- the oxford handbooks of American Politics
- [UNTITLED]
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- About the Contributors
- Preface
- Dedication
- A Heritage Made Our Own
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- The “First New Federalism” and the Development of the Administrative State, 1883–1929
- A Gendered Legacy?: The Progressive Reform Era Revisited
- Reevaluating Executive‐Centered Public Administrative Theory
- Metaphors and the Development of American Bureaucracy
- Herbert Hoover's Revenge: Politics, Policy, and Administrative Reform Movements
- Agency Theory and the Bureaucracy
- Agency Design and Evolution
- Goal Ambiguity and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- Street‐Level Bureaucracy Theory
- The Promises and Paradoxes of Performance‐Based Bureaucracy
- Leading Through Cultural Change
- Postmodernism, Bureaucracy, and Democracy
- Myths, Markets, and the <i>Visible Hand</i> of American Bureaucracy
- Networking in the Shadow of Bureaucracy
- The Promises, Performance, and Pitfalls of Government Contracting
- Reluctant Partners?: Nonprofit Collaboration, Social Entrepreneurship, and Leveraged Volunteerism
- Policy Tools, Mandates, and Intergovernmental Relations
- Promises, Perils, and Performance of Netcentric Bureaucracy
- Multilevel Methods in the Study of Bureaucracy
- Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies
- “Presidentializing” the Bureaucracy
- Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Judicial Review
- Interest Groups, Rulemaking, and American Bureaucracy
- Policymaking, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Overhead Democracy
- Choice‐Theoretic Approaches to Bureaucratic Structure
- Has Governance Eclipsed Government?
- Revitalizing Human Resources Management
- Representative Bureaucracy
- Innovations in Budgeting and Financial Management
- The Prospects for Revitalizing Ethics in a New Governance Era
- Experimental Methods, Agency Incentives, and the Study of Bureaucratic Behavior
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article describes the insights and limitations of rational choice institutionalism in political science. It then shows that organization theory offers insights into agency evolution but has limited explanatory power for public sector agencies. Moreover, a general model of agency adaptation failure that combines elements of the two theoretical perspectives is provided. The literatures in organization theory, political science, public administration, and public management that appear most relevant for studying agency adaptation failure do not offer any off-the-shelf approaches. The article looks at adaptation from the perspective of agency leaders, and then represents the substance and logic of the model of adaptation failure. It finally presents some thoughts about promising avenues of future research on agency design and evolution.
Keywords: agency design, evolution, rational choice institutionalism, organization theory, agency adaptation failure, political science, public administration, public management
Amy B. Zegart is Associate Professor of Public Policy in the School of Public Affairs at the University of California‐Los Angeles and a Research Fellow in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
Please subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.
For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.
- the oxford handbooks of American Politics
- [UNTITLED]
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- About the Contributors
- Preface
- Dedication
- A Heritage Made Our Own
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- The “First New Federalism” and the Development of the Administrative State, 1883–1929
- A Gendered Legacy?: The Progressive Reform Era Revisited
- Reevaluating Executive‐Centered Public Administrative Theory
- Metaphors and the Development of American Bureaucracy
- Herbert Hoover's Revenge: Politics, Policy, and Administrative Reform Movements
- Agency Theory and the Bureaucracy
- Agency Design and Evolution
- Goal Ambiguity and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- Street‐Level Bureaucracy Theory
- The Promises and Paradoxes of Performance‐Based Bureaucracy
- Leading Through Cultural Change
- Postmodernism, Bureaucracy, and Democracy
- Myths, Markets, and the <i>Visible Hand</i> of American Bureaucracy
- Networking in the Shadow of Bureaucracy
- The Promises, Performance, and Pitfalls of Government Contracting
- Reluctant Partners?: Nonprofit Collaboration, Social Entrepreneurship, and Leveraged Volunteerism
- Policy Tools, Mandates, and Intergovernmental Relations
- Promises, Perils, and Performance of Netcentric Bureaucracy
- Multilevel Methods in the Study of Bureaucracy
- Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies
- “Presidentializing” the Bureaucracy
- Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Judicial Review
- Interest Groups, Rulemaking, and American Bureaucracy
- Policymaking, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Overhead Democracy
- Choice‐Theoretic Approaches to Bureaucratic Structure
- Has Governance Eclipsed Government?
- Revitalizing Human Resources Management
- Representative Bureaucracy
- Innovations in Budgeting and Financial Management
- The Prospects for Revitalizing Ethics in a New Governance Era
- Experimental Methods, Agency Incentives, and the Study of Bureaucratic Behavior
- Name Index
- Subject Index
