- The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics
- List of Figures And Table
- About the Contributors
- Quantitative Approaches to Studying the Presidency
- Game Theory and the Study of the American Presidency
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Presidency
- Presidential Transitions
- Presidents and the Political Agenda
- Public Expectations of the President
- Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion
- Leading the Public
- Understanding the Rhetorical Presidency
- Public Evaluations of Presidents
- The Presidency and the Mass Media
- The President and Congressional Parties in an Era of Polarization
- Legislative Skills
- Presidential Approval as a Source of Influence in Congress
- The Presidential Veto
- The Consequences of Divided Government
- Connecting Interest Groups to the Presidency
- Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action
- Prerogative Power and Presidential Politics
- Assessing the Unilateral Presidency
- Organizational Structure and Presidential Decision Making
- Influences on Presidential Decision Making
- The Psychology of Presidential Decision Making
- Presidential Agendas, Administrative Strategies, and the Bureaucracy
- The Presidency–Bureaucracy Nexus: Examining Competence and Responsiveness
- Nominating Federal Judges and Justices
- Judicial Checks on the President
- Presidents, Domestic Politics, and the International Arena
- Presidents and International Cooperation
- War's Contributions to Presidential Power
- The Paradigm of Development in Presidential History
- Whose Presidency Is This Anyhow?
- Political Scientists and the Public Law Tradition
- The Study of Presidential Leadership
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article identifies what is known, what is not known, and what needs to be studied to inform better both practice and theoretical debates over the efficacy of five major administrative tools: centralizing policy making in the White House, establishing regulatory clearance and program evaluation in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), reorganizing agencies, appointing loyalists to run them, and wielding unilateral tools. The Bush administration's efforts to require OMB clearance of agency guidance documents suggest that centralization pressures may trump decentralization pressures. In general, this article provides a broad overview of some of the most important and promising lines of inquiry for improving the understanding of the promise versus the performance of administrative strategies designed to advance presidential agendas.
Robert F. Durant is Professor of Public Administration and Policy at American University in Washington, DC.
William G. Resh is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Public Administration and Policy in the School of Public Affairs at American University.
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