- What is Property Physicalism?
- What is the Physical?
- Idealism
- Panpsychism
- Subjectivity
- Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness
- Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
- The Explanatory Gap
- Phenomenal Concepts
- The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
- Intentional Systems Theory
- Wide Content
- Narrow Content
- Information‐Theoretic Semantics
- Biosemantics
- A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
- The Normativity of the Intentional
- Concepts and Possession Conditions
- The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
- Intentionalism
- The Content of Perceptual Experience
- Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
- The Self
- Unity of Consciousness
- Personal Identity and Metaphysics
- Imagination
- Thinking
- Language and Thought
- Consciousness and Reference
- Memory
- Emotions: Motivating Feelings
- Intention and Intentional Action
- Folk Psychology
- Other Minds
- Introspection
- Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge
- Self‐Deception
- Index