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date: 16 July 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Arguments specifically for and against idealism are arguments about the nature of the physical world, not about the nature of mind. This creates a problem for a would-be author of an entry on idealism, in a collection on the philosophy of mind, if he wishes to do justice both to the topic of his chapter and to the theme of the book as a whole. This article tries to resolve this conflict. Arguments for idealism usually take the form of attempted refutations of physical realism. They therefore tend to take the form of trying to prove that, in one way or another, the existence of material objects depends directly on the existence and activity of minds, other than that of the divine creator in his act of creating.

Keywords: idealism, physical world, nature of mind, philosophy of mind, physical realism, material objects

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