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date: 18 September 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article outlines the strategy for reconciling materialism and the explanatory gap. As one might imagine, there are a number of complex issues that must be sorted out concerning the alleged special nature of phenomenal concepts, and their alleged incommensurability with non-phenomenal concepts, before one can determine whether or not the strategy works in the end. In particular, it is unclear whether materialists can deliver an explanation of the special cognitive access afforded by phenomenal concepts which is itself consistent with its precepts.

Keywords: materialism, explanatory gap, phenomenal concepts, non-phenomenal concepts, cognitive access

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