- The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics
- List of Figures And Table
- About the Contributors
- Quantitative Approaches to Studying the Presidency
- Game Theory and the Study of the American Presidency
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Presidency
- Presidential Transitions
- Presidents and the Political Agenda
- Public Expectations of the President
- Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion
- Leading the Public
- Understanding the Rhetorical Presidency
- Public Evaluations of Presidents
- The Presidency and the Mass Media
- The President and Congressional Parties in an Era of Polarization
- Legislative Skills
- Presidential Approval as a Source of Influence in Congress
- The Presidential Veto
- The Consequences of Divided Government
- Connecting Interest Groups to the Presidency
- Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action
- Prerogative Power and Presidential Politics
- Assessing the Unilateral Presidency
- Organizational Structure and Presidential Decision Making
- Influences on Presidential Decision Making
- The Psychology of Presidential Decision Making
- Presidential Agendas, Administrative Strategies, and the Bureaucracy
- The Presidency–Bureaucracy Nexus: Examining Competence and Responsiveness
- Nominating Federal Judges and Justices
- Judicial Checks on the President
- Presidents, Domestic Politics, and the International Arena
- Presidents and International Cooperation
- War's Contributions to Presidential Power
- The Paradigm of Development in Presidential History
- Whose Presidency Is This Anyhow?
- Political Scientists and the Public Law Tradition
- The Study of Presidential Leadership
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article starts by asking: what is the nature of political parties in a system of separated powers? It then describes the most recent empirical manifestation of that debate: does party control of government matter? It also discusses what has yet to be learned about divided government and provides some thoughts about future research directions. The policy production of the president and Congress is greater in periods of unified government. Much of the research on divided government has focused on legislative outputs. The president's use of his commander in chief powers also varies systematically depending on party control. Furthermore, it explores the avenues that may benefit research into the presidency and largely set to the side other possible research directions regarding divided government.
John J. Coleman is Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin‐Madison.
David C. W. Parker is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Montana State University.
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