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date: 23 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article identifies what is known, what is not known, and what needs to be studied to inform better both practice and theoretical debates over the efficacy of five major administrative tools: centralizing policy making in the White House, establishing regulatory clearance and program evaluation in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), reorganizing agencies, appointing loyalists to run them, and wielding unilateral tools. The Bush administration's efforts to require OMB clearance of agency guidance documents suggest that centralization pressures may trump decentralization pressures. In general, this article provides a broad overview of some of the most important and promising lines of inquiry for improving the understanding of the promise versus the performance of administrative strategies designed to advance presidential agendas.

Keywords: presidential agendas, bureaucracy, policy making, White House, Office of Management and Budget, unilateral tools, appointment powers, reorganization tools

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