- the oxford handbooks of American Politics
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- About the Contributors
- A Heritage Made Our Own
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- The “First New Federalism” and the Development of the Administrative State, 1883–1929
- A Gendered Legacy?: The Progressive Reform Era Revisited
- Reevaluating Executive‐Centered Public Administrative Theory
- Metaphors and the Development of American Bureaucracy
- Herbert Hoover's Revenge: Politics, Policy, and Administrative Reform Movements
- Agency Theory and the Bureaucracy
- Agency Design and Evolution
- Goal Ambiguity and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- Street‐Level Bureaucracy Theory
- The Promises and Paradoxes of Performance‐Based Bureaucracy
- Leading Through Cultural Change
- Postmodernism, Bureaucracy, and Democracy
- Myths, Markets, and the <i>Visible Hand</i> of American Bureaucracy
- Networking in the Shadow of Bureaucracy
- The Promises, Performance, and Pitfalls of Government Contracting
- Reluctant Partners?: Nonprofit Collaboration, Social Entrepreneurship, and Leveraged Volunteerism
- Policy Tools, Mandates, and Intergovernmental Relations
- Promises, Perils, and Performance of Netcentric Bureaucracy
- Multilevel Methods in the Study of Bureaucracy
- Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies
- “Presidentializing” the Bureaucracy
- Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Judicial Review
- Interest Groups, Rulemaking, and American Bureaucracy
- Policymaking, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Overhead Democracy
- Choice‐Theoretic Approaches to Bureaucratic Structure
- Has Governance Eclipsed Government?
- Revitalizing Human Resources Management
- Representative Bureaucracy
- Innovations in Budgeting and Financial Management
- The Prospects for Revitalizing Ethics in a New Governance Era
- Experimental Methods, Agency Incentives, and the Study of Bureaucratic Behavior
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article investigates what prior research reports about the promises, performance, and perils of government contracting. It first presents an overview of the dimensions of government contracting in the U.S. It then discusses the theory underlying government contracting and how that theory has led to considerable expansion of its size and scope in the United States. The relationship between market theory and government service provision is explained. Reviewed are the claims and counterclaims of proponents and opponents of contracting. Next, the key issues and challenges facing government and nongovernmental agencies in contracting arrangements are investigated. The article then determines areas for future research that seem especially important and promising for improving the understanding of contracting and its implications for the American bureaucracy. The boundaries between public institutions and nongovernmental organizations, and between policymakers and the workforces that drive these sectors, are likely to become even more blurred in the coming decades.
Jocelyn M. Johnston is Associate Professor of Public Administration and Policy in the School of Public Affairs at American University.
Barbara S. Romzek is Professor of Public Administration and Associate Dean for Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Kansas.
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