- The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics
- List of Figures And Table
- About the Contributors
- Quantitative Approaches to Studying the Presidency
- Game Theory and the Study of the American Presidency
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Presidency
- Presidential Transitions
- Presidents and the Political Agenda
- Public Expectations of the President
- Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion
- Leading the Public
- Understanding the Rhetorical Presidency
- Public Evaluations of Presidents
- The Presidency and the Mass Media
- The President and Congressional Parties in an Era of Polarization
- Legislative Skills
- Presidential Approval as a Source of Influence in Congress
- The Presidential Veto
- The Consequences of Divided Government
- Connecting Interest Groups to the Presidency
- Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action
- Prerogative Power and Presidential Politics
- Assessing the Unilateral Presidency
- Organizational Structure and Presidential Decision Making
- Influences on Presidential Decision Making
- The Psychology of Presidential Decision Making
- Presidential Agendas, Administrative Strategies, and the Bureaucracy
- The Presidency–Bureaucracy Nexus: Examining Competence and Responsiveness
- Nominating Federal Judges and Justices
- Judicial Checks on the President
- Presidents, Domestic Politics, and the International Arena
- Presidents and International Cooperation
- War's Contributions to Presidential Power
- The Paradigm of Development in Presidential History
- Whose Presidency Is This Anyhow?
- Political Scientists and the Public Law Tradition
- The Study of Presidential Leadership
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article uses the large extant of literature to explore the president's goals and the constraints he confronts in attempting to achieve them. It also addresses what scholars have said about whether presidents ultimately achieve their goals; that is, it considers the question of whether presidents get what they want in their judicial appointments. Presidents may whine about disappointing appointees; and they may fail to pack the courts. But they do seem rational in their anticipation that the federal judges and justices they name can help ensure their ideological legacy at least in the first few years after they depart from office.
Lee Epstein is Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University.
Jeffrey A. Segal is SUNY Distinguished Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Stony Brook University.
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